Bill C-2 (39th Parliament, 1st Session) Committee on June 14th, 2006

[Pierre Poilievre, Conservative, Nepean—Carleton, ON]

There are two amendments forthcoming. One comes from the Bloc and one comes from the NDP. I'm interested in hearing some arguments on both of them before I state a firm position. Perhaps Ms. Jennings will have some arguments to share with me that might be of some persuasiveness, but the existing amendment, the one that is before us, I'm afraid, is not supportable.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

So if I understand the member correctly, in fact he has not made his decision, nor have his colleagues, as to which amendment, if any, they will be supporting, and they're waiting to hear arguments on amendment L-26. Should it carry, the question is moot; should it not carry, they haven't a preconceived decision.

So I will continue on amendment L-26, as I know the chair was going to urge me to do, in his wisdom.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

I'm just trying to keep order, Ms. Jennings.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

On L-26, obviously the objective is to implement the Conservative Party's, which then became the government's, commitment to put into place an independent process for political appointments—what's commonly called political appointments, and what we refer to as GIC appointments.

The amendment L-26, which was put forward by my colleague the Honourable Stephen Owen, would implement this very commitment, if carried. At the same time, given that there is already expertise in auditing the elaboration of criteria for selection—the selection processes that have been put into place—through the Public Service Employment Commission, commonly called the Public Service Commission.

While I take note of the points you've raised, Mr. O'Sullivan, I do think not only that this is something the Public Service Commission is qualified to do, but it would be appropriate for the Public Service Commission to do this, precisely because it is seen as being non-partisan, competent in establishing selection criteria for hiring, promotions, etc., and is also seen as competent in the auditing processes that were put in place by independent government organizations or agencies. Therefore, I do not believe there is another body or process within our Canadian federation and parliamentary system with that kind of expertise.

I don't believe that by transferring the audit function—it's purely the audit function—in any way impedes the constitutional autonomy of this Parliament to look into the process, the work of any public appointments commission, should either the Liberal or the NDP amendment carry, because in both the objective is to put a public appointments commission in place.

I believe that the NDP motion fails, or is weak, precisely because it does not put in place an independent, non-partisan process of audit and verification, whereas the Liberal amendment would do so.

I do believe that one of the points we wish to do is ensure that partisanship is taken out of the process of selection and GIC appointments. A commission would do this, but the audit function, if left solely to Parliament, would be a partisan activity. Our experience has shown that no matter how good-faithed and good-willed we are, at times we fall into partisanship—and I'm as guilty as every single other MP around this table. Therefore, I believe that having not only a parliamentary audit but also an independent audit through the Public Service Commission—which is non-partisan, completely independent, and an expert in auditing these kinds of processes—would be fair, reasonable, and I believe would be welcomed by most ordinary Canadians.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

Thank you, Ms. Jennings.

Mr. Owen, and then Mr. Tonks.

[Stephen Owen, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

Thank you, Chair. I'll speak very briefly because Ms. Jennings has said much of what I would have said.

Let me say that I do think that the Bloc, NDP, and Liberal amendments go to the same objective, which has also been stated by the government, and that is to have an objective, competitive, merit-based process.

Thank you to Mr. O'Sullivan for his remarks, which certainly stated the history properly.

I would only add that if this is passed, the present would represent an elimination of the distinction between political appointments and public service appointments, for the very objective that we all pursue, and that is to make them objective. The amendment is meant to bring the GIC process under their expertise and independence.

I have read the other amendments, and should this fail, as Ms. Jennings said, we will be supporting the objectives and the other amendments.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

Thank you.

Mr. Tonks, and then Mr. Lukiwski.

[Alan Tonks, Liberal, York South—Weston, ON]

Mr. Chairman, first of all, I think the amendments that have been put forward are fundamental to the whole objective of the Accountability Act. So it's very important that we understand the philosophical divergence of the two approaches that are being suggested in the amendments.

You have the Bloc perspective, which I certainly support and I think most of the committee would, looking at the entrenching of accountability in the committee structure for appointments, and that those appointments obviously would be according to a merit system that would be according to federal employment standards. But that's generally the perspective and direction those amendments are taking.

The other route is in the amendments suggesting a public service construct in the fashion of federal experience, either through the Public Service Commission model or through the Industrial Relations Board. So you have two conduits to the same objective.

It would be my feeling on the experience we had at committee that in selecting the committee oversight route there's almost the reverse onus concept, that the committee has to find reasons why a name that is being put forward is not acceptable. I find that a little like putting the cart before the horse. I'm worried that, partisan politics being what they are, that does a disservice to the whole process of merit-based citizens whose names are being put forward, and they get caught up in the groundswell of the politics of that moment, as compared to the professionalization through a public service entity that has and must mirror the experience that has already been obtained through time-worn processes.

So it would be my feeling, and the government side may not go this route, that this is more in keeping with the checks and balances that are the measure of accountability that the government is seeking out, and I'm much more comfortable with treating Canadians through a professional regime that has experience behind it.

If necessary, if at the end of the day there is a question raised with respect to the merits of an individual, that can still be brought before the committee if present practices are followed. That's your safety net.

I can cite two or three appointments that were brought during the last session that, granted, the previous government didn't accept, the sober second thought that was applied by the committee in saying, no, we do not think this individual is appropriate. But at least that is there and can be tested.

To me, it smacks of the kind of natural justice that I think Canadians would want, a fair hearing and merit-based decisions that will be made in a regime that reflects that kind of due consideration. So I would hope that we would support the amendment being put forward either by the Liberals or by the New Democrats, with great respect to the Bloc.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

Thank you, sir.

Mr. Lukiwski.

[Tom Lukiwski, Conservative, Regina—Lumsden—Lake Centre, SK]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank Mr. Tonks. He has captured some of the feelings I have.

I have a couple of questions. I'd like to get Mr. O'Sullivan's comments on one.

I'm not really sure if this appropriate. I think what we're doing here is trying to compare the three similarly intended motions before us. The spirit of all three, I believe, is equal, in trying to make sure we have a merit-based appointments body that deals with this.

Looking at what we have here, I'm leaning towards the NDP amendment.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

Mr. Lukiwski, just to point out so you're aware, there's a fourth one. You're not looking at three, you're looking at four. There's also amendment NDP-22A.

[Tom Lukiwski, Conservative, Regina—Lumsden—Lake Centre, SK]

All right. I was looking at amendment NDP-22 when I was leaning in that direction. I'll give you the reasons why, and then I just want a comment from Mr. O'Sullivan, if I could.

I agree with my colleague here. I do not believe that with the Liberal amendment, the Public Service Employment Act is the right way to go. I'm sensing that an independent commission should be struck to deal with that.

The major problem I have with the Bloc amendment, even though the spirit is similar, is the fact that it would go to a standing committee of the House that would, frankly, review some 3,000 appointments a year, including the judiciary.

There is, number one, great potential to become politicized in a hurry in that process. As well, there are just some logistical concerns I would have. What happens if they hire some folks and then have to fire them? Would you go back to the committee to deal with that? It just seems to be a little untenable to me.

However, on the audit function--and that's my primary question--Ms. Jennings was saying that where the Liberal amendment is perhaps more suited than the other two amendments is that they have this audit function in there.

I notice that the NDP motion also has an audit function built into it. However, the Bloc's does not. I would just like to hear Mr. O'Sullivan's interpretation on the audit function itself and the importance it could have to this type of process.

[Marc O'Sullivan]

In the design of the Public Appointments Commission and in the order in council that created it, the notion was to have a body that would be involved in overseeing the selection process proposed by agencies, boards, commissions, and departments for filling those positions, to ensure that the process is open, fair, and transparent, and that a clear statement of qualifications is made and the people applying for the positions are evaluated on the basis of those qualifications.

The thought was that the best way to proceed would be that the body that is involved in overseeing the selection process and ensuring they're adequate would also be the body that would perform an audit function or an oversight function to ensure that the selection processes are in fact being followed, and they're being followed according to not only the letter of how they're drafted but also the intent.

To give that audit function to a body that's completely separate from the Governor in Council appointment process then raises the issue that, although the Public Service Commission is expert in this field, it does so for public servants and not for Governor in Council appointments. It was felt that it made more sense to have a body that is constantly overseeing this process, from start to end, be the one that performed the audit function, rather than give the audit function to a separate body that's not at all involved in the Governor in Council appointment process, simply because the Public Appointments Commission would be aware of the incredible variety of requirements for positions.

There are, as you mentioned, a couple of thousand Governor in Council positions. The enabling legislation for those positions put in all sorts of requirements in terms of the type of training that's required, in terms of consultations that have to be undertaken, and so on. It is a very specialized field, and the thought was that a body that was devoted exclusively to overseeing that function would be best placed to exercise an audit function, as opposed to giving that function to the Public Service Commission. The same argument would hold true for giving that oversight function to parliamentary committees.

We also looked at models from other jurisdictions, notably British Columbia, notably the United Kingdom, and in those instances, they have given these responsibilities to a single body that performs that function, including the audit function.

So that was the thinking behind this model.

[Tom Lukiwski, Conservative, Regina—Lumsden—Lake Centre, SK]

Just to conclude, then, thank you for that. It explained--if I'm hearing you correctly, and I believe I did--that the audit function would perhaps be better served not with the Public Service Commission but with a body that was set up specifically to deal with these appointments.

So thank you for your comments. You've helped a great deal.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

Monsieur Sauvageau.

[Benoît Sauvageau, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

If I wanted to indulge in political point-scoring, I would ask whether this amendment is still relevant in light of the fact that Gwyn Morgan is not available. However, I would not say such a thing.

Mr. Lukiwski said earlier that the three amendments shared a virtually identical objective. I was going to speak about amendment BQ-32 later, and that is why I was late in putting my name on the speakers' list.

Our amendment is entirely different from L-26 and NDP-22 in that it proposes scrapping the idea of creating a Public Appointments Commission. In a responsible government, decisions are made by the governor in council and the Prime Minister, who assume responsibility for their decisions. It should be for the appropriate committees of the House of Commons to study the appointments that they see fit to review.

Mr. Lukiwski argued that there would be 3,000 appointments to review. Were we to apply that logic to the Auditor General, she would have to audit 21 departments and 3,000 programs each year. However, as far as I know, the Auditor General chooses which programs and departments she will audit. Similarly, I think that the appropriate committees of the House of Commons would know what was required of them and which appointments should be studied. For example, I do not think that the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade would study the appointment of each and every ambassador. However, if something seemed not quite right about a given appointment, the committee could summon the ambassador in question to appear before the committee to answer questions.

I want it to be clear that amendment BQ-32 is antithetical to the two other amendments. We shall therefore not be supporting amendments L-26 and NDP-22.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

I call the question on amendment L-26.

(Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings])

[Benoît Sauvageau, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Mr. Chairman, I would like to move amendment BQ-32. I have already explained the rationale behind this amendment and I will not go over it again, unless somebody would like clarification.

(Amendment negatived)

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

We will now proceed to the Bloc Québécois amendment, BQ-32, on page 170.

Monsieur Sauvageau.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

I call amendment NDP-22.

Mr. Martin, we're just questioning your two amendments. Is one a replacement of the other, or are they two separate amendments?

[Pat Martin, NDP, Winnipeg Centre, MB]

No, I would like to withdraw, if I could, amendment NDP-22, if that's where you are, sir.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

Thank you, sir.

We will proceed with amendment NDP-22A, which is on page 173.01.

Mr. Martin, you may move that.

[Pat Martin, NDP, Winnipeg Centre, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm happy to move amendment NDP-22A, found on page 173.01, which puts forward the NDP's vision of a public appointments commission.

We see this as one of the key pillars of the whole federal accountability exercise. We are very committed to the idea that the end to patronage is one of the things Canadians expect of us as we go through this exercise and have given a great deal of thought as to how it might best be put in place and into effect.

[Pat Martin, NDP, Winnipeg Centre, MB]

I won't read it word for word, Mr. Chairman, but if I could take two or three minutes. let me explain the ways in which I believe we've satisfied all of the concerns—and they're legitimate concerns—raised by each of the other parties as we looked through the first two attempts at this appointments process.

Our vision of it in amendment NDP-22A would have the Governor in Council create a Public Appointments Commission consisting of a chairperson and not more than four other members, and their task, their mandate would be:

to oversee, monitor, review and report on the selection process for appointments and reappointments by the Governor in Council to agencies, boards, commissions and Crown corporations, and to ensure that every such process is widely made public and conducted in a fair, open and transparent manner and that the appointments are based on merit;

This is where I believe our model promotes independence as a concept to a greater extent than the other attempts do. I'm not satisfied that the Public Service Commission in and of itself is widely accepted to be absolutely and completely independent. In fact, some of the public sector unions believe the Public Service Commission performs executive functions and can't ever be considered truly independent.

Secondly, it would:

evaluate and approve the selection processes proposed by ministers to fill those vacancies and determine reappointments within their portfolios, monitor and review those processes, and ensure that they are implemented as approved, giving special attention to any instances in which ministers make appointments that are inconsistent with the recommendations

Thirdly, in proposed paragraph 1.1(1)(c), this commission would be the one to develop and establish the code of practice. The code of practice wouldn't be put forward by government. It would be this independent commission, who would design their own code of practice for the appointments by Governor in Council and ministers, that sets out that it has to be fair, open, and transparent, including requirements regarding criteria to be made fully public.

This is exactly in keeping with the points our former leader Ed Broadbent was making at the ethics committee when he was seeking to have this appointments process addressed; that it's really the duty of the government to set out what the criteria should be for the job they seek to fill. The burden of proof and the onus is on them to say, within the direction of the commission: we seek to fill this position; these are the qualifications necessary; here's why this applicant has those qualifications, in our view; do you agree that this will be in keeping with the rules as set out by this new commission?

That is the transparency we're seeking to achieve, and that's what I think we've articulated in the cleanest way possible.

Also, the audit function was raised quite legitimately by all the other parties except the Bloc, who didn't see the need for an audit function here. The audit of appointment policies and practices doesn't have to preclude the Public Service Commission. That might be a legitimate role for the Public Service Commission. It would be an option: that the newly appointed appointments commission might want to draw from the expertise of the existing Public Service Commission's president, or might want to make her one of the members of the commission. We don't know. Our language doesn't preclude the possibility of some involvement.

A public reporting mechanism on compliance with the code of practice is critical, “in particular by providing an annual report to the Prime Minister to be transmitted to the Speaker of each House of Parliament for tabling and referral to the appropriate committee”, thus ultimately reporting to Parliament, where Parliament, with all of its authority and powers, can look at the compliance with these newly established guidelines of the practice.

As a further function that we think would be useful and have included—I think it's a very thoughtful addition that was brought forward to us by somebody outside the party, actually—we would call upon this newly created appointments commission to provide a public education and training component for public servants involved in the appointment and reappointment processes regarding the code of practice to ensure compliance, to make this part of the culture, and to strip away and hopefully drive a stake through the heart of the current culture of patronage that drove appointments processes for not just the last 13 years, with all due respect to other parties here, but from time immemorial in Ottawa.

The patronage process was integral to how Ottawa worked--rewarding the political hacks from your political party with patronage appointments. It became such a norm that some people joined and served political parties with the expectation that they would get their reward later on in the form of an inexplicable patronage appointment, for which they might not have been qualified at all. The Immigration and Refugee Board--Mr. Chairman, as a Canadian I'm embarrassed to raise it and have it televised here--has been a dumping ground for washed-up political hacks for so long that it does a disservice to the poor people who have to appear before these panels, because they're not--

[Stephen Owen, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

On a point of order, Mr. Chair, I think Mr. Martin has gone on long enough with his speech. He's put forward the principles of his amendment. We've had all three other parties accept the principles. I suggest we call the question and end the unnecessary insults and speeches.