Thank you, Ms. Gualtieri.
I think many of us, if not all of us, in this room understand that the horrific experience you went through has added force to the demand for whistle-blower legislation in this country, which is real and remedial in the way you've set out, but also serves the broader public interest. I think Bill C-11 and Bill C-2 at this stage are a testament to your courage, determination, and resilience in this process. So thank you for that, and thank you for the very comprehensive brief.
I have a couple of questions on points one and four.
With respect to the power to actually enforce with the commissioner, despite the OAS ombudsman model you've referenced, in most ombudsman systems you do not include the power to enforce, the power of sanction, because certainly in a parliamentary system the person is an officer of Parliament and there, in effect, to assist members of Parliament to get to the truth, make it public, and get some remedial action either through embarrassment of the executive or direct legislative action.
The difficulty, of course--and I suspect this is what the government was considering in Bill C-2--is that an officer of Parliament is not elected and does not operate within a quasi-judicial due process regime. So I suspect that the suggestion for the tribunal, while it may provide some delay, is to bring that aspect of procedural fairness into fact-finding and then a sanction.
I take your point about the delay and the need to expedite matters, but I suspect that's what's going on, and I'd like to have your view on that.
The other one is the question that--and you've mentioned it--as a second-best choice, if Parliament or the government is not going to respond to a recommendation of the commissioner, then the government should have to, in a deliberative and reasoned way, explain to Parliament why not. I think that is very much in the practice of ombudsman-type models around the world, certainly in Canada, and that can be helpful.
I'll give two examples where that is used quite effectively: first of all, in the Law Commission of Canada, where its statute sets out that it's a public but independent body on law reform, but when it gives a report to the Minister of Justice, it must be tabled in Parliament and the minister must respond in Parliament, in a reasoned fashion, within a certain period of time.
There are also models in judicial compensation provisions in different provinces that require that after an independent commission makes a recommendation on increased compensation--and I don't think they've ever recommended decreased compensation for judges--if that's not followed by the government, again a reasoned response must be tabled in the legislature and that can be reviewable by a court for its reasonableness. So there's an additional model there.
The other point I'll mention briefly concerns the discretion to release. I agree with you certainly that in Bill C-2 we have to look very carefully at those increased restrictions, or exemptions, really, on release in a number of provisions there. You should at least have a public interest override or consent—at least consent, but a public interest override as well—and also a demonstration of harm, so that it not just be a blanket exemption.
I wonder if you might respond to those observations.