Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to appear before your committee today.
To begin, I would like to introduce my colleagues who are with me — Mr. Robert Benson, the Deputy Commissioner, and Ms. Lyne Robinson-Dalpé, Director of Corporate Services.
I have some brief opening remarks with respect to various issues related to Bill C-2, then I will be pleased to answer your questions.
At the outset, I want to point out that my comments will focus not on Bill C-2 generally, but on the proposed Conflict of Interest Act, which creates a new conflict of interest regime for the public office holders in the federal government.
In general, I am pleased to see many positive features in the proposed regime in which the role and mandate of the commissioner will be expanded, notably in four areas: first, responsibility for the administration and compliance of the conflict of interest code for senators; second, investigative authority to include all current and former public office-holders, not just ministers, ministers of state, and parliamentary secretaries; third, authority for the commissioner to self-initiate inquiries; and fourth, powers of the commissioner to issue notices of violations and to impose administrative penalties.
I'm also pleased to note that some of the proposals included in the act directly address some of my own concerns and recommendations raised notably in my Issues and Challenges 2005 paper issued last fall and during my appearances before parliamentary committees in the last Parliament. These include the requirement for a timely publication in the public registry of ministerial recusals from cabinet meetings and adoption of a formal mechanism by which members of Parliament can refer requests for examinations from the public to the commissioner.
However, I do have some general comments on the overall approach of the proposed Conflict of Interest Act and the implications of this approach. The most important of these is that the new act represents a fundamental shift in the federal conflict of interest regime for public office-holders from a values-based system based on explicit principles to a rules-based system enshrined in legislation, which in some ways of course strengthens the regime.
On the other hand, this change in the foundation of the conflict of interest regime has a number of potentially problematic implications, and I will just raise three.
First, the act does not include any preamble or principles upon which ethical conduct can be evaluated as in the current code and indeed in the current code for the members of the House of Commons as well. Thus there is, for example, no mention of the requirement to conserve and enhance the objectivity and impartiality of government to make decisions in the public interest and to avoid giving preferential treatment to any person.
Second, the act sets out a definition of conflict of interest for the first time, which in itself, I think, is a step forward. However, there is no explicit mention of apparent or potential conflicts of interest. If the intent of the bill is for the commissioner to deal only with situations of what are referred to as real conflicts of interest and that cases of apparent or potential conflict of interest should be dealt with in the political arena, then the current wording of the bill is probably appropriate. Otherwise it could lead to ambiguity on the exact role of the commissioner.
Third, the focus of the new model is on enforcing specific conflict of interest provisions rather than managing conflict of interest in situations that might arise. Moreover, the statutory nature of the new model will require significant legal resources to interpret and of course enforce the rules.
Nevertheless, I believe that in general a lot has been gained under the proposed act. But something of course may have been lost in terms of some of the good features in the transition from a values-based system to a rules-based system. Relative to the observations I have made, I would like therefore to suggest three proposals for your consideration.
First, I believe it would be beneficial to add a preamble to the act setting out the ethical principles that the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner would be empowered to use to interpret the act. These principles, of course, need not be the current ones. They could be a different set altogether, as long as there was some reference to standards that could be interpreted. Then if a public office-holder is engaged in an activity that might be perceived to be a conflict of interest but that is not covered specifically by the legislation, the commissioner would be able to advise, at least, on the manner in which the matter could be resolved.
Let me give you an example. Suppose a minister is faced with having to decide whether to personally approve a large amount of public funds to a business entity in the minister's own riding. In this situation, even though the minister's private interests would not be furthered, as provided in the definition of conflict of interest included in the act, I believe the public expectation is that the minister should not personally approve this funding, unless of course it is one in a series of selected business grants across Canada. However, there is nothing specific in the proposed act that would require the minister to recuse himself in this situation, as it is not considered, apparently, a conflict of interest in terms of personal financial interests. Under the current code the principles of impartiality, making decisions in the public interest, and avoiding preferential treatment to anyone would provide the rationale for requiring a recusal.
Second, it would be very helpful to the commissioner, in carrying out his or her functions and responsibilities, if he or she had some additional discretionary authority for the interpretation of the act on the basis of the principles that might be included and, as is currently the case, for the extension of compliance deadlines where warranted—for example, to deal with a large number of new clients after an election, where there's a tsunami of material coming forward as various new people are appointed.
Third, I would like to propose that a clause requiring the act to be reviewed in five years be added. I know it is getting to be a bit of an annoying habit for many members to be constantly reviewing acts that have already been passed. Nevertheless, I think it would provide an opportunity to evaluate the experiences of this new regime and to make any necessary changes.
I believe these amendments would go a long way toward meeting the intent of the act, which is, I believe, to underline the importance of accountability in general, and ethics in particular, and to provide Parliament, the public office-holders, and the Canadian public with a solid framework to achieve these results.
In addition to these three suggestions, I want to point out two provisions in the bill that will pose some interpretation and compliance challenges. Subclause 15(4) on political activities appears to be wide open on the type and extent of political activities permitted for a public office-holder, and this could engender—I'm not saying that it will, but it could—difficulties in terms of the perception that a public office-holder would be biased in carrying out his or her official duties. However, if the intent of the bill is that any apparent or perceived conflict of interest situations are to be dealt with in the political arena, and that the commissioner is only required to deal with substantive conflicts of interest, then the proposed arrangements are appropriate as they are; if not, the section could be problematic.
The current wording of proposed section 64 on the activities of ministers and parliamentary secretaries vis-à-vis their activities as parliamentarians may create some confusion. Under what circumstances exactly should a minister wear his or hat as an ordinary MP and serve the constituents? This confusion would be especially acute when the minister is asked by constituents to deal with a quasi-judicial body, or a crown corporation, on their behalf.
The last area I would like to mention is that there will be administrative challenges in the implementation of the new act and the expanded mandate of the commissioner. Additional immediate and longer-term resources will be required for inquiries and legal services, as well as for system adaptations and changes.
In addition to the issues I raised above, I do have comments on other areas of the act. Given the limited time available this afternoon, I cannot raise them all, however, I will be glad to provide them to the committee if it wishes to receive them.
Along with my colleagues, I would now be pleased to answer your questions.