Bill C-2 (39th Parliament, 1st Session) Committee on May 16th, 2006

[Carole Lavallée, Bloc, Saint-Bruno—Saint-Hubert, QC]

I do not know whether I have time to ask my question and get an answer.

I would like to ask you about the estimates. I am a newcomer, and I am not familiar with all the nuances of parliamentary procedure. However, I know that I am sitting opposite the undisputed authority on parliamentary procedure.

Firstly, I understand that there are no estimates for private members' bills. There are, however, estimates for government bills, including Bill C-2. If I understand you correctly, you are suggesting that we should turn our attention to the cost of implementing Bill C-2, and ask somebody to help the committee prepare the budgetary estimates. You are suggesting that this person should be the Parliamentary Budget Officer.

I need some clarification, and I think you see what it is that I am not understanding.

[Robert Marleau]

According to my reading of the bill, the Parliamentary Budget Officer could analyze private members' bills. I did not see his role going as far as assessing the costs or conducting financial analyses of government bills. Having read that, I have a better understanding as to why there are requests for analysis of private members' bills.

Personally, and even as a practitioner of parliamentary procedures, I question the merit of such a provision. After all, the ultimate decision to adopt a bill or not and whether there will be financial implications lies with the Speaker of the House. A situation could arise where an entity of Parliament might decide that a bill contains no pecuniary measures, whereas the Speaker could decide that there were. There could be an internal conflict.

In my opinion, the resources devoted to that would be better used if they served to support members in analyzing the estimates.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

Thank you.

Mr. Martin.

[Pat Martin, NDP, Winnipeg Centre, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Mr. Marleau. I want to say how often we think of you. Even though you may feel you are distant now, many of us carry around your book, Marleau and Montpetit, like a Bible and use it very well. So you're often in our thoughts, even if you're not here physically.

I want to thank you for this very helpful recommendation. Coming from the province of Manitoba, since I've been here, I have often found it odd how little time we spend on estimates. We dedicate all our time after the fact at the public accounts committee, scrutinizing every nickel that was spent and often criticizing how it was spent, but almost no time at the front end in reviewing the estimates.

Where I come from, it is not unusual to bring the minister in to a committee in the legislature in Manitoba and stay there all night. They will spend 50 to 60 hours of committee time on the Minister of Health's budget, going line by line and grilling that minister on everything he proposes to spend in the coming year. That has two positive effects: first of all, that's the correct time to give it that level of scrutiny, and second, the minister or his deputy or his technical people have to become an absolute authority on everything that's being spent.

I think this is an excellent idea. It's a graphic illustration of the benefit of giving all this time to hearing so many witnesses for this important bill. This is the type of thing we are getting here. I certainly hope we can agree to expand the role of the budget officer. Perhaps we can ask you for even further detail as to how you see that fleshing out. I won't dwell on that.

I do have a question, though. There are enemies of Bill C-2. There are people who don't want to see it go ahead. I won't say if some are political. Some, I think, are entrenched in the bureaucracy. But first of all, what is your view on omnibus bills? Do you think some of these bills get so big and so massive that they collapse under their own weight? Do you see it a viable option sometimes to hive off some of the less controversial components and deal with them separately?

Could you speak to that briefly?

[Robert Marleau]

Yes, I can, very briefly, and I will give you the same response I would give to the Speaker asking for my advice.

Procedurally, omnibus bills have been part of our parliamentary culture for a long time. Many arguments are made as to why they should be split, and sometimes they're made to the Speaker. In my entire 10 years as Clerk of the House, I only remember the Speaker splitting one bill.

[Pat Martin, NDP, Winnipeg Centre, MB]

Which one was that?

[Robert Marleau]

It was an immigration bill under Speaker Fraser, I believe, in 1988.

First, splitting an omnibus bill is the decision of the government. It's a political and policy decision as to how it's packaged, and it remains a political decision as to whether it will be split. The House may agree to split a bill or send two parts to different committees. That's possible, but it has to be a decision of the House.

I won't comment on the substantive part of your question as to whether it is desirable. It can be a very efficient way of proceeding, but it can make it difficult for a member to cast a single vote on the principle of the bill or on third reading.

[Pat Martin, NDP, Winnipeg Centre, MB]

Wasn't the cruelty to animals bill split? Do you remember that bill, Mr. Marleau?

[Robert Marleau]

I recall something about the cruelty to animals bill. I think that was a multi-party decision; it certainly wasn't a decision by the Speaker.

[Pat Martin, NDP, Winnipeg Centre, MB]

On the secret ballot for election of officers, the Auditor General pointed out that she would feel uncomfortable if a public vote were held on her appointment and she only had a 51% mandate. Do you think that's a valid reason to keep this secret?

[Robert Marleau]

I think the decision of having a secret ballot is a matter of policy, and I can understand the reasons behind it in terms of trying to maybe take out the party leadership influence--diminish the party discipline--allowing the member to make a more individual choice than a party choice. It has its advantages. Having run a few of those secret ballots myself, I can say it certainly has proven its worth in a speakership of a House of Commons process. But whether an officer of Parliament gets a semblance of unanimity to a secret ballot, I think the original round of consultations on the candidates will determine the outcome more than a secret ballot. I'm not sure.

What I'm saying is, what does the secret ballot substantially add to the selection? You're only voting for one person at one point. It's not as if you're going for a slate of candidates.

[Pat Martin, NDP, Winnipeg Centre, MB]

Yes, that's a good point. But even a yea or a nay can be a pretty difficult choice sometimes.

One of the things the Reform Party did when they got here, which I thought was an excellent move, was change the private members' business vote so that the back row votes first, so you don't see how the front bench is voting when you cast your vote. That makes a big difference--watching how your leadership is voting.

[Robert Marleau]

The best vote for a parliamentary officer is no vote at all. I think that's what needs to be achieved through the consultations, where there is massive support for an officer, confidence expressed.

I had the privilege of serving not only as Clerk of the House but as Privacy Commissioner at a time of crisis in the privacy commission, and it was unanimous decisions of the party. I did say to the Governor in Council at the time that if it was not unanimous, I would not serve.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

Thank you, Mr. Marleau.

Monsieur Petit, and if we have time, Mr. Rob Moore--or the other way around.

[Rob Moore, Conservative, Fundy Royal, NB]

Yes thanks, Mr.Chair. I'm splitting my time with Mr. Petit.

I thank you, Mr. Marleau, for being here.

I think today, with the report of the Auditor General, illustrates how effective independent officers can be, the value they bring to our work as parliamentarians, and some of the things that we as parliamentarians are unable to do. When we have these independent officers, they're certainly tasked with working in the best interests of Parliament and, in doing so, working in the best interests of all Canadians to get a job done. That's why I'm taking a great deal of interest in what you've said on maybe some value-added for the parliamentary budget officer.

I want to clarify one thing. There might be some confusion, but my understanding under Bill C-2 is that the parliamentary budget officer is indeed an officer of the Library of Parliament and is, therefore, probably physically and organizationally part of the Library of Parliament. So that may address some of my colleagues' concerns as to duplication or so on.

I know for a new member of Parliament there are so many things we have to do. The estimates are very daunting for a new member--and it's been mentioned here--when you see these numbers coming out. So I see the value to what you're saying on perhaps expanding the role of the parliamentary budget officer to look at estimates.

Can you comment a bit further on how that added role could be of assistance to us in our day-to-day work when it comes to analyzing what the government spends on behalf of Canadian taxpayers?

[Robert Marleau]

I'd be glad to do that, Mr. Moore.

Beyond just expanding the mandate of the parliamentary budget officer, you would have to do some tinkering with the Standing Orders in terms of powers of committees, particularly the government operations committee, and I'll get back to that in a moment.

The parliamentary budget officer would have the same authority and powers on estimates that the bill is providing for on the budget; that is, access to Treasury Board documents and access in a timely fashion to departmental planning papers, in order come up with an analysis of the proposed estimates and provide that advice to a committee or to members of Parliament taking interest in a particular program or issue.

So it's a question of having the same kind of access, if I can say that. Right now, the poor researchers at the Library of Parliament, with whom I sympathize, can only deal with public information in advising you on what's going on. Whatever they can pull off the website is what they can use to advise you on departmental programs. They would have more privileged access under this legislation, as it is proposed, for the budget side of the operation.

If I may bootleg in one small point about the government operations committee, it has an estimates mandate and it has yet to fully exercise that mandate. It's had it now for seven or eight years. I think we need to return to a time way past--the seventies and early eighties--where there existed a committee called the miscellaneous estimates committee. The supplementary estimates that come out in the fall went as a package to this committee. They weren't split among 23 committees. The President of Treasury Board and the Secretary of Treasury Board came before that committee to explain the supplementary context of the government and why all this extra money was required, and it fit in a more global analysis or review of the estimates.

Right now they're hived off here and there, with vote 1 over here and vote 5 over there. That's what happened on the gun control thing. The justice committee was busy that year on the same-sex legislation. It was travelling, under great pressure to get through the bill, and it didn't look at supplementary estimates.

If the supplementary estimates go as a package to government operations and are analyzed by an office in support of Parliament, I think you've got a better accountability dialogue with the government, with the executive. I like to call it a kind of sustained accountability dialogue, and not so much an adversarial one. The more you ask for information, the more information you get, and the better you can judge the efficiency of programs and their delivery.

[Daniel Petit, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for being here, Mr. Marleau.

For some time, we have known that the various people who would be appointed, such as the Auditor General, would prefer to be appointed using what we call an open ballot instead of a secret ballot.

You are aware that a secret ballot has the advantage of providing freedom to the people who are voting. For example, in unions, voting by a show of hands has been replaced by a secret ballot in order to enable union members to vote more freely for a proposed agreement.

In this case, would a secret ballot not give all members more freedom?

Secondly, I would also like to understand the link you make with removal. It is quite uncommon—at least I have not seen it very often—for removal to be by way of a secret ballot. The removal procedure is generally as follows. For example, a problem is raised with the members of a committee, and the board of directors removes the person involved after having heard from him, in accordance with certain procedures.

I am trying to understand how you would be able to remove someone by way of a secret ballot. I know that it can be done, but that is quite a rare procedure. I have rarely seen that kind of a procedure in the organizations I have belonged to. Perhaps you have examples to give us. I would like to hear you on that.

Thank you.

[Robert Marleau]

Thank you, Mr. Petit.

Regarding your last question, I agree with you about removal by way of a secret ballot. It is almost equally as uncommon to see nominations by secret ballot. I would say that there are two aspects. First of all, it is true that a secret ballot gives some freedom of action to the person voting. Others will say that people must have the courage to vote openly according to their convictions.

I am not speaking in favour or against either option, I am simply explaining both. In the case of a removal, I think it is above all important to know who, what faction, wants to see a person removed. It is perhaps more difficult to be removed by way of a secret ballot, without knowing where it has come from, than it is to be appointed by way of a secret ballot, assuming that it came from everyone. So I would say that is a lack of consistency that I identified in the bill.

Our political system, generally speaking, advocates transparency in votes by members. You are elected individually as members of Parliament, and citizens expect to know what your positions are and to see how you carry out the responsibilities they have given you.

So there are pros and cons to a secret ballot. In some cases, such as the election of the Speaker of the House of Commons, I think it is a success. The Speaker of the House of Commons would be removed, if necessary, by way of an open ballot.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

Thank you.

Madame Lavallée, you have four minutes.

[Carole Lavallée, Bloc, Saint-Bruno—Saint-Hubert, QC]

Thank you very much, you are too kind. How generous of you!

I want to go back to what we were talking about earlier. You have talked a little bit about the budgetary estimates.

I want to ask my question again so as to truly understand the answer. Would this mean, for example in the case of Bill C-2 currently before us, that from the time the committee meets, this bill would be sent to a government agent or a parliamentary budget officer who would examine it carefully and see the financial repercussions and their cost given internal government information?

[Robert Marleau]

It is not my job to interpret this aspect of the role of the Parliamentary Budget Officer. As members, you may always ask the Library of Parliament Parliamentary Information and Research Service to provide you with an approximate cost assessment of any bill. This service is already available to you up to a certain point.

This bill contains a royal recommendation. As a result, the government has the power to introduce a bill appropriating public funds. Sometimes, the expenditures associated with a bill are quite clear: the number of agencies that will be created, the staff required, salaries, etc. Sometimes, it is extremely complex, and given the delays that are inherent in government operations, the full amount of expenditures associated with passing the bill will not be known until latter stages of the process. Sometimes, these expenditures are not known until the government tables in the House the budgetary estimates associated with a bill that has already been passed.

I have noted in this bill that for private members' business, a member or a committee could request a cost assessment. Generally speaking, MPs do not have the authority to introduce bills for the appropriation of public funds.

[Carole Lavallée, Bloc, Saint-Bruno—Saint-Hubert, QC]

Exactly.

[Robert Marleau]

If a private members' bill involves the spending of public money, that bill can survive until third reading, but if, after that stage, the bill fails to obtain the support of a minister in order to obtain a royal recommendation, that is it. The Speaker will then rule the bill out of order because it violates the Constitution and the Standing Orders.

So, I wonder why energy, time and money would be invested to examine the expenditures associated with the adoption of private members' bills, when the Speaker will ultimately decide.

[Carole Lavallée, Bloc, Saint-Bruno—Saint-Hubert, QC]

You came here to provide us with some recommendations. Am I to understand that you are recommending that evaluations and budgetary estimates be provided for government bills? Have I understood correctly?

[Robert Marleau]

No. Perhaps I was not clear.