--Hebert and others in 1990.
If it does, then the existence of the presumption in this section of the new Bill C-27, which is...your staff will know what I'm talking about. The existence of a presumption in section 753(1.1) would seem to undermine the right of the accused to remain silent. If you foist a presumption upon a convicted person, he or she has to rebut, and they've then lost the right to silence.
If the answer is no, that the right to remain silent doesn't exist after conviction, then I would also put this question to you. We are asking the convicted person to rebut, to prove a negative, i.e., that they're not dangerous. We're asking an individual who's just been convicted for the third time, by way of a presumption foisted upon him or her, to prove a negative, i.e., that they're not dangerous. I don't think in philosophy 101 anyone can be asked to prove a negative, because you can't prove a negative on balance of probabilities or by any standard.
Those are the three questions I would ask you: the right to remain silent before and/or after conviction, and whether you can, under the charter, foist upon a convicted person the need, by way of a presumption, to rebut a negative. If you want to call me an advocate for convicted persons, I guess we'll have to do that, but that's my job.
Mr. Harris, that is our job here. We have to actually charter test the thing before we squirt it out the end of the toothpaste tube. That's my job.
There's a question.