Yes. Thank you.
I want to get back to a question I left on the table yesterday that we didn't have time to answer. It had to do with the dangerous offender provisions of the statute. I think there's agreement all around that the right to remain silent is a principle of fundamental justice. It's protected by the charter. If there's any argument about that from officials, I'd like to hear that, but I'll take it as a given that the right to remain silent is protected.
My question was whether or not that right to remain silent remained right through the conviction phase into the sentencing phase of a trial. That's the first question. If the right is there, then I'm going to suggest that these provisions may actually breach that charter-protected right because it imposes on that person a burden to rebut a presumption and they have to prove a negative, i.e., that they're not a dangerous person. These people hopefully are all dangerous once the crown attorneys make their decision, but in any event, the judge in this case will be looking at, to quote Mr. Keddy, someone who has attained the three strikes threshold.
So could you answer that, please, about whether or not this would breach the charter, if the right to remain silent is a protected right?