Thank you.
In our continuing effort to hit the nail on the head here on charter issues, I'll ask a question to any of the witnesses who wishes to make a quick answer.
If the right to remain silent as a principle of fundamental justice recognized by our law is, in fact, a right, and if that right has existed in a criminal law framework where the state has always had to prove, usually beyond a reasonable doubt, whatever had to be proved, and if the right exists right through the criminal justice procedure from the time of investigation, charge, trial, and sentencing, then doesn't this new presumption practically remove that right to remain silent? Because if you do remain silent, you're done--you're a dangerous offender, subject to a judge relying on the assessment report or some fair-minded crown attorney determining otherwise.
What I want one or more of the witnesses to say--just yes or no--is whether that change in the presumption practically removes for a convicted person the right to remain silent. Are we not looking at a brick wall here as legislators in trying to legislate the removal of what up to now has been called and styled as a right?