Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Drilling down on that answer, there was some suggestion that in the dangerous offender procedure where this evidentiary burden would shift to the accused—it's more than an accused, the convicted person on sentencing—it might in some way infringe the convicted person's right to silence, that is, the right against self-incrimination. In buttressing that position, I believe Mr. Hoover suggested that there was case law to that effect. I believe the name is—I was going to say Grewal, but that's not the right name—Grayer, something like the cheese, not the member of Parliament.
In any event, it was subsequently suggested by witnesses at our last meeting that that case law was not authoritative for the proposition that when there are shifting evidentiary burdens, silence is still protected, just at one's peril. In other words, the convicted person can remain silent, but they bear the consequences of doing so if it means they don't adduce evidence that might help them.
It was quite clear in the testimony we had from the Criminal Lawyers' Association that it was a misinterpretation of that....
Well, Mr. Hoover, you were in the room when it was suggested.
So maybe rightfully to you, Mr. Cohen, what is the implication of these changes to the right to remain silent or the right against self-incrimination in the charter?