I will try to wrap up.
I would just say that the Singh case deals with the right to silence and it also makes some observations on the relationship between self-incrimination and the right to silence. It's worth looking at.
It also refers to the case of White in the Supreme Court of Canada, which deals extensively with the ambit of self-incrimination protection.
I would suggest that this one quote taken from Singh, which actually draws on White, is germane. This is Mr. Justice Iacobucci:
I begin this inquiry by asserting that any rule demanded by the principle against self-incrimination which places a limit on compellability is in dynamic tension with an opposing principle of fundamental justice. That is the principle which suggests that, in a search for truth, relevant evidence should be available to the trier of fact. Obviously, the Charter sanctions deviations from this positive general rule. Sections 11(c) and 13 stand as obvious examples. The question is whether we need another exemption and if so, why?
I think that has to be examined and shaken down in terms of the Grayer case, which you've been referred to, which indicates that an individual is able to lawfully resist any mechanisms that might seek to enlist his cooperation. No separate proceedings are contemplated here, and the right to silence, in effect, can be successfully asserted, albeit at the peril of the individual.