As I understand it—perhaps putting it with some clarity, Mr. Comartin—Mr. Cooper, who frequently is an agent of the Ontario crown in these types of cases, makes it clear in his brief that he is also a practitioner in this area of law and he's trying to be even-handed. I think he's trying to say what the unintended consequence is. We know what the intention was, but--and I'll read it--the unintended consequence was that:
—a specific statutory reference to the admissibility of victim evidence, may be to suggest that other evidence tendered—is not admissible in a similar fashion.
In other words, he thinks that as it is drafted it would be harmful to the outcome to specifically mention the victim's verbal testimony and not mention all the evidence; someday down the road it might be possible to attack the method by which the evidence was given. In other words, I do think that Mr. Comartin is correct in suggesting this is a valid amendment. It doesn't detract from the intention, which is not to revictimize the victim. He also adds what seems to me to be the very sensible wording that evidence given and evidence adduced are two different meanings, and all your original wording intended was the verbal testimony. What the amendment suggests is that all evidence shall be adduced.
Maybe Mr. Hoover can answer this. If the floodgate argument is in play here—that you don't necessarily want to give a buy to all evidence—Mr. Cooper seems to say that at the Supreme Court level, hearsay and conjecture evidence is often very much acceptable at sentencing; it's not a trial of innocence or guilt.
Maybe Mr. Hoover would be best to answer this. I suppose you're going to throw out the consultation thing, but what are the real, concrete legal objections to the amendment?