Thank you, Madam Chair.
I want to begin by saying that I agree with the commentary made by all three of our experts today. I have two crisp questions for each of them, and I'll attempt to keep my questions very short so there'll be time for adequate answers.
I think, Professor Whyte, you put it well—that the Senate now is generally carefully restrained. And Professor Côté, you put it well when you said that in the new beast, under the Bill C-20 regime, the senators might feel, since they were elected, just as legitimate as members of the House of Commons. So with two competing equally powerful houses and no real system for the elimination of gridlock, what would be the outcome?
The second question is a little more intense, I think, from a legislative point of view. Professor Hogg was here. He's widely respected. He said very clearly that although the vote in the selection process would likely be in all cases respected by a Prime Minister, this would not, however, violate section 24 and would not violate section 42. It is just another way of selecting senators, which is now not delineated in section 42(c). It's just a convention. Perhaps a new convention would arise that every prime minister accept the results of the election process for senators, but that's not the case. And he says this in very black letters, I might add. This is a sort of immunization; a good lawyer will do that, expecting that the other side will glom onto Hogg and disrespect your view with respect to interpretation.
The idea—and Professor Hogg was very clear—is that the Prime MInister and cabinet still suggest to the Governor General, who actually appoints senators, and there's no change because the Prime Minister has that parachute, where he has the right not to respect the outcome. What do you say to that?