Basically there are two things we are doing. The first is that in the context of the emissions trading scheme, every member state has to allocate, before the trading period, to each of the installations in their countries a number of allowances, because the allowances are not auctioned on the market; they are given out for free. So a member state that is way off track, such as Spain, is having very tough conditions. They don't have plenty of allowances to give to their companies.
In reverse, member states that have done a lot in the past, for example in transport, or have a target that's much less, due for example to forest availability, have more leeway. They have more allowances that they can give to their companies.
What we look at in the commission is the balance between the two: on the one hand, the availability of allowances, given that the Kyoto target is what it is for each and every single member state; and on the other, sound, competitive economic conditions, so as to avoid the distortions of competition that would creep in--for example, in the context of the liberalization of electricity markets, which we are going through. So we have these two: the economic conditions and how far member states are away from their Kyoto targets.
The national allocation plans, which we are currently going through, are very difficult exercises to handle for that reason. Out of the 27 national allocation plans today, we have done 13.
You may have seen where we were criticized here or there in the press for having been too tough or not tough enough. The two conditions were economic conditions on the one hand, and the availability, or the question as to whether Kyoto was within reach—yes or no.