Canada-China Relations Committee on Aug. 13th, 2020

[Samuel M. Chu]

I think that in the U.S. and Canada there are some very clear, defined parameters and mechanisms. That is not the case in many countries. Therefore, I actually don't know for sure which countries have an extradition treaty and, even if they don't have one, if extradition could happen to me if I just transferred.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Mr. Chair, I would like some help from our analysts in the next while on that question of extradition and on how we could warn Canadians perhaps about travel to other countries and what would be effective.

I have one minute left, so Mr. Cohen, I want to ask you a question. I read about your work with the four Cs and what we could be doing with respect to co-operation. The environment has changed. Even in weeks the environment has changed. We have containment, we have a challenge and we have to do these things. Are there areas where we'd still have co-operation, or is that era gone?

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Please respond in 20 seconds.

[Jerome A. Cohen]

That era has not passed. Those are good questions. Canada is certainly in the Arctic. Canada needs a good environment. Canada needs to prevent pollution. We need to have co-operation with respect to military weapons.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Professor, thank you very much. I'm sorry to cut you off, but we are over Mr. Oliphant's time.

Mr. Bergeron, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I invite the witnesses to choose their preferred language for interpretation if they are not able to understand what I am going to say in French. I would also like to thank them for their important contribution to the work of this committee.

We are seeking to do an in-depth study on China-Canada relations and so the question of Hong Kong is of great importance for us, not only because it has an effect on Taiwan, as Mr. Williamson pointed out, but also because Canada is a member of the Commonwealth. In that context, the violation of the joint declaration by the government of China concerns us, as, in the Second World War, Canada saw a number of its sons perish during the Japanese invasion of Hong Kong. So the future of Hong Kong is very important to us, and the reason why we are very specifically focusing on the current situation.

During the current health crisis, we have seen criticisms of Xi Jinping, even inside the People's Republic of China. Many hold the view that he is the president who has the greatest grip on power since Mao Zedong himself, and we are asking ourselves a number of questions.

For those of you who had the opportunity to hear the first part of this meeting, we have a kind of dilemma with welcoming activists to Canada. By welcoming a large number of those activists, are we going to weaken the democracy movement on the ground in Hong Kong?

The issue of sanctions raises another dilemma. A number of people think that sanctions would have the effect of weakening Xi Jinping's grip on the People's Republic of China and its people. Others, however, think that sanctions could reinforce the feeling of Chinese nationalism and strengthen Xi Jinping's power over the People's Republic of China and its people.

I would like to hear what the witnesses think about that tough old dilemma, starting with Ms. Boyajian. Can sanctions have effects that are more detrimental than desirable for the objectives that Western democracies are seeking, specifically with regard to Hong Kong?

[Annie Boyajian]

I think that if China is looking to de-escalate tensions, a great way to do that would be for them to start following their own domestic laws and international commitments they have already agreed to. I think sanctions always need to be weighed carefully.

In this case, this is why Freedom House and others have advocated for carefully placed sanctions on the individuals who are guilty of actual abuses, not widespread sanctions that would hurt the Chinese people. I think that's critical to remember.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Would Mr. Chu or Mr. Cohen perhaps like to continue?

[Jerome A. Cohen]

Yes, I'd like to say something.

Sanctions are a symbol and, even if largely ineffectual, they do symbolize our detestation for what is taking place. We live by symbols, but of course they can backfire, and they're not very effective because we know who runs China. It isn't Carrie Lam and other people that these sanctions have been placed against. Can we sanction Xi Jinping? It would be good because the financial sanctions on Hong Kong would affect the fortunes of many people in his family, and the fortunes of the families of other members of the Chinese Politburo. However, Xi Jinping is the boss. There's one-man management in China. Sanctions should be imposed upon him, but they can't be. It's not politically feasible, so it shows the limitations of sanctions.

There are other steps that can be taken. Canada, the U.S., the U.K. and other democratic countries can welcome immigration to a greater extent than they have done so far for the people of Hong Kong, and provide them with the financial wherewithal to make that welcome realistic. Now, most of them won't want to come, and they may want to go to different places; but that's a real symbol, and it doesn't harm the people of Hong Kong.

Anything we do can be mobilized by the propaganda apparatus in Beijing to foment greater nationalism in China. There's nothing we can do about that. That's what dictatorships do. We have to be as rational as we can. I think the foremost symbolic and effective measure we can take is to foster the possibility of immigration if people want to leave. I don't blame them if they don't want to leave. I admire those who will fight to the end. Many will decide, “Look, it's not so bad.” People in China have given up their freedoms, but they have a good life in many places.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much, Mr. Cohen.

Thank you very much, Mr. Bergeron.

Mr. Harris, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

My first question is for Mr. Chu. Thank you all, by the way, for coming here today and offering your opinions and experience on this extremely important issue for Canada and for Hong Kong—and the world, in fact.

Mr. Chu, as a U.S. citizen not living in Hong Kong, you were just charged with an offence in China. Can you tell us why you think you were charged? Is it because of the strength of your organization, though you've only been in existence since last September? Is it because of you, personally, or is it because they want a symbol as well? Professor Cohen talked about symbols, the fact that the reach of this law can go beyond the boundaries of China. In fact, it's gone to a U.S. citizen acting in the United States, not in China. Can you comment on that?

[Samuel M. Chu]

Yes. Specifically, up to last year, before we were formed, I think that much of the international support had been more symbolic or an expression of solidarity. For instance, people hold rallies and there are protests in Hong Kong. They come out in support. They sometimes provide testimony like this at hearings before western governments.

What has happened is that the HKDC was built particularly to directly engage in the legislative law-making process and policy-making process. That activity mobilized Hong Kongers, who are U.S. citizens and residents, to directly engage with their elected officials. I think that shift is a much larger threat in the minds of Hong Kong and Chinese authorities. It's not just that we're unfurling banners in support of what's happening in Hong Kong, but that we're actually sitting down and using our American citizenship rights to engage in the law-making process. In the last nine months we have actually been the driving force behind the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act that was passed; the PROTECT Hong Kong act that bans crowd-control items...to Hong Kong; and the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, which was recently passed and signed to sanction financial institutions that are doing business with Chinese and Hong Kong officials.

I think that has escalated their level of threat as far as what they consider to be influential overseas.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

It's interesting what you pointed out, that there are three specific pieces of legislation in the United States related directly to Hong Kong, and that these are the mechanisms the U.S. government is now using to target sanctions and do the kinds of things you talked about.

[Samuel M. Chu]

Exactly. I'll add one more note. We have heard from witnesses and folks in Hong Kong that calling for sanctions—which we have done consistently and submitted names and evidence, and have talked to State Department officials and others to provide targets and the rationale as to why the U.S. should sanction Chinese and Hong Kong officials—appears to be one of the trigger points, the mentioning and advocacy of sanctions specifically that has led to the charges.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Is the action by the Chinese government against the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong also defensive in your view? Are they concerned that the thirst for democracy demonstrated by activists in Hong Kong and by people seeking to enforce the Basic Law will spill over to the mainland? Is that one of the reasons they're being so particularly aggressive in their approach?

[Samuel M. Chu]

I think that is actually the primary reason, in my view. As Professor Cohen talked about, Xi Jinping is a one-person management. It is very difficult to hold together that kind of total control, and for years Hong Kong has been a place where they could not completely control and silence, and all of it is spilling over.

I think I will even add that it is unusual and different because unlike Xinjiang and other regions within China or within the mainland, Hong Kong has experienced freedom of speech, freedom of the press, all the assemblies and protests already, and they're trying to put it back into the box, which is a much more difficult task than what they've done.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you. I want to have time for a quick question for Professor Cohen.

You said in 2018 that President Xi “wields greater domestic power than any Chinese leader since...Mao Zedong.... Yet there are increasing signs that Xi's apparently untrammelled power is confronting quiet but growing resistance at home.” That was in 2018.

Do you still believe that, and has it diminished or increased?

[Jerome A. Cohen]

I think it has increased because of the world's reaction to what's taking place in Hong Kong, and it's increased because of increasing concern over the crisis in the Taiwan Strait and over economic problems.

There are many intelligent members of the Communist Party leadership—and I know some of them—who are very unhappy with what the great leader is doing, and when things get worse, there's only one place people will look. They'll look at him, and these people aren't free even to talk to each other now. The surveillance of the party elite is so great, but there is great mistrust. There's great doubt about the wisdom of Xi Jinping's increasingly assertive policy.

We should not delude ourselves. We've seen enough in the history of Communist Party leadership rivalries to know this exists and I hear from people, confidentially of course, many of the misgivings that they have. I urge everybody to try to see this movie that was semi-humorous but quite to the point, The Death of Stalin.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much, Professor.

Thank you, Mr. Harris.

We will now go to the second round. We have Mr. Albas for five minutes, please.

[Dan Albas, Conservative, Central Okanagan—Similkameen—Nicola, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to all of our witnesses for being here with us today.

I'd like to ask each of you one question that I have for all of you, perhaps starting with Ms. Boyajian, then Mr. Cohen and finally Mr. Chu. Could you respond in 45 seconds or less if possible because I want to survey all of our witnesses.

We have over 300,000 Canadian citizens living in Hong Kong. As parliamentarians, should we be concerned for their personal safety given all that we've seen in the past few months?

[Annie Boyajian]

I believe yes, you should be. It would be an escalation to see wide-scale arrests of Canadian citizens, but it would not be unprecedented, as you've seen with Mr. Chu's case.

[Jerome A. Cohen]

I think you have to be worried about their security for various reasons. It's possible that if things get worse in Hong Kong, the violence could increase and you could have some very serious violence as you did in Beijing in 1989.

More likely, however, is that your people in Hong Kong will have to be much more discreet, not only in what they say in public but even in their business activities. They have to be very careful and they could get bounced out of there by the Hong Kong government—not prosecuting them, but just ending their right to stay there and right to return to Hong Kong.

[Samuel M. Chu]

The short answer is that I think it should be a worry.

I think, even more, there is the uncertainty it creates, so that people are beginning to self-censor, or companies will get into situations where they're wondering if they can do certain things and if they can speak freely and operate as normal. I think that effect goes with the actual threat of the arrest itself.

[Dan Albas, Conservative, Central Okanagan—Similkameen—Nicola, BC]

I am also concerned that if many were in a position to leave, they might not, because they have family members who are not Canadian citizens or have other obligations. They may not have current identity documents to be able to get a new passport where they could travel as a Canadian citizen.

I appreciate each one of you giving your views on it. I am quickly going to go to the Freedom institute one more time.

The rule of law was one of the pillars, I would say, behind the one China, two systems policy in Hong Kong in relation to that. It seems that mainland China is imposing its own laws and interpreting them with such wide scope. You mentioned your concern about Taiwan being the next area. Former ambassador David Mulroney said that the Government of Canada must completely rethink its foreign policy when it comes to China. Do you believe that this collapse of the one China, two systems policy by China itself deserves that level of response?

[Annie Boyajian]

I do. That's the short answer. I actually think that now is a good time for every nation, not just Canada, to take a good, hard look at its China policy. The national security law, the forced imposition of it in Hong Kong and the fact that it really does reach everyone everywhere in the world are significant.

Chinese officials often like to talk about non-interference and sovereignty, but in fact that's not a principle they actually believe in. They are seeking to set what everyone else is allowed to say and do, even in their own countries, so it's critical to think creatively about China policy.