Canada-China Relations Committee on Aug. 13th, 2020

[Dan Albas, Conservative, Central Okanagan—Similkameen—Nicola, BC]

Thank you.

Mr. Chu, your organization is based in the United States. Today, the Secretary of State announced that for all intents and purposes, the Confucius Institute will now be treated as a foreign mission of the PRC. Obviously, they're concerned not just about the suppression of rights for people such as you, domestic Americans, but also that countries such as the PRC are utilizing these kinds of institutes as foreign policy to influence domestic policy.

Do you believe that this is a good step and that this is another approach that should be studied by other western countries?

[Samuel M. Chu]

I think that what Ms. Boyajian talked about included Confucius Institute but also media outlets. I think there have been steps in the last few weeks to label and explicitly call out state-owned, state-funded institutions, entities or corporations, including media outlets here in the U.S. and globally. I think those are important steps.

I want to be very careful. I think we want to make sure that it doesn't create anti-ethnic blowback or discrimination. However, being able to clearly see when something is state-backed and state-funded is a good step that I think the Canadian government should consider.

[Dan Albas, Conservative, Central Okanagan—Similkameen—Nicola, BC]

That's a very good point.

Thank you, everyone.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you, Mr. Chu.

Thank you, Mr. Albas.

Now we'll go on to Ms. Yip, for five minutes, please.

[Jean Yip, Liberal, Scarborough—Agincourt, ON]

Thank you very much, everyone, for taking the time to give your important testimony.

My question is directed to Mr. Chu. It must be very hard not to be able to speak to your parents. In your opening statement, you mentioned how simply retweeting can land you into trouble. How are people in Hong Kong now using social media to express their views?

[Samuel M. Chu]

We obviously saw it in the Houston Rockets case, where the general manager retweeted something and China literally shut down basketball for a time for the whole country.

In my case, and to your question, people in Hong Kong are still engaging, but I think there have already been signs that they are being tracked. The four young activists who were arrested about three weeks ago were specifically picked up, arrested and charged for social media posting. That is the same charge that Agnes Chow, another prominent leader who was arrested on Monday, is being targeted for. They are saying that she used social media as a way of engaging in inciting secession and calling for foreign influence.

[Jean Yip, Liberal, Scarborough—Agincourt, ON]

It can be difficult for the people of Hong Kong to respond on social media to questions from foreign journalists and legislatures about the situation in Hong Kong. How will they get their opinions out there?

[Samuel M. Chu]

As you have seen over the past 13 months, Hong Kongers have been very creative and very resilient. Even just this week, Jimmy Lai, who was arrested, detained and then released, immediately went on Twitter to do his weekly “Live chat with Jimmy Lai” and is not being silenced. Joshua Wong, whom many consider to be a high target as well, wrote an op-ed for the New York Times that was published yesterday.

I think we are seeing a society in Hong Kong that has experienced and exercised, for decades and generations, their freedom of speech and press and protest, so I don't think we will see complete silence. I think the cost will go up. The risk is already high, but I think we are already seeing people evolving in the ways they are voicing and demonstrating their resistance.

[Jean Yip, Liberal, Scarborough—Agincourt, ON]

Can you comment on the extent to which companies like Facebook, Google and WhatsApp are co-operating with China and the national security law?

[Samuel M. Chu]

I think we saw this on June 4 this year, in a memorial vigil that always gets organized in Hong Kong. Leading up to it, one of our former advisory board members, Lee Cheuk-yan, who is also the head of the Hong Kong Alliance right now, was explicitly banned from Zoom, the platform we're on. Zoom issued a statement that the Chinese government asked them to suspend his account because of the meetings he was hosting through Zoom.

I think that is already happening and a lot of the screening already happened before the national security law, but now what is very important is that even though at this point, temporarily, all the major tech companies have said they are not sharing data with Hong Kong police and authorities, that is not a permanent set-up. At some point, do they turn over their data or do they have a way of providing a history of what people have written even in direct public or private messages?

I think what the tech companies will do in the long term is a huge concern.

[Jean Yip, Liberal, Scarborough—Agincourt, ON]

Do you feel that TikTok is a national security threat, and will the ban be effective in limiting China's interference?

[Samuel M. Chu]

I'm not a cybersecurity expert, but I think TikTok is a great illustration of the kind of complexity around technology, supply chain and data management, and we have to take a look at it. This is similar to the situation about the global supply chain for personal protective equipment. I think what is revealing is that the infrastructure behind some of these technologies like TikTok is not as simple as some would make it out to be. It's not as if they are listening to every TikTok.

The security of the data, where it is stored and how it is used, is definitely a national security concern, because, again, if they are able to use the data to prosecute under something like the national security law, then that becomes a direct threat that I think people may not recognize, which exists right now.

[Jean Yip, Liberal, Scarborough—Agincourt, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much, Ms. Yip and Mr. Chu.

We will now go on to Mr. Genuis for five minutes, please.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Again, we're hearing information discussed about interference in the lives of Canadians on Canadian soil as part of the broader neocolonial project of the Chinese state. I think this is something Canadians need to know about and should certainly become more concerned about the more they hear about it.

When we in the opposition raise issues of Chinese state interference, we get what I see as a sort of ineffectual machismo response from the foreign affairs minister, saying that nobody had better be doing this and that they take it very seriously, but without substantively responding or taking action.

We heard testimony from Amnesty International at the last committee meeting that despite that kind of bluster, the system is very ineffective in responding to victims of foreign interference who are seeking help and assistance, and also that there isn't an effective or co-ordinated response to foreign interference here in Canada. We're hoping to see the government proceed with policy and legislative changes, and to see the minister take action, such as expelling diplomats when and where appropriate.

I would appreciate a brief comment from all three witnesses on the things we can do to move from bluster to action, to protect Canadians living in Canada from having their freedom of speech, their activities and their associations interfered with by a foreign government.

Maybe we could start with Ms. Boyajian on that.

[Annie Boyajian]

Sure, thank you.

I think it's critical. You can divide it into broad categories. There's a real need, I think, in democracies around the world, including Canada, for transparency. Where is information coming from? How has the United Front Work Department, which is China's propaganda agency, infiltrated Canada? What is it doing? That's one step.

The CCP does, of course, understand and respond to action, so concrete actions, as I already mentioned, include the imposition of sanctions, looking at imports and exports, and getting your immigration system in order to help folks. But it is something that needs to be carefully balanced, because you're not looking to escalate things or inspire racist attacks on anyone.

At Freedom House, we understand the challenges of TikTok and other apps, but it is a complex issue. We don't necessarily support a wholesale banning of apps.

I think it starts with looking at the situation very carefully, what's actually happening, and then thinking about what concrete steps would make the most sense—and more than words but also actions, yes.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Mr. Chu.

[Samuel M. Chu]

I like everything that Ms. Boyajian just talked about.

I would add that I think part of the protection here also has to do with recruiting businesses and other entities to turn against the crackdowns and this oppression that is happening. I think what you're seeing is that part of the purpose of the sanction is not just to punitively sanction individuals, but to force institutions like banks and financial institutions not to become explicit, proactive agents for the Chinese regime to enforce and support these kinds of policies. I do think that it's not just the public rhetoric, but it's also using and recruiting other entities as influence to help strengthen the protection.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you.

Mr. Cohen.

[Jerome A. Cohen]

I think you have to start with your relations with the Chinese security authorities. You have to make it clear to them that you will not tolerate any existing interference with the rights of Canadian citizens in their own country, and that you will cause consequences if they refuse to relent. I think you also have to make it more obvious to people of Chinese descent, and others who are being coerced quietly in Canada by Chinese officialdom, that they have to make known to you, as well as to members of the executive branch of your government, what's going on.

A very critical area is universities. We have had in the United States, including at my own university, examples where the Chinese consulate is very actively in touch with certain students from China in putting on certain events and trying to suppress other events, and trying to restrict people from speaking out to challenge their own country's policies.

I think you have to make greater efforts at home, starting with Chinese officialdom.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you, Professor.

Thank you, Mr. Genuis.

Mr. Fragiskatos, you have five minutes, please.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses.

I want to begin with Mr. Cohen.

Professor, you spoke about sanctions earlier, and you've left us with quite a lot to think about as a committee on the efficacy or perhaps lack of efficacy with respect to sanctions. I'm still keeping a very open mind on this committee.

I hear those calls in Canada that have been made to the Canadian government, urging that it apply Magnitsky sanctions on Chinese officials. You gave us an alternative view as to why that might not be the best approach. How would you counsel us as a committee, but also the Canadian government, with respect to possible actions that Canada could take as a country vis-à-vis China?

We heard earlier, for example—from Mr. Albas, I believe—a very good question about the safety and security of Canadians living in China or working there. I also think about Canadians who are apprehended in China. We have two Canadian citizens who.... It's a very closely followed case. I'm sure you know about it, the case of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. Canadians are quite rightly concerned about their plight.

Are there particular trigger points that China would look at and be particularly offended by, or that could pose a particular danger over others? Would sanctions be more of a cause, over immigration measures, for China to say, here's all the more reason to endanger the lives of Canadians in China? What are the trigger points that you see, as far as this particular regime is concerned?

[Jerome A. Cohen]

I think your government should be more vigorous in its protests and requests to the Chinese government about the treatment of Canadians in many respects. I've known of certain cases—in one or two I've been consulted—where the people who feel intimidated by the efforts of the Chinese government—whether to send people quietly to intimidate them in Canada or to use the telephone or financial pressures—don't feel that your ministry of foreign affairs has been vigorous enough in protecting their rights and telling the Chinese government to cut it out.

Also, on your cases, I don't know why your extradition process should take so long. Extradition is a complicated business, but your court system should be functioning far more quickly in handling the controversial Huawei case that is causing so much difficulty. This has been going on forever.

Even though Ms. Meng is living in two wonderful houses in Vancouver, there are restrictions on her rights, however comfortable she is. Certainly, look what it's doing to the people who have been unfairly retaliated against, the two Michaels, and at least one of those who have been condemned to death is a Canadian national. This shouldn't go on forever. Extradition could take place more quickly.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you, Professor Cohen. I can't speak to the efficiency of Canadian courts or the processes in Canadian courts, but thank you for your view.

Mr. Chu, with the time remaining, why now? Why this national security law now? President Xi has been in power since 2013. Leaders before him could have taken action in the same way. What particular set of factors pushed the Chinese regime and President Xi to act at this particular moment to come up with this particular law now, in 2020?

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

You have 25 seconds, please.