Canada-China Relations Committee on Aug. 17th, 2020

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Mr. Medeiros and Ms. Ong, would you like to respond to what Mr. Cheung said?

[Lynette H. Ong]

If I could intervene for a second, I agree with Professor Cheung on his point. I would just like to add that I think the Magnitsky act would impose inconvenience on Hong Kong officials, but I have no doubt in my mind where their loyalty lies, where their political loyalty lies.

Having said that, I think sanctions also serve important signalling purposes. I think the importance of signalling should not be overlooked, but the actual impact could be rather limited, because short-term inconvenience could often be overcome by some creative measures.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.

Mr. Harris, you have two minutes and 30 seconds.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you, Chair.

Ms. Ong, you talked about how we deal with the financial aspects of Hong Kong. As I see it, China wants to show that it can repress the people of Hong Kong with the security law and still obtain the benefits of the financial advantages of having Hong Kong in place. It's a bit of a tightrope to me. How do we move China towards a rules-based system while keeping Hong Kong in the same situation as it is?

I take it you see that what the U.S. is doing by erasing the difference between financial measures towards Hong Kong businesses versus mainland businesses is not effective, but what would be effective in terms of moving the dial towards the expectation that China should follow these rules, or is that a long-term strategy rather than a short-term one?

[Lynette H. Ong]

I see it as a long-term strategy. We should really be working with like-minded countries and our allies—including the United States, ideally—to come up with long-term strategies that would help to bring about some long-term changes.

I do believe that the fate of Hong Kong, including what the people on the streets of Hong Kong are asking for—universal suffrage and freedom of expression—is not a question of Hong Kong alone. It is also a question about Beijing. It's really a question about the government in mainland China. I think the two questions are inherently intertwined.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Dr. Medeiros, could you comment in terms of long-term and short-term measures?

[Evan S. Medeiros]

I think we have to be mindful that our leverage on the Hong Kong question is generally very limited because of the geographic proximity, the size of China's economy vis-à-vis Hong Kong, etc., so as I said, I think we have to play the long game.

I think we have to have modest expectations and we have to come up with creative approaches, which means creative approaches that don't exist yet with the international business community, especially international finance, including banks in Canada, and then think about issue-specific coalitions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much, Mr. Harris.

This concludes our first panel.

On behalf of the committee, I want to thank you very much. We very deeply appreciate your time today, and I'm sure we're all sorry for having kept you waiting as we dealt with some important business of the committee.

The committee will now suspend while we arrange for the next panel. Please be ready in four or five minutes.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

I call the meeting back to order. Welcome back, colleagues and witnesses.

I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of the new witnesses.

Before speaking, please wait until I recognize you by name. When you are ready to speak, you can click on the microphone icon to activate your mike. I should say, however, that once we get into the questions from members, the members will indicate who is to answer their question and you won't have to wait for me to call upon you as they go to you.

I remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair.

Interpretation in this video conference will work very much as it does in a regular committee meeting. You have the choice, at the bottom of your screen, of floor, English or French. As you are speaking, if you plan to alternate from one language to the other, you will need to also switch the interpretation channel so that it aligns with the language you are speaking. You may want to allow for a short pause when switching languages.

As a reminder to witnesses, if you require French interpretation, you should be selecting your English channel on the bottom of your screen, and vice versa if you need English interpretation.

When you are not speaking, your mike should be on mute.

The use of headsets is strongly encouraged.

I would now like to welcome our second panel of witnesses. We have, as an individual, Stéphane Chatigny, lawyer; on behalf of Human Rights in China, Sharon Hom, executive director; and, from the University of Surrey, Malte Philipp Kaeding, assistant professor in international politics.

We will begin with Mr. Chatigny's opening remarks.

You have the floor for 10 minutes.

[Stéphane Chatigny, Lawyer, As an Individual]

Certainly, Mr. Chair. Thank you.

I would like to thank the Special Committee for hearing my comments today on Canada-China relations and the current situation in Hong Kong.

I have been a lawyer since 1992, and I had the unique experience of living in Hong Kong for 10 years, from 2008 to 2017.

In my law practice, I specialize in economic immigration to Canada and, more specifically, the Quebec government's immigrant investor program. I have helped over 2,000 program applicants, mainly owners and officers of private companies established in mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. The applicants have told me how they became wealthy in China and neighbouring countries. In under 30 years, China has become the world's second largest economic power, now rivalling North America and the European Union in a number of industrial sectors.

For all those years, I lived in Hong Kong, a democracy with 7.5 million inhabitants, never fearing the state. I also travelled in Taiwan, another Asian democracy with 23 million inhabitants, again, never fearing the state.

The people of Hong Kong and Taiwan are brave and determined. Like Canadians, they want to freely elect their government and continue to live in a transparent and predictable legal environment that upholds the values, freedoms and democratic safeguards set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Basic Law of Hong Kong and the Constitution of Taiwan.

As several witnesses before me have pointed out, Canada has close ties with Hong Kong, and the current crisis there requires decisive, coordinated action and attention from the Canadian government.

When you live in Hong Kong, you live on the corrosive periphery of a harsh authoritarian regime and a system of government that runs completely counter to the democratic values that every Canadian lawyer upholds and defends.

When I would return home to Hong Kong after a trip to mainland China, I would breathe more deeply, as if relieved, gripped by the impression that, for a few days, I had found myself under a glass dome, in a social environment swarming with over-policed, indoctrinated, neutralized individuals, to whom the Chinese Communist Party allows only a limited spectrum of life reduced to an economic existence.

Recently, thanks to powerful algorithms and a growing sea of data, China has been subjecting individuals and businesses on its territory to a social credit rating system that takes into account such things as online browsing and comments.

Hong Kong's national security law of July 2020 extended that freedom-crushing glass dome over Hong Kong's democracy. The Communist Party of China is therefore starting to set up its ecosystem of repression and hyper-surveillance well before July 2047, in violation of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration.

That ecosystem has led to self-censorship, a protective reflex that, it seemed to me, has become deeply rooted in the inhabitants of mainland China, especially since denunciation is encouraged and even arranged.

A veritable Trojan horse in the Hong Kong legal system, the national security law is already leading the people of Hong Kong to self-censor. Individuals and organizations are closing their social media accounts in a hurry, removing the yellow square and the books liable to stir up anger. The legislation has therefore created a fear of the state that was not there before. In the end, the communist regime will confine the people of Hong Kong also to a limited spectrum of life reduced to an economic existence.

This summer, I came across the January-February 2008 issue of Foreign Affairs, entitled “Changing China”. Twelve years later, it actually made me smile. Hoping to change China means hoping to convince its ruling class to reform their political and economic governance and lead them to respect the rule of law, human rights and the market economy. That has turned out to be a little naive when we look at the facts over the past 20 years.

The gullible and reckless instincts of the Canadian government, businesses, research facilities and educational institutions have at times been appalling.

From my early years in China, I have been hoping to hear statements like the one French President Emmanuel Macron made in March 2019, declaring an end to the European Union's naive relations with China.

Western sympathy for and commitment to this noble and beautiful civilization have endured despite its repressive and predatory regime, have not turned into trust. Quite the opposite is true, and in the end, its peoples are being deprived of a more bountiful relationship.

Since 2014, President Xi Jinping has urged his people to pursue “the Chinese dream of a great national rejuvenation”. The legitimacy and sincerity of the call seem indisputable for the country long known as “the sick man of Asia”.

However, the current propaganda has led to almost fanatical and xenophobic nationalism in a society deprived of reliable and critical information. The propaganda also finds fertile ground in the national education that emphasizes the century of Chinese humiliation at the hands of foreign powers.

Henceforth, Canada must assume that the Chinese regime, in its pursuit of a characteristically Chinese socialism, is profoundly opposed to many Western values.

In September 2013, the U.S.-based magazine Mingjing published a document intended for the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party entitled “Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere: A Notice from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's General Office”. The document points out that the ideological struggle is a constant battle and warns against incorrect ideological tendencies, activities and positions, such as promoting Western constitutional democracy, universal values, civil society, neoliberalism and the West's view of the media.

It seems unrealistic to go on believing that China will change in the way we want it to change. In the 21st century, the greater risk is of the communist regime changing us in a way we do not want to change.

From this point, it is becoming critically important for Canada to ensure that our relations with China, which is now a major global player, do not lead us to relativism or to compromise the form and significance of our own standards, values and interests.

The regime in China has a holistic approach to its relations with Canada, where multiple, sometimes totally unrelated issues might be used as pressure tactics, even when they clearly flout international standards, such as detaining Kevin and Julia Garratt in 2014, and Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor in 2018.

Every time we do not speak up or do nothing, each time we compromise our values, standards and interests, the regime becomes more comfortable with using intimidation. Canada must stop the Chinese regime from achieving its objective, that is, self-censorship and compliant behaviour.

Together with our allies, we need to develop and maintain an ever-stronger coordination of international, interdisciplinary and interdepartmental vigilance and action with respect to the Chinese regime's behaviour. This is particularly so in matters of human rights and interference in foreign political life, intimidation on foreign soil, the erosion of civil and political rights in Hong Kong and Taiwan, the theft of intellectual property, industrial espionage, artificial intelligence and commercial, scientific and educational partnerships that put Canada's autonomy, security or economic interests at risk.

That vigilance will help ensure that our foreign, trade and national security policies towards China increasingly reflect the realities and identities of 37 million Canadians, including the 300,000 Canadians living in Hong Kong.

Let us make sure that China does not change us.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much.

Now we will go to Ms. Hom for 10 minutes, please.

[Sharon Hom, Executive Director, Human Rights in China]

Thank you for this opportunity to testify before the committee. It's really an honour and a challenge to follow the witnesses who offered such powerful, expert views last week and this morning, in particular in highlighting the ongoing critical developments in Hong Kong that will impact Canadians at home and in Hong Kong. I think that COVID-19 has made it quite clear that the impacts on the health and stability of the world and the region will not stay within its borders.

I am a Hong Konger by birth and a holder of permanent Hong Kong residency. I'm also a professor of law emerita at the City University of New York School of Law. I taught law for 18 years, including training Chinese lawyers, judges, law teachers and legal cadres over the course of 10 years, beginning in the late 1980s.

My organization, Human Rights in China, was formed in March 1989 to support the 1989 democracy movement. Within an international human rights framework, we support human rights defenders and civil society groups to advance human rights protections. We have had a presence in Hong Kong since 1996.

The last time I was in Ottawa was in 2012, for the World Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet conference. Ms. Zann's question this morning about warning signs triggered that for me. In fact, Beijing's policies, militarization and comprehensive securitization, including national security laws and the tactics of social repression and control, were deployed decades ago and signalled clearly the writing on the wall for Hong Kong, if there were the political will to read it.

I want to begin with an overarching point. Then I will proceed to a few pickup comments to tunnel down on the national security law, and then I would like to jump to recommendations, hoping that through the questions we can have a more detailed discussion.

My overarching point is that it's very important for this committee, in its report or whatever concrete product comes out of this set of hearings, to pay attention to the control of the narrative. The Hong Kong headlines that are declaring the death of Hong Kong, the end of Hong Kong as we know it, one country but no future, and so on, are indeed dire descriptions grounded in sobering daily evidence of the onslaught on the rule of law, the values and the way of life of Hong Kong, an onslaught that has indeed resulted in censorship, a chilled atmosphere, etc., but I want to urge on all of us, when talking about Hong Kong, caution in repeating or highlighting this partial narrative of hopelessness, especially one that is prematurely declaring a future not yet written.

It's important for the public conversation in Canada, and in the recommendations of the government, that although the right to peaceful assembly has been almost gutted in Hong Kong, Hong Kongers are not silent and have not given up hope. You can see the front page of the Apple Daily for the new Lennon Wall. Hong Kongers online are saying, “We are still alive. Stop declaring us dead. We need solidarity and concrete support, not funeral dirges.” Mr. Williamson's question on whether there was reason for hope was best answered by an activist: “It's not that we have lost. It's just that we have not yet won”, recognizing the long road ahead.

So let's not consciously or unconsciously adopt official Beijing narratives that contribute to the work of the official propaganda outlets.

There's been a lot of reference to and discussion on the national security law, and the general critiques have extensively discussed how it's contributing to the ecosystem and how it's being imported into Hong Kong from the mainland, but I want to add a couple of quick points.

One point is that the new Office for Safeguarding National Security, the OSNS, is made up of personnel sent by the mainland to supervise all the national security work. Not only are they not subject to Hong Kong jurisdiction, but they also hold an ID document of certification issued by the office, and any vehicle used by the holder is not subject to inspection, search or detention by Hong Kong law enforcement officers. There was an incident just a few days ago with Ted Hui, a Hong Kong legislator. He was being followed for days, as were other legislators, by people in unmarked or dark cars. He went to ask who they were and why they were following him. The car hit him and he called the police. The police arrived and tackled Ted Hui, the legislator, to the ground, and the car that hit him, which they did not stop for any questions, was escorted away. This is really very concerning.

The other requirement that I want to highlight, which hasn't been highlighted, is that the heads of the new departments of national security in the Hong Kong police must swear allegiance and to observe the obligation of secrecy. This is not very good for transparency and to address impunity, and for the good governance that's required for the business community, or for the protection of Canadian citizens, for the protections of all persons in Hong Kong.

Finally, we are really seeing, under the implementing regulations for article 43, that an already unaccountable Hong Kong Police Force has now been strengthened in the ways in which it can carry out its arrests.

I'll speak to extraterritoriality in a minute.

I think that Canadians and this committee will fully appreciate the problems of translation. The national security law in Hong Kong is the only law in Hong Kong SAR that has only the Chinese version as the legally authoritative version. However, if you look carefully at the English “translation” of the Hong Kong SAR government, there are errors, omissions and misleading translations into English.

For example, article 1 in Chinese, after listing the kinds of problems addressed by the law, has the term dang. Dang is not in the English. What is dang? It means “and other”. In other words, it's not a comprehensive list of what is being targeted by the law.

Also, in other provisions, gung tung, joint liability, is not in the English.

Also, in articles 9 and 10, “universities” does not exist in the Chinese. It has hok haau, schools. That is a problem because of the whole academic freedom debate now. In what way does the law apply to higher education institutions?

The other one that's misleading is that in Chinese, hoeng gong tung baau is translated as “Hong Kong people”. That is not Hong Kong people. Hoeng gong tung baau is Hong Kong compatriots, carrying all the resonances of the party.

On the implementation concerns, as I'm running out of time, I want to say this quickly. It is as if, in the rush to pass this law through, they took off in a plane and now they don't know how to land.

Many of the procedural and substantive issues, which I hope you can ask questions about, were not thought through or addressed. One of them, for example, is that we have a civil law system on the mainland predominantly, and a common law system in Hong Kong. It is trying to now merge jurisdiction, under article 55, for cases that will be tried on the mainland with a “Legalistic-Fascist-Stalinism” system, as described by China expert Barmé. Even the Supreme Court of Canada ensures that your judges have expertise in both civil and common law, and none of that exists.

Because I am out of time, let me jump to recommendations.

I have five recommendations for the committee to consider, and for the government.

First, all of the recommendations—working multilaterally, joint sanctions, targeted sanctions, safe haven, etc.—are extremely important and have been repeated very powerfully.

I have one national suggestion regarding the Confucius institutes. Recognizing that there are controversies—and I don't want to jump into domestic controversies—you may consider whether you want to adopt the Swedish approach, which is to close them all, or whether you want to adopt the U.S. approach, which is to designate them as “foreign missions”. This would send a message that's consistent with Canadian values and your commitment to freedom of expression.

We are out of time.

Regarding admonitions on using international human rights norms, institutions and values—this is to Mr. Harris's question on how we move China towards a more rules-based system—yes, it's long-term, but there are immediate opportunities. One is that the national security law of Hong Kong is the only mainland law that explicitly incorporates the ICCPR into the law. If we take article 4 seriously, we should look at opportunities, and the list of issues that has been issued by the standing committee as normative international concerns that the Canadian government can use. There is the Human Rights Council election. China is running. You should take a position on that. You can also use more extensively the existing platforms, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the IPAC, of course.

I'm sorry, but I'm out of time. Please ask me questions about all the things I was not able to get to.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much, Professor Hom.

Now we'll hear from Professor Kaeding, please, for 10 minutes.

[Dr. Malte Philipp Kaeding, Assistant Professor in International Politics, University of Surrey]

Thank you very much.

It's a great honour and privilege to have the opportunity to testify at this important and very timely hearing. I thank the committee very much for inviting me.

I have conducted research on Hong Kong for almost 20 years now. In recent years, I have researched the localism and independence movement. I will use a political psychology approach here to outline how recent events in Hong Kong really question the existing perception or, as Ms. Hom mentioned, narrative about China. I think it helps to establish a new narrative on China-Canada relations, which would facilitate all the actions for Canada in terms of diplomacy, sanctions and refugees, which my esteemed colleagues have already outlined in detail during past hearings.

We already know that the PRC cannot be trusted to keep its international commitments. It uses its own narrative to devalue treaties and international institutions. Beijing, as you have heard already, began in Hong Kong, as early as 1997, abolishing elected councils, changing the electoral system and derailing democratization by imposing Chinese-style democracy. After the 2014 umbrella movement, there was no real hope for democratic reforms as promised in the Basic Law.

The question now, of course, is, why this heavy-handed introduction of the national security law, with all these arrests, disqualifications and postponement of legislative elections? I argue that the actions of the Beijing regime are actually driven by fear. The arrest of Jimmy Lai and Agnes Chow, the raiding of Apple Daily, the arrests of the group of teenagers just debating independence—they all, of course, should intimidate Hong Kongers. At the same time, they show the domestic Chinese audience that the regime is very tough on the so-called separatists colluding with foreign forces.

We have to understand that the regime in Beijing rules by fear, but it is also ruled by fear itself—fear of cracks in its ruling elite, fear of economic downturns and fear of growing dissatisfaction in its own population. That's why, despite disqualifying opposition candidates for the Legislative Council elections, the Hong Kong government still postponed the election. Beijing was afraid that it would be unable to bus thousands of pro-Beijing supporters from the mainland who are still registered voters in Hong Kong. The pro-Beijing government heavily relies on the allocation of these votes. Without them, it cannot guarantee the outcome of complete control in Hong Kong. Even worse, it cannot communicate the outcome to its Chinese citizens.

We know that Xi has to be very tough on Hong Kong, because Beijing was completely surprised by the anti-extradition movement last year. It fears most the protestors' radical tactics and attitudes. The protest repertoire, including the main slogan, was inspired by the so-called localist movement. I want to talk a little bit about that.

The localists want to protect Hong Kong's democratic values and unique cultural identity. In the early to mid-2010s, they saw China breaking all its promises and undermining the one country, two systems framework more and more blatantly. The localists were really among the first to question the relationship with China and to verbalize the distrust of Beijing and its promises. Some called for a referendum on Hong Kong's future, and some called for Hong Kong's independence.

I did a lot of very secretive interviews with the entire leadership and a lot of followers of these localists. A lot of them, of course, identified themselves as solely Hong Kongers and not Chinese. The most important part was that they were not afraid to pay an extremely high personal price for the protection of Hong Kong. After the success of localists in the 2016 Legislative Council election, a lot of them were driven into bankruptcy and exile and were sentenced to long prison terms. We have heard about Edward Leung, who is still serving a six-year prison term.

The suppression of the localists really intensified hopelessness in the society. Ms. Hom already mentioned this sentiment. Localists offered Hong Kong independence as a kind of hope for their own supporters, allowing them to cope with the negative emotions experienced through Chinese pressure. This initially very far-fetched idea of Hong Kong independence is now uniting the younger generation after a crackdown on the current movement. In other words, Hong Kong independence is a psychological coping mechanism that results from the repression by the Hong Kong and Beijing governments.

The second thing I want to highlight about the current movement is that it replicates some of the ideas and repertoire of these localists. One key element is the idea of self-sacrifice, or what they talk about as burnism or mutual destruction, meaning, “If I have to burn, you have to burn with me.” This identifies, really, that many of the mainland Chinese—cadres, businessmen or middle-class families—use Hong Kong for their own private security, getting a different passport or parking their assets overseas, because of the permanent uncertainties of the Chinese system. You're never safe when you're inside China, no matter what you're doing.

At the heart of burnism is the rejection of the CCP’s instrumental approach to the Hong Kong liberal system. The idea of mutual destruction transforms the Hong Kong people's fear of authoritarian erosion into a concrete fear for the Chinese elite: first, by creating an unpredictable economic and political situation in Hong Kong through protests and so forth, and second, by denying Hong Kong as a safe haven through international sanctions, etc.

As you remember, there was very little reaction when China was criticized for its treatment of the Uighurs. China didn't do very much when it was criticized, but once Hong Kong was targeted, the Xi administration went so far as to implement this national security law with all this extraterritorial scope, and you can argue that it even legalizes hostage diplomacy. The overreaction we see does confirm, I think, China’s fear.

I want to conclude here with what it means for Canada. With Hong Kong and the U.S. closing doors for China's ruling elite, Canada might be a target destination. If this is not addressed, then Canada’s democratic system will be quickly confronted with authoritarian erosion and the CCP’s political mobilization, like what happened in Hong Kong.

I think Canada should be aware of the fears of the Chinese regime. This is about the narrative Ms. Hom mentioned. If we see that China itself is actually afraid, we'll see that the Chinese regime is not almighty and there are many potential cracks in the ruling coalition. This new narrative would be a good basis to work in alliance with like-minded countries, to speak up and limit the undermining of democratic and open institutions by authoritarian regimes.

With Canada’s strong legacy of creative and very effective diplomacy, I am very confident that Canada has the responsibilities and means to protect Hong Kong people and our shared faith in democracy.

Thank you very much for your kind attention. I am looking forward to answering any questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much, Professor.

We will now go to the first round of questions.

Leading off for six minutes is Mr. Williamson, please.

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To our witnesses, thank you for joining us today. You've all added some really solid and good information, as well as insights.

I'll start with Ms. Sharon Hom.

First, thank you for stiffening my spine. Sometimes my questions are rhetorical, but it's always good to hear the reasons for hope and the reasons why we need to do more, not less, for the people of Hong Kong, while we also consider how best to help our friends in neighbouring Taiwan.

I thought earlier today that Professor Ong had some really good points about Hong Kong still being the golden goose for mainland officials and for the country. This means the territory is not going to suddenly or quickly—or even, perhaps, gradually—become just another Chinese city, because of the wealth and prosperity that would be lost. This will benefit both dissidents and activists in Hong Kong to continue their struggle for freedom and human rights.

You asked for a few minutes. Could you maybe give us in 90 seconds all the things you wanted to say but didn't have a chance to? I will cut you off after 90 seconds because I, too, am on the clock and under the mindful eye of our own Big Brother here.

[Sharon Hom]

I won't say everything I could say, Mr. Williamson, but thank you so much for that question.

Hong Kong is indeed the golden goose, but Beijing does not keep that golden goose on a free-range farm. That's number one. Unless the renminbi replaces the U.S. dollar as the major currency in global settlement, Hong Kong will continue to be important, and not only for the fact that Hong Kong people will resist to the end that they will not ever be another Chinese city. That's important.

Another thing I want to add this morning is that what is good for Canadian business, or what is good for all business, is a rule of law. You need information. The market can't function without information. When you have vetted information, controlled information, and censored media, you don't have a real competitive marketplace. I think we should emphasize that. It's not only for human rights people that we need transparency, accurate information, rule of law and independent courts; it's important for all the stakeholders in Hong Kong.

I want to say that I'm glad you're.... We want to stiffen your spine. As we say—I believe this is also rapidly becoming censored—Ga yáu, “Add oil!” Just keep going. This is very important.

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

Right.

[Sharon Hom]

Mr. Harris asked this morning about how we move China into a rules-based system and about how we get China moving more to where we want it to go.

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

I'll have to cut you off in about 15 seconds, but go ahead.

[Sharon Hom]

I think the question is not where we want it go. It's how we support Hong Kong people to get the Hong Kong government to be where they want it to go. It's not what the U.S., the west, or the multilaterals want; it's what we want. I think that's the question.

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

Thank you.

Professor Kaeding, I thought your insight was unique. You provided a possible glimpse into the thinking of mainland officials. The point you made that Beijing cannot be trusted has some serious implications, because if a partner cannot be trusted, that means they have to be dealt with as untrustworthy.

What, then, should Canada's policy be? Should it be, then, for Canadian trading, to have commercial relations with both mainland China and Hong Kong, but also have the internal fortitude to denounce and speak out when Beijing is out of step, something that unfortunately we're not seeing now? Is it the combination of both trade, which is mutually beneficial to both parties, and speaking out, finding our voice in Canada and perhaps following in the footsteps of Australia and some of the other Asian nations that are closer to mainland China? What say you to that?

[Dr. Malte Philipp Kaeding]

Yes, I agree with you that we can't go back to what is now called this new cold war and completely shut ourselves out, but I think it's very, very important to speak out, and to do it, as many of my colleagues mentioned, in alliance with others so that there is collaboration and acknowledgment that we have to speak together—the free countries, with the European Union, the U.S., New Zealand and Australia—to highlight when China moves beyond what is acceptable in the international rules-based society, and to just be aware that institutions can be amended through interpretation by the Chinese.

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

Right. That would mean, of course, that when you speak out, there might be some blowback on commercial relations, but that's just the price of standing up.

Basically, Mr. Chatigny, you do not believe there is much that Canada or its allies can do to change Beijing. Did I understand you correctly?

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

You have 20 seconds left to respond.