Evidence of meeting #7 for Canada-China Relations in the 43rd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was china's.
A video is available from Parliament.
12:45 p.m.
Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, As an Individual
On the question of Huawei, I have some complex views. I can't do them in one second. The point is that this is an issue of security, yes. I'm also on record as saying that research partnerships with universities should also be subject to some security concerns. The problem of Huawei is also a problem of competitiveness and technology development and investment in Canada. We have to take a look at the Huawei issue from the perspective of what it means—if we start banning particular companies in particular countries—to the whole notion of national treatment in international trade. That's a problem.
12:45 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Geoff Regan
Thank you very much.
I'm sorry. The time is up.
Mr. Genuis, you have five minutes.
12:45 p.m.
Conservative
Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Professor Tiberghien, I want to give you most of this round to respond to whatever you want to respond to. In fairness, I asked you questions in the first round, and in the second round I simply shared emails that seemed to suggest a somewhat different interpretation of the facts.
You said, in response to my colleague's question just now, that in this rare instance on January 18 when you asked Mr. de Jager if he encouraged you to do the interview.... You seemed to imply that there was no response. In fact, there was a response. That email was sent on the Friday. On the Monday, there was a response that said, “Good morning, Yves. Thanks for the note. Please see below for UBC's position on research agreements with Huawei. I hope this helps.”
Then it contains what looks like five or six paragraphs of bold type. That's there. That's part of the record. I would welcome members and members of the public to take a look at these emails because they raise concerns for me about about the fact that we have not one but two people today who are coming to us as experts who are involved in this Canada—China council.
That's a minute and a half, but you have three and a half minutes left of my round to address whatever you like and use how you see fit.
12:45 p.m.
Professor, Department of Political Science, and Faculty Associate, School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, University of British Columbia, As an Individual
Thank you, Mr. Genuis, for the time.
Obviously, I haven't prepared for this. I haven't looked back at all the emails. I have 300 to 400 a day. Thank you for correcting my memory on this. My recollection is that.... I often meet the UBC student newspaper because they are often my students.
As far as I recollect, whatever the formal facts given by Mr. de Jager, they may not have popped up in a discussion. I can't recall. I will have to check. As far as I know, most of my interviews with student papers are pretty broad discussions. They want to know what's happening, the views on both sides, etc. Usually, I'm very frank. I've often been very open and frank. I can look back at whether this was used in an interview. It may not have been even used. I don't recall. It was not very striking. I want to say again that those are....
The emails in January 2019 follow conversations in Ottawa by Paul Evans—for me, it was with GAC—where we heard for the first time that there was concern in Ottawa. I guess the professional thing that we did with UBC in the end was to hold a conversation where, for the first time, there was discussion that involved some deans and the vice-president, etc. It was a professional thing to do, to hear what we heard from Ottawa. That was the bulk of it.
12:50 p.m.
Conservative
Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB
Thank you, Mr. Tiberghien.
I really feel that this is an area where we need to have further study at the committee. We've talked about a few examples of the financial exposure. Clearly, the financial exposure is coming up in conversations with the China council. We've identified two small examples—likely small in the scheme of things—that total $17 million for one Canadian university in terms of exposure.
I have about a minute left, but I'll turn that over to Mr. Albas.
12:50 p.m.
Conservative
Dan Albas Conservative Central Okanagan—Similkameen—Nicola, BC
Thank you, Mr. Genuis, Mr. Chair, and all of our witnesses.
I am also concerned. I know Waterloo university has publicly asked for clarification on who it can contract with, particularly when they are concerned about certain corporations. In this case, I'm sure one of them would be Huawei, although I can't be certain. However, there's a lot of clarity that is being asked for by Canadian universities.
I would like to go to the Canada West Foundation now.
You said that the growth that Canada has seen over past years in selling our agriculture, for example, to China, has gone up and up. You have suggested that perhaps some sort of deal could be made.
I think that would be subject to the new NAFTA provisions, and I think we also need to understand what this U.S.-China managed trade agreement will do to our own exports. It's very difficult to foresee that there are not going to be major structural changes in flows in the North American-Chinese trade balance. Those things will harm Canadian agriculture.
Could you please...?
12:50 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Geoff Regan
It will have to be a comment rather than a question, because your time is up.
Now we have—
12:50 p.m.
Liberal
Rob Oliphant Liberal Don Valley West, ON
Mr. Chair, may I suggest that in our remaining time, we will take maybe two minutes and then offer it to the opposition, the third and fourth parties, if that works for our time?
12:50 p.m.
Liberal
12:50 p.m.
Liberal
Lenore Zann Liberal Cumberland—Colchester, NS
First of all I want to say thank you again to all of the witnesses. I want to apologize if anybody has been made to feel uncomfortable. I think sometimes these little moments of “gotcha” are very unpleasant and really unprofessional.
On that note, though, I would love to ask Mr. Tiberghien a question.
Having spent time in Hong Kong doing research, and having given lectures in China on global governance, what do you think of the current state of affairs in Hong Kong and how it's going to evolve? What are the reactions and attitudes of students in China toward that topic and also global governance?
12:50 p.m.
Professor, Department of Political Science, and Faculty Associate, School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, University of British Columbia, As an Individual
Thank you very much for this great question, Madam Zann.
First, on global governance, that's an easy one. When I give lectures at universities in China, I'm struck that there is a lot of interest and enthusiasm about the idea of global governance or global public good. You can find a young class, at this moment in history, and they believe in a rules-based order on the economic and environmental side. There is a lot of interest in the UN, in the SDGs, in climate change. It is quite similar to what you see in Europe, or to some extent, in places like Japan or Korea and Canada.
I want to put this on the table. When I get to discuss the political situation, usually they aspire for more freedom and fixing problems in China, but they do it in a way that's humbled by history. They want to find a pathway that's not going to destroy China like it has in the past. There is that awareness as well.
When it comes to Hong Kong, I feel a bit of a sense of tragedy. I feel sad. I have a lot of friends in Hong Kong. I was there in 1996 and 1997. I did months of interviews. When I was at Stanford in a legal and a co-operation centre—
12:55 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Geoff Regan
I'm sorry, Mr. Tiberghien, but your two minutes are up.
I must now give the floor to Mr. Bergeron, who has two minutes and thirty seconds.
12:55 p.m.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'll try to be brief to give our witnesses some time.
I ended my last round of questions with a question that I thought was highly relevant, especially since it is the kind of question that our public servants are not able to answer objectively. It's not that they don't have the competence to do so, but, in any event, I think we're beginning to understand that there are changes to be made in Canada's foreign policy, particularly with respect to China.
The question I asked the previous witnesses is this: do you believe that Canada is currently well equipped to take full measure of the changes that are taking place and to adapt to them?
12:55 p.m.
Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, As an Individual
May I start?
12:55 p.m.
Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, As an Individual
I have advocated for some time that we need more co-operation with people who are facing the same circumstances. We can't deal with China alone. Our traditional way of dealing with it is that our alliance goes straight to the United States. The American alliances in Asia are also bilateralized. There is no framework that we could, and should, use to talk with like-minded countries, if we want to call it that—South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand—where we can compare notes on not just dealing with China, but also dealing with their allies and the relationship between them.
We need a structure for this, so that we can be on the same page and be able to approach China collectively, because individually, we do not have the leverage. Of course, Europe is also important, but Europe has its own issues and problems.
12:55 p.m.
Director, Trade and Investment Centre, Canada West Foundation
Canada must increase its capability.
We don't have the research institutions, the non-academic think tanks, that can engage on an ongoing basis. This is a critical weakness, when you look at Australia or the U.S., though it's difficult when we stray from the practicalities and go into political grandstanding and into attacking organizations that have worked hard to help Canada and have worked hard to increase our capacity and understanding.
You hear time and again that we simply don't have the capacity. What we had here today kind of diminishes our ability to get capacity.
12:55 p.m.
Liberal
12:55 p.m.
NDP
Jack Harris NDP St. John's East, NL
Thank you.
First of all, Professor Paltiel, you talked about Huawei. I'm interested. I don't want to put words in your mouth, but I gather from what you're saying that you believe that Canada should take an independent view and decision with respect to Huawei, and it should include business aspects to it as well as security.
Are you suggesting that we should seriously consider an approach that's similar to what the U.K. has taken in terms of recognizing the security issues with respect to certain aspects of the 5G network, but that there are business aspects in which there can be participation? Is that your position?
12:55 p.m.
Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, As an Individual
That is my position. I put in my remarks, but didn't get to it, that we should take an empirical approach to security issues. That's what the British have done. That's what Canada has done in the past. We have to be mindful of our senior ally. We also have to be mindful of the risks. We also have to be mindful, if we want to have an open climate for investment and also the creation of intellectual property in Canada, that much of the 5G technology that Huawei has developed came from Canadian scientists, scientists in Ottawa.
Are we going to be able to enjoy the benefits of the creation of intellectual property created here in Canada? That's a question both for regulation and for universities, but it's also a question of how we deal with this 5G network issue.
12:55 p.m.
NDP
Jack Harris NDP St. John's East, NL
Thank you.
The second question has to do with increased trade with China with less than absolute market access. Are we making ourselves more vulnerable by being dependent on that trade in the absence of a rules-based system that guarantees they'll actually following those rules? The knock on the idea of a trade agreement with China—and some celebrated the fact that it failed—was that we would be bound by the rules through our legal system but they would not. Is that a concern?
Should we be getting that certainty first?
1 p.m.
Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, As an Individual
China is a member of the WTO. It's subject to more anti-dumping provisions than any other country. The dispute mechanism of the WTO is not working because the United States refuses to name judges to it. That's a problem that has to be dealt with. China actually acts in many ways within the rules of the WTO. We do need the WTO. We do need to be on that.
The premise of your question is a little strange in some sense. Either we're a trading nation or we're not. When you're a trading nation, you're, in that sense, automatically vulnerable to changes in trade flows. Unless we decide to go the way of North Korea to autarky, we have no choice but to be subject to those vulnerabilities.