Thank you, Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before the committee, albeit virtually, by video conference from 15,000 kilometres away in Singapore.
I've been studying and teaching international relations for more than 40 years, mostly dealing with U.S.-China and Canada-China relations. The focus of my remarks today will be about government-to-government relations between Canada and China. The overall relationship is, of course, much broader and includes human flows and cultural, business and educational exchanges, but this is an era in which high politics matter and government policies are in flux.
All of us are aware of how the fates of Michael Kovrig, Michael Spavor and Meng Wanzhou have generated a major diplomatic rift and changed the emotional landscape of feelings and emotions in both countries. Trust and mutual respect have been badly shaken. More recently the COVID-19 virus has affected Canadian interactions with China and our views about how to evaluate the competence of the Government of the People's Republic of China.
In the midst of these and other controversies, it's tempting to think that when they're resolved we can revert to normal in our bilateral diplomatic relations. I think this is unlikely. Rather, we have entered new territory, the product of forces much larger than individual incidents and consular cases and much larger than commercial issues like Huawei's potential involvement in our 5G telecommunications network. We are living amidst major shifts in economic, diplomatic and technological power, the emergence of a multi-polar world order and a resurgence of great power rivalry.
For almost all of the past 50 years, there has been a consensus in Canada about the main outlines of a China policy, one that we came to call “engagement” and that at one time involved a strategic partnership between our two countries. Engagement was built on three pillars. First, the closer interaction with China was of commercial value and would benefit the prosperity of Canadians. Second, it was initially important to end China's isolation and later to integrate it into what we now call a rules-based international order. Third, it served the moral purpose of supporting economic and societal openness that would lead, over time, to political liberalization in China.
Engagement, Canadian-style, depended on a geopolitical context in which Canada had room for independent manoeuvre when it moved in somewhat different directions from Washington—for example in recognizing the PRC eight years ahead of the U.S. Engagement with Canadian characteristics overall was very successful, but it now has to be rethought, not out of anger about specific Chinese actions or fear about the hard edge of growing Chinese power and influence. It needs to be amended because of new circumstances that are not likely to change anytime soon.
The geopolitical and geo-economic balances are shifting. China is now a major global player, present in virtually every international institution and proving capable of creating some of its own. Moreover it is increasingly assertive in pursuing its own interests and in challenging the liberal dimensions of those institutions, particularly as they relate to human rights and democracy. China doesn't need Canadian help in the way it did in the past, and in some instances it is championing positions that challenge us directly.
The belief that economic openness would produce political liberalization now seems mistaken, at least for the time being. Under Xi Jinping, China is more repressive domestically and along its periphery than at any time since Mao Zedong. In addition, a new American consensus has emerged, spearheaded by the Trump administration but with broader bipartisan support, that the American version of engagement is dead. It has been replaced by a framing of China somewhere along a continuum of strategic competitor, adversary, rival or enemy. Washington is engaged in a full-court press, militarily, diplomatically and economically, to counter China's rising influence and power. As Henry Kissinger recently stated, this has led the U.S. and China to “the foothills of a cold war.”
As Washington is making abundantly clear in its pressure on Canada and other governments on the matter of Huawei and 5G, the costs of a made-in-Canada choice could be steep. Caught between Xi Jinping's China dream, Donald Trump's America first and a deepening geostrategic competition between the two, what can Canada do?
Let me make three recommendations.
First, rather than signing up for Cold War 2.0 and the active containment or confinement of China, we need to discuss and define a more flexible policy frame. Engaging in China 2.0, a sort of post-engagement engagement policy, is one way. Another would be co-existing with China. Neither is premised on changing China but on finding ways to live with China. Neither locks China into defined roles as friend or adversary, partner or competitor, ally or existential threat, but allows Canadian interests and values to determine the course of action on an issue-by-issue basis. Co-operate where we can in areas including climate change, global economic and financial governance, peacekeeping, agri-tech and the Arctic, to name a few. Push back where we must, particularly in matters related to interference in our domestic affairs and gross violations of human rights.
Second, we need to fight for the rule-based international order at the same time as we promote its reform in institutions, including the WTO, IMF and the World Bank, and through regional processes like the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership. We need to push back against efforts to unravel or corrode the multilateral rules-based system, whether those challenges come from China or, as we have increasingly seen, from the United States. This will require recapturing a middle power identity that respects our alliance with the U.S. but navigates an independent course in matters like supporting the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or giving a balanced assessment of its belt and road initiative, both of which offer new approaches to international co-operation and development.
We will not be with the U.S. or with China in all matters, but we will not be alone. It is worth looking closely at how other countries facing similar dilemmas are adjusting their China policies. A good start would be to look at Australia, Japan, Singapore and perhaps the United Kingdom.
Finally, a new frontier of the relationship is reacting to China's growing presence, influence and occasional interference in Canada. A higher level of awareness and vigilance is needed to protect Canadian values and institutions at home. We need to do this without sensationalizing or exaggerating Chinese activities and their impact, without singularizing China as the only player in the influence and interference business, and without stigmatizing Chinese Canadians by calling into question their integrity and loyalty.
How, for example, do we keep our doors open to Chinese students and to research exchanges in our universities while closing windows to protect intellectual property and national security in an era of technological competition with China and extraterritorial pressure from the United States? Fashioning a new national consensus and a new narrative for relations with China and building it on a multi-party foundation will not be easy. We haven't tried it in a systematic way since 1966.
The work and recommendations of this special committee have the potential to make a signal contribution.
Thank you so much.