I'll give you a quick overview of a few matters.
Looking at demographic change, China is going to hit peak labour by 2025. It has already maxed out in its productivity gains. Currently there are eight working Chinese per retiree; by 2050 there will be two. China has a real challenge with growing old before it grows wealthy.
It has rising debt levels—300% of GDP in 2019—and so China can't buy its way up the ladder in the way, for instance, that South Korea or Taiwan did. China is running out of runway to catch up, which is why President Xi is doubling down. He knows he has only so much time to catch up.
At the same time, there is the sclerotic political system, this Leninist rigidity. There is shrinking room for innovation and top-down decision-making. Bad news is never tolerated at the top. This is why we saw the challenges coming out of Wuhan in reporting on the virus.
We see the rising negative views of China, which are at historic highs across a diverse set of partner and allied countries, including Canada. There are budgetary constraints with a cooling economy. There are rising demands from its population and an aging society. There are serious risks of default on some of the loans from the belt and road Initiative, which would have serious legitimacy implications for the Chinese leadership, which has really sold this idea as the future of China. They're also vulnerable on food and energy security: China can't grow enough food for its population, and it imports half its oil from the Middle East.
I can go on, if you'd like.