I'd say to that question that, in terms of the flow of information and intelligence between the security agency CSIS, the RCMP, Public Safety, the Communications Security Establishment and others, it's very good and very healthy. There are multiple fora that meet regularly—weekly—to discuss these intelligence matters. I'd say to you that, within the Government of Canada and within the national security establishment, there is very broad awareness and understanding of the threats, general and specific, that we're facing.
When it comes to actually transitioning intelligence to evidence that would allow police and enforcement to lay charges, that is a challenge—and that was alluded to in the previous panel—but there are other avenues and tools we can use.
For example, for the service we have our threat reduction mandate. We may see or perceive foreign influence activity occurring within a community or against a certain official, and within the national security community we would discuss that and talk about what the best method is to address it. It might not be charges. It might be the service using its threat reduction mandate to reduce the threat, which we'll never hear about publicly and we can never talk about publicly, but it occurs and it does occur within the foreign influence activity threat.