Canada-China Relations Committee on Oct. 4th, 2022

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Good evening. I'll call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number three of the House of Commons Special Committee on the Canada-People's Republic of China Relationship. Pursuant to the order of reference of May 16, 2022, the committee is meeting on its study of the Canada-People's Republic of China relations.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the House order of June 23, 2022. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application. I have a couple of comments for the benefit of the witnesses and members.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your microphone and please mute yourself when you're not speaking. For interpretation for those on Zoom, you have the choice at the bottom of your screen of floor, English or French. Those in the room can use the earpiece and select the desired channel. All comments should be addressed through the chair.

For members in the room, if you wish to speak, please raise your hand. For members on Zoom, please use the “raise hand” function. The clerk and I will manage the speaking order as best we can, and we appreciate your patience and understanding in this regard.

We have a couple of people filling in.

Mr. Viersen, it's good to see you here. You are here for Mr. Chong, I presume.

Ms. Dancho is over there. That's good. There's Ms. Yip, with a flash of dust and a cloud of light.

Now that we are all here, I'd like to welcome our witnesses for the first half of the meeting.

From the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, we have Jean-Marc Gionet, the director general of immigration program guidance, by video conference. We have Glen Linder, the director general of social and temporary migration, by video conference.

From the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, we have Paul Thoppil, assistant deputy minister, Asia-Pacific; Jay Allen, director general, trade negotiations, by video conference; Weldon Epp, director general, trade and diplomacy, north Asia; Doug Forsyth, director general, market access and chief negotiator, by video conference; and Jennie Chen, executive director, greater China political and coordination.

From the Department of National Defence, we have Brigadier-General Eric Laforest, director general of operations, strategic joint staff, by video conference.

The first five-minute statement will be done by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development.

The floor is yours.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

A point of order, Mr. Chair.

I see there are witnesses participating by videoconference. I just want to make sure that the tests were done and were conclusive.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

I'm sorry. You'll have to repeat that, sir. My headset wasn't working properly.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Mr. Chair, I just want to make sure that the tests were done and were conclusive.

[The Clerk of the Committee, Ms. Nancy Vohl]

Yes.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Yes, for everybody but the chair, it would seem. Thank you.

The Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development has the floor for five minutes.

[Paul Thoppil, Assistant Deputy Minister, Asia Pacific, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Mr. Chair, members of the committee, I am grateful for the opportunity to provide you an update on Canada-China relations.

Much has changed since this committee last met in June 2021. China's efforts to shape the rules-based international order in ways contrary to Canada's interests have only accelerated in that period, but the government's approach to China has consistently followed the four Cs of challenge, co-operate, compete and coexist.

I will convey my update within that framework.

First is challenge.

We recently celebrated the one-year anniversary of the return of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. Since their return, Canada has taken important decisions, including a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Olympic Games and our decision on 5G.

Canada remains concerned with and will continue to challenge China's activities that undermine international principles and rules, including recent escalations of cross-strait tensions and the PLA's unsafe conduct with Canadian military aircraft. The safety of Canadians in China remains an important priority in our bilateral relationship. Canada will always advocate for Canadians detained in China. The safety of Canadian citizens and residents in Canada is equally important. We, therefore, note recent reports of foreign interference activities in Canada and are working with relevant partners on next steps.

The UN report on Xinjiang underscores our long-standing concerns regarding China's human rights violations against Uighurs and other Muslim ethnic minorities. We note with great concern its assessment that China's actions may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity. Canada will continue to challenge China to uphold its human rights obligations and respond to the report's recommendations.

Canada is also concerned with the human rights situation in Tibet and in Hong Kong, and with the rights of Falun Gong practitioners and other religious minorities.

Second is co-operation.

Advancing Canadian interests requires diplomacy with China. In that regard, we have carefully re-opened official channels of communication with China. Minister Joly held two meetings with Foreign Minister Wang Yi, including in person at the G20 in July. Canada has used these meetings for frank exchanges on bilateral and global challenges.

The recent appointment of Canada’s new Ambassador to China, Jennifer May, will facilitate ongoing diplomatic efforts. We are also cooperating on shared global interests, as Canada and China will welcome thousands of delegates from around the world to Montreal in December for COP15.

Third is compete.

Our embassy and consulates work hard to ensure the viability of our commercial relationship so that Canadian companies can continue to benefit from opportunities in China, while maintaining competitiveness and mitigating risks to Canada's national security. We support their efforts to diversify beyond China to ensure supply chain security. We are working bilaterally and with partners, including at the WTO, to address market access barriers and other uncompetitive policies.

We're concerned that, instead of defending Ukraine's sovereignty, China appears not only to embrace the view that international rules and norms don't apply to “great powers” in their spheres of influence, but also to offer a competing vision for global governance. Canada, like most nations, defends a competing view that rules and norms apply equally to all states.

And last, there is coexist. Our longstanding people-to-people ties remain important, as Chinese diaspora communities are integral to the multicultural fabric of our society. Unfortunately, we witnessed an increase of anti-Asian racism during the COVID-19 pandemic, which we denounce in the strongest possible terms.

As Canada navigates the complexities of coexisting with China, we will respond to emerging challenges and opportunities and will always be willing to pursue co-operation and dialogue with China.

Thank you very much, Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you very much, Mr. Thoppil.

We'll now go to Brigadier-General Eric Laforest, director general of operations, strategic joint staff, for his five-minute statement.

[Brigadier-General Éric Laforest, Director General of Operations, Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence]

Mr. Chair and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide you with another update this week, this time, on the situation in the Indo-Pacific region.

I am Brigadier-General Éric Laforest, Director General of Operations, with the Strategic Joint Staff at Defence Headquarters here in Ottawa. My role is to provide decision-making support to the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Eyre, with respect to military strategy, operational planning, and operations of the Canadian Forces.

My Global Affairs colleagues have already discussed the geopolitical strategic context. I wish to also add that, from a defence perspective, we are deeply concerned by China's increasingly assertive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific.

In recent years, China has transformed its military into a modern force with an ever-expanding regional reach in the Indo-Pacific. As its capabilities have grown, China is increasingly turning to the military to support its national objectives. Following the recent U.S. congressional visit to Taiwan, China staged a range of military exercises around the island, including ballistic missiles fired over the island for the first time, as part of a coercive messaging campaign to signal Beijing's extreme displeasure over the visit.

[BGen Éric Laforest]

This is just one example of how China’s actions have heightened tension in the Indo-Pacific and undermined the rules-based international order.

Now, given my role as the Director General for Operations, I want to speak to you about the Canadian Armed Forces operations in the region.

Canada, as a Pacific nation, has a vested interest in ensuring a peaceful, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. Indeed, the Canadian Armed Forces plays a vital role in promoting Canadian interests and values and contributing to a more peaceful, prosperous world, including in this region. The CAF does this by maintaining a near-persistent presence in the Indo-Pacific, with significant and growing contributions to the region, including the deployment of military ships, aircraft and personnel. These contributions support Canada's participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises with allies and partners, contribute to the multinational efforts that promote peace and security in the Indo-Pacific and advance partnerships through defence diplomacy.

The two major operations the CAF contributes to the Indo-Pacific region are Operation Projection and Operation Neon. Under Operation Projection, the Royal Canadian Navy deploys warships to the Indo-Pacific region to responsibly engage with our allies and partners through joint missions and exercises. This forward naval presence operation also supports defence diplomacy, allowing, therefore, the CAF to conduct port visits, co-operative deployments and international naval exercises with important regional partner nations including Australia, New Zealand and Japan, as well as a host of our Association of Southeast Asian Nation partners. These port visits are a cornerstone of the CAF defence engagement in the region and are critical to strengthening valuable partnerships. They are also a tangible and visible demonstration of Canada's commitment to increasing its presence and activities in the Indo-Pacific.

Following their participation in RIMPAC, a large, multinational, naval exercise in Hawaii in August, Royal Canadian Navy’s Ships Vancouver and Winnipeg continue to operate in the Indo-Pacific, where they will remain deployed until December 2022, on Operation Projection and Operation Neon.

As part of Op Projection, Vancouver and Winnipeg are participating in bilateral and multinational training exercises and engaging with regional militaries and other international security partners in order to reinforce collective defence and promote stability in the region. The two frigates sailed across the Pacific together to Hawaii, and are now sailing in the international waters of the Indo-Pacific region, both independently and as part of cooperative deployments with allied and partner nations.

Following port visits and exercises in the region, HMCS Vancouver sailed through the waters of the Taiwan Strait on September 19, along with the USS Higgins, on their way to Operation Neon's area of operation in the East China Sea. This sail was done in full accordance with international law, including high seas navigation rights as outlined in UNCLOS.

Through Operation Neon now, the CAF deploys ships and aircraft in support of a coordinated, multinational effort to support the implementation of the United Nations Security Council sanctions imposed against North Korea. Both these ships and aircraft, equipped with an array of sensors, are able to identify ship-to-ship transfers being conducted in violation of the United Nations Security Council sanctions imposed against North Korea. This contribution bolsters the integrity of the global sanctions' regime against North Korea, demonstrates Canada's commitment to being a reliable, credible partner to our Pacific partners, and promotes regional security and the rules-based international order.

I would like to share one example which I think demonstrates the value of the Canadian Armed Forces’ contributions to the Government of Canada’s objectives in the Indo-Pacific, and which is truly a success of this mission, and that is the deepening of the Canada-Japan bilateral relationship.

While Canada and Japan have long shared...

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Excuse me, Brigadier General, we've gone a little over time on your presentation. We'll hold that thought, and perhaps you'll have an opportunity to mention it in response to the questions we'll have.

Thank you for that.

[BGen Éric Laforest]

Yes, sir.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Next we will hear from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development.

Your five-minute statement begins now. Thank you.

[Glen Linder, Director General, Social and Temporary Migration, Department of Citizenship and Immigration]

I'm sorry, Mr. Chair. It's the Department of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, but I can start straightaway if that works for you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Yes, please. Thank you.

[Glen Linder]

Mr. Chair, members of the committee, thank you for inviting asking us to join you this evening.

My name is Glen Linder, and I am Director General of Social and Temporary Migration Policy at the Department of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship. Accompanying me is my colleague, Jean-Marc Gionet, Director General of Immigration Program Guidance.

I am going to use these opening remarks to give the Committee a snapshot of recent trends in migration to Canada of foreign nationals who hold Peoples’ Republic of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwanese passports. I will then give the Committee some recent metrics with respect to the special measures we put in place in 2021 for the benefit of Hong Kongers.

In terms of our footprint on the ground, IRCC has contracted Visa Application Centres in 11 cities in mainland China, one in Hong Kong, and one in Taiwan. These Visa Application Centres facilitate visa applications from clients, take the biometrics of our clients to enable them to be vetted, and submit the applications for review by IRCC officers.

Canada remains a destination of choice for clients from China. The numbers of applicants for both our permanent and temporary resident pathways have rebounded to prepandemic levels, and our final numbers for 2021 generally show that we are at about the same levels as we received in 2019.

China is the second top source country for new permanent residents to Canada, the second-largest international student source country and the third-largest source of tourism. In terms of actual numbers with respect to permanent resident applications, from China we processed 12,753 in 2021 compared to 14,500 in 2019 and from Taiwan, 1,571 in 2021 compared to 1,063 in 2019.

With respect to Hong Kong, we have seen significantly increased interest in Canada. For example, study permit applications increased from 1,499 in 2019 to 7,755 in 2021, while work permit applications increased from 1,800 in 2019 to 12,362 in 2021.

I will now turn in greater detail to these special measures for Hong Kong, all of which remain in place. On February 8, 2021, Canada put in place a special measure that allows Hong Kongers who have completed post-secondary studies in the last five years to access an open work permit for Canada. On June 8, 2021, this measure was expanded to allow access to a work permit to those with graduate or post-graduate studies where the program length is a minimum of one year and where a post-secondary degree or diploma is a prerequisite. As of June 30, 2022, a total of close to 17,000 individuals from Hong Kong had applied for this measure.

In addition to this temporary resident pathway, Canada also put in place two special pathways to permanent residence for Hong Kongers, effective June 1, 2021. The first pathway targets former Hong Kong residents who have gained a minimum of one year of full-time authorized work experience in Canada in the last three years and graduated in or outside Canada in the past five years with a degree or diploma. The second pathway is for those who have graduated from a post-secondary institution in Canada in the past three years with a degree or diploma. At least 50% of the program of study must have been completed while physically present in Canada. As of June 30, 2022, 1,851 individuals have applied for permanent residence in Canada under these two pathways.

Finally, I'd like to note that foreign nationals in Canada, including Hong Kong residents, continue to have access to our asylum system. Those with eligible asylum claims are referred to the Immigration and Refugee Board, which hears and decides claims for refugee protection made in Canada.

Thank you again, Mr. Chair, for asking us to join you today. We would be happy to take your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you very much, Mr. Linder.

We'll now go to our first round of questioning. For six minutes, we have Mr. Chong.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My first question is for the Department of National Defence and Brigadier-General Laforest.

The budget announced a defence policy review to update the existing defence policy. When will that be completed?

[BGen Éric Laforest]

I cannot at this moment express the timeline on the situation with the DPU. This is not within my area of responsibility. The update will focus, obviously, on the size and capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces, their roles and responsibilities. The work is ongoing.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Yes, that was in the budget: size and capabilities, roles, responsibilities and resources.

Is there coordination between the Department of National Defence and Global Affairs with respect to the development of this particular defence policy review?

[BGen Éric Laforest]

I will turn to my colleagues from Global Affairs Canada to reply as well, but that is definitely a whole-of-government affair for sure.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Is Global Affairs coordinating with DND on both the development of the Indo-Pacific strategy and the defence review?

[Paul Thoppil]

I can confirm there are very close conversations and discussions going on to ensure alignment between DND, its defence policy update and the development of the Indo-Pacific strategy.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

I assume that the defence policy will follow the Indo-Pacific strategy policy in the Indo-Pacific region. I'm assuming the component of the defence policy on the Indo-Pacific will follow from the Indo-Pacific strategy developed by Global Affairs.

[Paul Thoppil]

It will be up to the government to determine the appropriate sequencing when it rolls it out. I know that Minister Joly has made a firm commitment to release the Indo-Pacific strategy later this fall.