I've been really wrong in my long career on certain things, particularly the Soviet Union. I could see the cracks in the wall. I thought it was all going to come down. I thought it was going to take 50 years. Eighteen months after I left my mission, it had all collapsed. Take that as a warning. I have no magic crystal ball.
I actually thought that the Chinese reaction was much milder than I'd expected and many people had thought, which tells me something, I think, about their willingness to pull a trigger in the near future. I thought it was relatively mild. They fly jets almost every day that are within sight of the island. I didn't see the strong reaction, and they have lots of tools that they can bring to bear—not just an actual invasion but all sorts of grey areas, boycotts and shutting Taiwan out of markets. Taiwan's main market for their goods is still the PRC.
Looking into the future, I think the Ukraine may have been a bit of a warning. When you start a war, it's not easy necessarily to conclude it. It doesn't necessarily conclude in a time frame you wish or in a manner that you would hope for. An opposed maritime landing is one of the most difficult military exercises conceivable. There's no defence in the medium term—let's say a few weeks into a conflict—without direct U.S. assistance. However, I think that also brings in another factor. Are Xi Jinping and the Chinese willing to engage in a potential open military conflict with the United States?
The number one job of the Communist Party of China is to stay in power. Yes, on that short list is unification, welcoming Taiwan back into the embrace of the motherland. However, it's not number one—the party maintains power. Number two would be, then, how they do that—mainly economic means.
Yes, they want to do it. If there was a moment of weakness, as my friends have suggested, they might lunge forward. However, we're not there yet. I think right now, actually, a working relationship of some fashion with the United States—reducing the risk of open conflict and maintaining market access and a stable global economy—is more important than bringing back Taiwan right now.
Xi is in the position where he can redefine those goals at any given time. It's really up to him and the Chinese media, and they have a big role in shaping public opinion. He's not saying in 12 months or in 24 months. Obviously he would like to do it sooner rather than later, but I see hesitation and caution.