Chair, vice-chairs and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today and for your service to democracy. This is an excellent committee. It's very inspiring.
I'm going to begin by explaining very broadly how I think the Chinese Communist Party looks at the world. With that in mind, I'll offer some suggestions for how Canada might like to engage in one specific area.
To understand CCP strategies, it helps to note two terms that are common in PRC think tanks. The first is comprehensive national power, abbreviated to CNP.
China's Ministry of State Security-like think tank describes CNP as “the sum total of the powers or strengths of a country in economy, military affairs, science and technology, education and resources, and its influence.” It is a very broad definition. Adopted by Beijing in the 1990s, PRC researchers obsessively calculate every country's comprehensive national power score. As Captain Moreland, who served as U.S. Coast Guard liaison to Beijing, explained, “For the Chinese Communist Party, Comprehensive National Power as measured by a CNP score is a goal in itself and pursuit of CNP justifies just about anything.”
Apart from the continued survival of the CCP, the main goal of the CCP is for China to be number one in the world in comprehensive national power. Given that rankings are relative, that can be achieved either through out-competing others or by knocking others down and then comparatively being in a better position.
One way the PRC works to increase its own comprehensive national power while decreasing that of others is through unrestricted warfare. That's the second PRC term to remember. A 1999 book by the same name was written by two People's Liberation Army, PLA, air force colonels. It details a “no rules apply” approach to targeting an enemy. This doesn't mean actual fighting is neglected. Actual fighting is just one of a very wide range of weapons in the tool kit that the PRC employs, guided by perceptions of efficacity rather than morality or law.
The colonels' book details 24 different warfares, including legal warfare, which we know as lawfare; media warfare; and drug warfare. As an example, drug warfare can mean either taking control of medical supply chains to increase your comprehensive national power relative to a country that relies on you for pharmaceuticals, or pumping fentanyl into target countries to weaken them and their comprehensive national power from the inside.
The Chinese Communist Party uses unrestricted warfare to increase its relative comprehensive national power. It is the concept that connects the dots of everything from the artificial islands in the South China Sea to the BRI to getting Canadian teenagers addicted to TikTok.
What does this mean for Canadian global engagement? First, it's an acknowledgement that any good plan, something that bolsters a country's resilience and serenity, will be seen by Beijing as a loss to the PRC's comprehensive national power score and is likely to be attacked. That means anything you try to build should include a plan to protect it and block malign influence. We need a “block and build” approach.
As for Canadian engagement, let's look at one geographic area, Oceania, including the Pacific Islands. This is the contested strategic front line between Asia and the Americas. If China gains control, it can box in Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and Australia, and push America back to Hawaii, as Imperial Japan tried to do through its control of its islands during World War II. Conversely, if democracies flourish, it means the survival of a free and open Indo-Pacific. The stakes couldn't be higher.
In this context, there are broadly three ways for Canada to engage internationally. First is by bolting onto existing multilateral fora, such as the Pacific Islands Forum. Second is by joining a new consortium early enough to shape its development from the start. For example, this would have happened if we had joined Quad or AUKUS. Third is bilaterally, people to people, ideally through specific Canadian strengths.
While all three are important, it might be helpful to spend more time on bilaterals, though they are often last on the list. It would show partners that Canada isn't just a weaker version of Australia but has something special to offer.
For example, there are cultural and historical linkages between the Polynesians and some first nations, specifically the Haida. First nation and Inuit leaders know and understand the challenges of tight-knit communities living in relatively isolated locations, in many cases with complex communal land laws. A knowledge exchange program between them and the people of Oceania would be groundbreaking and would build trust and resilience, something few, including the CCP, can offer.
Another potential advantage for Canada is language. Some of the Pacific Islands speak English, some French. There's limited crossover between English and French analyses. Canada, in particular Quebec, could set up a global centre for excellence for bilingual Oceania analysis that could host visiting scholars from the region, as well as from the U.S., Japan, India and elsewhere. As an additional bonus, French citizens could study for graduate degrees in Quebec at the same rates Quebeckers pay. Students from French Polynesia and New Caledonia are already studying in Quebec. Quebec's proximity to Washington and the United Nations in New York is also a benefit. This is the sort of approach that can explain to the world “why Canada”.
The CCP will not stop in its attempts to increase its comprehensive national power, including by using unrestricted warfare. To ensure democracy continues to flourish in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, we need to block and build, ideally using the tools that are uniquely and wonderfully Canadian.
I'd like to thank you and the excellent interpreters.