Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I will move my motion.
I will read it out for the benefit of members of the public and for members of the committee who may be here for the first time.
Mr. Chair, I move:
That pursuant to its order of reference of Monday, May 16, 2022, the committee undertake a study of the matters revealed in the Winnipeg lab documents together with the broader concerns they represent in relation to Canada’s national security, as well as the obstacles encountered in obtaining these documents, provided that the committee:
(a) make this study a priority over its other business, notwithstanding the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, December 4, 2023, respecting the appearance of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance;
(b) instruct the Chair and the clerk to take the necessary steps to arrange for two meetings of the committee each sitting week for the purposes of this study;
(c) take into consideration the relevant evidence and documentation received by the former Special Committee on Canada-China Relations during the First and Second sessions of the 43rd Parliament;
(d) invite and, if this invitation is not accepted, summons, pursuant to Standing Order 108(1) the following witnesses to appear, at dates and times to be fixed by the Chair:
(i) the Departmental Security Officer, Executive Director of Security, Public Health Agency of Canada;
(ii) the Deputy Minister of Health, Dr. Stephen Lucas;
(iii) the Vice-President, Infectious Diseases Branch, Public Health Agency of Canada, Dr. Donald Sheppard;
(iv) the Vice-President, National Microbiology Laboratory Branch, Public Health Agency of Canada, Dr. Guillaume Poliquin;
(v) the President of the Public Health Agency of Canada, Heather Jeffrey;
(vi) the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, David Vigneault; and
(vii) the Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council and National Security and Intelligence Adviser to the Prime Minister, Nathalie G. Drouin;
(e) invite the following to appear on dates to be fixed by the Chair:
(i) the Minister of Health, the Honourable Mark Holland,
(ii) the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs, the Honourable Dominic LeBlanc, and
(iii) other witnesses whose names shall be provided by the parties to the clerk of the committee within one week of the adoption of this motion; and
(f) report its findings to the House.
Thank you, Mr. Chair, for allowing me to move this motion. I'm just going to speak briefly to it, so we can all have a say on the motion and get it to a vote.
We finally got the documents relating to the Winnipeg lab. My view is that this is the start of the matter, not the end. The collection of evidence is usually the start of a process, not the completion of it. Really, we're leaving off where we left three years ago when the Canada-China committee in the previous Parliament asked for the Winnipeg lab documents.
I believe strongly that the committee is the right place to examine these documents, the right place to hold the government accountable and the right place for us to hear from witnesses and to produce a report with recommendations.
This is a grave and serious matter, as CSIS highlighted in the intelligence assessment it submitted to the Public Health Agency of Canada, an assessment that is contained in the documents we received. It's a grave and serious matter because the government scientists clandestinely collaborated with the government and the military of the People's Republic of China and were paid clandestinely by the government and the military of the People's Republic of China without the Government of Canada knowing.
These serious national security breaches, I believe, warrant examination by a parliamentary committee. It's now been four weeks since we received the documents, which is the reason, Mr. Chair, as you know I've called this emergency meeting so that we can make a decision, I hope, in favour of holding hearings on these documents. It took us three years to get the documents. It's now taken us four weeks to have a discussion about whether or not a committee should look at these documents. I think we should have done that almost immediately upon receiving the documents.
The motion in front of us will allow us to examine these serious national security breaches. It will allow us to examine the flow of information and intelligence within the Government of Canada and to get answers to questions such as the following: Why wasn't this caught earlier than September 2018? Why did it take 10 months for the government to secure the lab?
According to the documents, the first red flag went up in September 2018 when a patent was discovered to have been registered in the People's Republic of China, which is contrary to government policy and contrary to Canadian law. It then took 10 months for the lab to be secured, which was on July 5, 2019. In my view, it's an unacceptably long period of time to wait for that to happen.
We also need to examine why it took us three years to get the documents. The minister indicated that it was up to public servants to make the decision on what information to release to the committee. We need to examine what is wrong with the information flow between the Government of Canada and Parliament so that, in the future, when a parliamentary committee asks for these sorts of documents, they're provided forthwith in a way that protects national security, as we put in place three years ago, and not in three years.
The motion is also to examine the flow of information within the government as it relates to the most senior figures in the government—the Minister of Health, the Minister of Public Safety and the Prime Minister's Office—and to understand if the information flow within the government is working.
At the end of the day, I believe we need to hold the government accountable in this. This saga started more than three years ago. The government defied four orders of the House of Commons and its committee. It took the Speaker to court, and it disposed of these four orders by the dissolution of Parliament, which, as you know, dissolved the four orders. We cannot allow that to go unanswered and unexamined.
Finally, I'll say there was a report just today in the news that a new containment level 4 lab is being proposed in Canada. Surely we need to study this matter about the only existing level 4 lab and its security breaches at committee before a new level 4 lab is stood up in this country that might pose security risks.
I hope that members of the committee will support the motion, and I look forward to their views on it.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.