Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Good evening, everyone.
Mr. Chair and members of the committee, it is an honour to join you this evening and to have the opportunity to contribute to your discussion on the matters revealed in the Winnipeg National Microbiology Laboratory documents and, more broadly, on the importance of protecting Canada's research from foreign interference.
My goal today is to provide some clarity on CSIS's role in protecting our research, through its screening mandate, intelligence collection and advice, and stakeholder engagement. I also welcome the opportunity to provide clarity on CSIS's disclosure processes, and how we are working to maximize transparency while protecting sensitive information.
As this committee is well aware, Canada's research sector is often targeted by foreign threat actors seeking to advance their interests at our expense. This can take many forms, from covertly influencing research agendas or peer review processes to engaging in funding arrangements whereby details about the source of funds can be obscured or misrepresented. Through deceptive partnerships and collaborations, vital research and novel intellectual property are stolen. The PRC is by far the greatest perpetrator of these activities.
Needless to say, as state actors become more sophisticated, these threats become harder to identify and counter. It is therefore imperative that Canadians work together. This effort begins with informed and transparent discussions among and within all levels and branches of government, as well as with communities, academia and businesses.
As a committed partner in this effort, CSIS continues to investigate, provide advice to the government and, when appropriate, take measures to reduce threats. This work includes close collaboration with other government departments. For example, CSIS leverages its unique tools and access to provide to requesting departments thorough security assessments on individuals who require access to classified Government of Canada information or sensitive sites. This is one of the tools used to protect Canada's research infrastructure against insider threats.
Other tools include stakeholder engagement, which, through education and knowledge dissemination, builds resilience against foreign interference, and thus ensures that government investments do not inadvertently advance the research of hostile states in sensitive areas.
While, as an intelligence service, CSIS needs to be able to protect its own intelligence in order to fulfil its mandate, CSIS has also actively been taking measures to increase transparency with Canadians through increased public engagement with communities and institutions on national security issues. CSIS has briefed more than 200 organizations and 1,000 individuals across Canada who are now well informed about possible threats, which has provided them with the tools to protect themselves, their research, and their employees.
CSIS also exercises transparency through regular proactive and responsive disclosures of information. In the case of the Winnipeg lab documents, CSIS worked collaboratively with the panel of arbiters to maximize transparency through sanitization, including by summarizing certain redactions to provide unclassified information. This resulted in the publication of a greater amount of national security information than previously released. The panel recognized that the release of the remaining redactions could be detrimental to Canada's national security.
What is considered injurious to national security is not static; rather, it evolves over time. With the passage of time, these assessments may change. This is why CSIS dedicates subject matter experts to review documents line by line, irrespective of their initial classification, to maximize transparency to Parliament and Canadians.
The PRC has been bold in its attempts to threaten Canada's security, prosperity and research through strategic espionage and foreign interference. To counter these threats, CSIS is continuously implementing lessons in how it responds to the constantly evolving threat environment. This includes increasing transparency with Canadians through an increased openness and willingness to release as much information as possible through processes such as this one.
Finally, I will note that in order to protect the safety and security of Canadians, I cannot publicly comment on operational matters and requirements. Nonetheless, I welcome this opportunity for frank and transparent discussions to the extent that's possible, and will be happy to answer your questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.