Canada-China Relations Committee on April 8th, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

I'll call the meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 36 of the House of Commons Special Committee on the Canada–People’s Republic of China Relationship. Pursuant to the order of reference of May 16, 2022, the committee is meeting for its study of the Canada–People’s Republic of China relationship.

As a substitute member today, we have Mr. Cooper subbing for Ms. Lantsman. I'm sure the shoes are killing you.

We also have MP Ellis substituting for MP Seeback and MP Naqvi for MP Oliphant, and Mr. Desjarlais is in for Ms. McPherson.

It's good to have you joining us.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mic and please mute yourself while you're not speaking.

For interpretation, those on Zoom have the choice at the bottom of the screen of floor, English or French. Those in the room can use the earpiece and select the desired channel.

I'll remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair. For members in the room, if you wish to speak, please raise your hand. For members on Zoom, please use the “raise hand” function. The clerk and I will manage the speaking order as best we can. We appreciate your patience and understanding in this regard.

Per the motion adopted on March 26, 2024, we're hearing testimony in relation to the matters revealed in the Winnipeg lab documents.

I'd now like to welcome the Honourable Mark Holland, Minister of Health, and, from the Department of Health, Nadine Huggins, assistant deputy minister and chief security officer, corporate services branch.

From the Public Health Agency of Canada, we have Heather Jeffrey, president. By video conference, we also have Dr. Guillaume Poliquin, vice-president of the national microbiology laboratory.

We see everybody present.

Minister, you may commence with a five-minute opening statement.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Minister of Health]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

It's wonderful to be here. I appreciate the committee giving me the opportunity to answer questions and to make some brief opening remarks.

Let me start by saying the action of the two former employees at the national microbiology laboratory are reprehensible and deeply disturbing. The two Canadian citizens, two eminent scientists who were well known throughout North America for their contributions in the field of therapeutics, vaccines and virology, lied. They misrepresented themselves. These were employees who were hired in 2003 and 2006, respectively, and who made great contributions outside of this. Appropriately, the Public Health Agency identified them. They were fired, and they are now the subject of an investigation.

The second thing I'd like to do at the onset is recognize the extraordinary world-class work done by the national microbiology laboratory. Its surveillance work in the area of infectious disease, in emergency outbreak preparedness and response, in training and in research and development helps keep Canadians safe. We're extraordinarily lucky to have some of the greatest scientists in the world working in that facility. Their work is absolutely critical to the continually evolving health environment we're in, which necessitates international co-operation.

I will also recognize that in the past five or six years, not only have we had a global pandemic, but the threat environment we live in is different. Countries such as China are implicating themselves in our domestic processes in a way that would have been unimaginable just five years ago. As such, we have to respond, and we are. I'm happy to talk about some of those responses.

I think it's important for context to talk about how we got here today.

I was a member of the public safety and national security committee. I was its vice-chair. We had an opportunity, going back, in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2011 to say to the government of the day, the Conservative government, that the recommendations of Justice Iacobucci and Justice O'Connor were essential. One of the main recommendations in both of those processes was to have a committee of parliamentarians that had the opportunity to look at all documents.

It's important to note in this particular case with the employees who were hired in 2003 and 2006 that the only thing that would be different today if there weren't a Liberal government is we wouldn't be having this meeting and you wouldn't see the documents. The Conservative government of the day refused to allow parliamentary oversight.

In 2021, when this matter was before the House of Commons, there was a battle in Parliament, a disagreement about how these documents should be looked at. At the time, the offer was made for NSICOP to be given an opportunity to look at this so parliamentarians of every political party would have the opportunity to look at the documents in their totality without redactions. After the 2021 election, the comment was made to me when I was the House leader that the opposition parties had a concern that this would mean if they disagreed with redactions, they would have no challenge function to those redactions. Appropriately, they asked for the ability to challenge redactions.

At that point in time, as House leader, I worked with other parties—initially it was just the New Democratic Party, but eventually, many months later, the Conservatives and the Bloc also joined us—to have an ad hoc process of independent arbiters who were able to look at the documents, and where there was disagreement on redactions, they could make a decision about what should or shouldn't be released. That committee and the independent panel of arbiters appropriately were asked to err on the side of public disclosure and to make sure the maximum public view into the documents would be made available. That's precisely what occurred.

We're not just talking here about national security in these redactions. The Public Health Agency also obviously has to consider confidential employee information. Quite rightly in this case, the normal protections around confidentiality of employee information were waived, given the serious security breach these two Canadian citizens engaged in. That's why we're here today.

With that, Mr. Chair, I'm pleased to take questions from the committee.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and I'll turn it back over to you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Minister Holland.

We will begin with Mr. Cooper for six minutes.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Minister, and thank you to the officials who are here.

Minister, three weeks ago when you appeared before the health committee and were asked about the massive national security breach at the Winnipeg lab, you stated that PHAC at all material times acted in the “highest order” and that with respect to accountability, no one at PHAC will be fired. Do you stand by that?

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax, ON]

Well, in the first order, these two employees were fired. They were held to account for their actions and for the lies they told. However, I believe, as I stated then, that the Public Health Agency acted appropriately throughout the process in responding to those lies and the misinformation.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

No one else will be fired. Is that correct?

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax, ON]

I am not aware of anybody else being fired. The people who were responsible—

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Okay, thank you, Minister—

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax, ON]

—for engaging in that activity have been fired.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

I want to ask you some questions about decisions that PHAC made surrounding this massive national security failure. Canadians themselves can judge whether PHAC acted in the highest order, as you stated three weeks ago before the health committee.

First, why in October 2018 did PHAC enter into a material transfer agreement with the Wuhan Institute of Virology to transfer, from the Winnipeg lab, Ebola and Henipah, two of the most deadly pathogens? Why did that happen?

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax, ON]

In 2018, we were working collaboratively with China on developing therapies and interventions with respect to Ebola. It is a serious global pathogen, and the efforts at that point in time were to collaborate with China in a partnership—

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Okay. In October—

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax, ON]

—to take action with respect to Ebola.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Minister, I asked you a question and I'm going to build on it.

October 2018 is significant. This material transfer agreement was initiated by none other than Dr. Qiu, one of the two scientists.

In October 2018, at the time that material transfer agreement was entered into, PHAC was already aware that Dr. Qiu was named on a Chinese patent that was highly suspicious and had been flagged to CSIS by the head of the Winnipeg lab as a potential national security threat. Why in the world, with that knowledge, would PHAC transfer deadly, dangerous pathogens to Wuhan at the request of a scientist that PHAC knew at the time was a potential national security risk?

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax, ON]

As you know, it was in the fall of 2018 that this matter was first flagged as a concern, and we have due process. The transfer you're talking about was done with the full knowledge and the full co-operation of the Public Health Agency in the interest of advancing the protection of our species against the infectious disease Ebola. At that point in time, because Ebola doesn't know boundaries, the effort was to work collaboratively with China and other countries. It is deeply disturbing, obviously—

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Minister, I only have so much time.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Chair, I have a point of order. This is the third time now that Mr. Cooper has interrupted the minister, who is here as a witness.

He's answering in good faith, and I think Mr. Cooper is asking questions that he's perfectly entitled to ask. However, I would ask, Mr. Chair, that the usual, the typical and the collegial back-and-forth that we expect here at committee be allowed to take place rather than interruptions, because I'm trying to get a sense of the answers as well, and interruptions get in the way.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you for that, Mr. Fragiskatos.

Minister Holland, I think you should do your best to keep your answers concise, given that there is limited time for questions.

Mr. Cooper, allow the minister to complete his answers.

Go ahead. We stopped the clock. You're good to go.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Minister, you are right that it was in the fall of 2018 that red flags were first raised about these two scientists. A preliminary investigation wasn't undertaken until December 2018. That's months after the first red flags were raised, and in the interim, a material transfer agreement was signed with Wuhan at the request of one of the scientists who was deemed to be a potential national security threat.

Why did it take so long to launch a preliminary investigation? Three or four months is a long time.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax, ON]

In this instance, the nature of that patent and the reason the patent hadn't been disclosed were being investigated, and there is due process.

It is indeed sad for the world that we are no longer able to co-operate closely with countries with respect to deadly pathogens that represent a clear and present threat to the human race. The fact that there are countries engaging in activities that would endanger not only our country but all human beings is profoundly disturbing.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Minister, the preliminary fact-finding report was issued on March 23, 2019. It identified that the two scientists had engaged in multiple security and intellectual property breaches, that they had engaged in unauthorized transfers, including to Wuhan, and that they had engaged in unauthorized research collaboration with the Beijing regime, including the People's Liberation Army.

What did PHAC do next? PHAC then transferred Ebola and Henipah to Wuhan.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax, ON]

You're making a connection between two completely separate things.

In the first order, the transferring and working with China at that point in time to try to protect our species from Ebola was something we were doing earnestly, with the belief that China shared our desire to protect human beings from a deadly pathogen.

In the second order, when you're talking about the individuals—the scientists who were fired—you have to remember that these individuals were hired in 2003 and 2006. They are published throughout North America. They are eminent scientists. They are Canadian citizens—

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Minister, it's amazing that you cannot see how reckless this is—

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax, ON]

Sir, if I could finish—

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

—and not only that, Minister, but—