Thank you, Mr. Chair.
For the record, I will say that I did not write this paragraph. That's why we employ people at CSIS who are much more intelligent than I am to make sense of this information.
Seriously, Mr. Chair, what I think is important here is understanding that the cutting-edge research being done at the national microbiology lab, as mentioned by my colleague, is absolutely essential for Canada. The fact that we have scientists working on these issues is in our own national interest. The problem—and the committee has been very clear on this issue—is that there were two individuals who lied to their employer and engaged in activities that were against Canada's national interest.
I think this is where principles of the complexity of the world's national security and international collaboration in science will sometimes clash with each other. It is only by having a very sophisticated approach—and, I think, a better understanding of how these different relationships interact, depending on the issue—that these can be assessed and more weight be put on national security versus international scientific collaboration.
Perhaps the last thing I will say to Mr. Erskine-Smith, through you, Mr. Chair, is that Canada and CSIS have not concluded that the virus jumped out of a lab, as others have said. I think our intelligence community friends in the U.S. have a different perspective on this issue.