Canada-China Relations Committee on April 29th, 2024

[Matthew Gilmour]

Mr. Chair, a really good example, again coming from the U.K., is where security authorities have co-developed, with scientific institutes, guidelines and practices .

An example comes from the National Protective Security Authority where they have co-developed pieces with science. This tries to marry the aspects in the U.K. where academic research is enshrined into law, yet recognizing that yes, the majority of collaborations are international and there is this elevated expectation of security. There is active co-development of it in the U.K.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Dr. Gilmour.

We'll now go to Mr. Bergeron for six minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Mr. Gilmour, thank you very much for being with us this evening.

On April 8, when he appeared before the committee, the Minister of Health said, “In 2018, we were working collaboratively with China on developing therapies and interventions with respect to Ebola.”

Why was it essential for Canada to work with the People's Republic of China to combat the Ebola virus? Why wasn't that work happening with labs in G7 countries, as you mentioned a few moments ago? Why was it specifically with the People's Republic of China?

[Matthew Gilmour]

Mr. Chair, I don't recall the specific work that might have happened with China over the course of the Ebola virus work.

Certainly in general, internationally, there would be coordination and collaboration on this because, of course, for most countries this is, fortunately, not a virus that is native to their country, so it's something you have to work with other countries to obtain and work on.

I'm sorry. I'm not familiar with the specific project being discussed.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

I would have thought you would know about that collaboration, because we sent Ebola specimens to the People's Republic of China. I guess the reason we had to send Ebola to China was that they didn't have any samples. I will ask my question again.

Why was it necessary to work with the People's Republic of China to combat a virus like Ebola?

[Matthew Gilmour]

Mr. Chair, again, the rationale for working with them is just part of that international expectation of benefit sharing. Again, for those who don't have access to these viruses, you're in a position to share. That would have been the ethos at the time.

Again, within the laboratory, in terms of due diligence on the process, it would have been almost entirely a biosafety consideration. Within the documentation that was released with the package of documents, the final 100 pages were all about the documentation the NML produced regarding, again, their own due diligence in fulfilling their own processes and checks and balances.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Dr. Gilmour, I'm pausing for a second. You tend to drift off microphone a little bit. If you could just aim right down in there, that would be great, or just shift it over depending on which side of the table you're speaking with, okay?

Mr. Bergeron, you can continue now.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Did it ever occur to you that China might want to have viruses to use as biological weapons one day?

[Matthew Gilmour]

No, I didn't have that specific concern, sir.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Also on April 8, when he appeared before this committee, the Minister of Health confirmed that the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg does not collaborate in any way with entities or individuals in the People's Republic of China.

When he appeared before our committee on April 19, Dr. Guillaume Poliquin, who now holds the position you used to hold at the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg, said that “international collaboration in this space is essential for the advancement of the work.”

To reconcile the minister's statement that there is no longer any collaboration with the People's Republic of China and Dr. Poliquin's statement that this collaboration is essential to the advancement of the work, would you say that no longer collaborating with the People's Republic of China is hindering the advancement of Canadian scientists' work?

[Matthew Gilmour]

Mr. Chair, I would reiterate that it was part of the overall ethos and the culture, scientifically, for that benefit-sharing where possible, but with the checks and balances that I mentioned.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Mr. Chair, I would like to take a few moments to give notice of a motion that we will discuss later out of respect for our witness. It reads:

That, pursuant to the order of reference of Monday, May 16, 2022, the committee, in light of the government's expressed intention to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China, invite in person and before June 21, 2024, the Minister of Environment and Climate Change; Mr. David Morrison, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Canadian Ambassador to China, as well as the President of the Canada-China Legislative Association.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Mr. Bergeron, we'll take that as a notice of motion—

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Yes.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

—but we will need it in both official languages, too.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Absolutely.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

That's good. You can continue with your questions. You have one minute.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

I'm done for now.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Barron, you won't be splitting time with the cat, I trust.

[Lisa Marie Barron, NDP, Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC]

Thank you, Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

And we will not talk about fish.

Ms. Barron and I serve on the fisheries and oceans committee together.

You have six minutes or less.

[Lisa Marie Barron, NDP, Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC]

That's right.

Yes, my apologies, as my cat wanted to join the meeting.

Thank you to our witness for being here today.

I'm happy to be here to ask a few questions on behalf of my colleague who's unable to be here today.

I apologize that I came in a little late. If you're repeating this, perhaps you can expand on it a little bit. What are your thoughts on the ways we could avoid the same problems from occurring again? What are some of the learnings that we could take from this that you might be able to share with us?

[Matthew Gilmour]

Mr. Chair, that's a good question.

One of the examples that I haven't yet mentioned—again, drawing upon some of the practices within the U.K.—is that there's a program there called the academic technology approval scheme. This is integrated right at the national level. It's integrated with the visa scheme. As people apply for visas from non-exempt countries—Canada would be an exempt country—for certain categories of work.... The security agencies have identified particular categories of work that are of concern to them in terms of, with regard to the previous member's question, things related to bioterror. That's built right into the visa application scheme—some of that vetting. It's not happening closer to the front line within the actual departments or within universities; it's happening at the outset as people are coming into the country.

[Lisa Marie Barron, NDP, Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC]

That's interesting. Thank you.

I was learning that the PRC's thousand talents plan is one of an estimated 200 talent recruitment programs that are using incentives such as salaries, research funding and lab space to encourage Chinese researchers abroad to transmit knowledge to the PRC, as you know.

Could you share to what extent the PRC's talent recruitment programs are a threat to Canada's national security, or are they?

[Matthew Gilmour]

Mr. Chair, my own specific awareness of these programs is quite low. They're not something I have to deal with in my day-to-day job anymore.

Certainly, going back in time to my time at the national microbiology lab, I had periodic engagements with an individual CSIS agent from the Winnipeg office where we were mutually developing a little bit of awareness. He would show me things that would come across the wire that were of interest or concern to them and then would ask for my reflections in terms of what they might mean. It often meant actually talking about and educating a little bit on the science of what they were looking at. I should clarify that in those meetings we weren't talking about anything specific at the NML. It was just their own process of, again, generating awareness in myself and some of the security pieces.

To my recollection, things like education on the talent management programs didn't actually occur until that August 2018 meeting, so I've had limited exposure in terms of analysis of those. I apologize to the member.