Canada-China Relations Committee on May 3rd, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Welcome to meeting number 40 of the House of Commons Special Committee on the Canada–People's Republic of China Relationship.

Pursuant to the order of reference of May 16, 2022, the committee is meeting on its study of the Canada–People's Republic of China relationship.

As indicated in the communiqué from the Speaker to all members on Monday, April 29, the following measures have been taken to prevent audio feedback incidents.

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Now, as we get into the meeting, I just wanted to make it official that we'll be here for one hour. We had scheduled committee business for the second hour, but with the large number of substitutes in this session, we've decided to hold committee business over to Monday, when there will be ample time to, first of all, provide drafting instructions on this study, as well as deal with where the committee wants to go next.

Speaking of substitutes, we have MP Blaney for MP McPherson, MP Ellis for MP Kurek, and MP Tolmie for MP Chong—well, that would be for the second hour, which we're not going to have. Mr. Cooper is here for Ms. Lantsman, Mr. Longfield is here for MP Erskine-Smith, and Mr. Naqvi, of course, is here for Rob Oliphant.

This meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, as is usual these days. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application.

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Per the motion adopted on March 26, 2024, we're hearing testimony in relation to the matters revealed in the Winnipeg lab documents.

I would now like to welcome our witness for today's meeting, Mr. Richard Fadden.

Mr. Fadden, you have up to five minutes to deliver some opening remarks.

[Richard Fadden, As an Individual]

Thank you, Chair.

In the hope that they might be useful to you, I'd like to offer a few contextual remarks about departmental security generally. I make these comments drawing both on my national security experience and on my experience in, I think, eight departments while I was still working.

Outside of core national security departments and agencies, absent a crisis, departmental security is not a priority. It would not engage the attention of deputy heads and certainly not that of ministers.

In these non-national security core departments, it's policy, operations or science that gets attention, not security or, for that matter, any other matter relating to corporate issues, like finance. As long as people are paid, they're happy. They're not going to spend a lot of time worrying about finance, procurement or things of that nature.

Having worked in two science-based departments, I think this is especially true of science and scientists. They are not particularly interested in security. I'm not ascribing ill intent to either departmental security or scientists, but rather disinterest and insufficient training and resources, which can lead to security violations—some minor, some serious.

At the same time, I think it's fair to say that most departmental security units are not equipped to deal with significant national security issues. If, for example, you're in a department like Canadian Heritage, you don't worry about national security, even if there is a threat there, because people move around. You are, to some degree, like a medium-sized city's general-purpose police officer. You don't have national security training, and I think that's increasingly a problem today.

Additionally, I think the overall national security environment has an impact on how seriously departmental security can carry out its duties or is equipped or resourced to do so. In Canada, over the last few decades, I think it's fair to say that the national security environment has not been consistent, especially as it concerns China. If you're a departmental security officer wondering how seriously you should apply rules and whatnot, you find comfort in the fact, I think, that up and down the system, nobody is jumping up and down and telling you to do things very seriously.

All of the above is not to suggest that I disagree with the final decisions taken at the Winnipeg lab concerning the two scientists. Rather, I wanted to try to paint a picture that I think still applies today in most departments. It's a significant cultural and resource issue, and I think it's indicative of a serious, systemic range of issues that I hope the committee might be able to deal with, not only with respect to labs, but also with respect to departments and agencies generally.

Thank you, Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you very much, Mr. Fadden.

We'll now go to our rounds of questioning. We'll begin with Mr. Cooper for six minutes.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Fadden, for appearing.

One of the things that struck me about this national security breach, in terms of how it was handled, was the length of time it took between when red flags were first raised in August 2018 and the time these two scientists were led out of the lab on July 5, 2019. That's almost a year.

During that time, these scientists had unfettered access to the lab, even after a fact-finding report was issued in March. Although it was incomplete, it validated that they were, among other things, transferring materials on an unauthorized basis from the lab to the PRC, and that there were multiple breaches of security and intellectual property policy.

I'd be interested in your thoughts on the issue of the timeline and how PHAC responded.

[Richard Fadden]

Thank you, Chair.

My general-purpose reaction is that the time frame allowing them full access was too long. I don't necessarily think that when the red flags were first raised, they should have been handcuffed and walked out of the building, but there was a range of measures that departmental security and the deputy head could have taken to restrict their access and control where they were going and whatnot.

It became increasingly clear—certainly based on the material I've read—as time went on that it was more and more serious. They also could have made the conditions to which they were subjected more serious as time went on.

My bottom line is that their general, unfettered access until almost the very end was too long. At the bare minimum, if they were to remain on the job, they should have had their physical access restricted and, perhaps, their electronic access restricted. You don't have to cut somebody off entirely in order to limit the threat they pose.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

It has been my contention that upon the issuance of that fact-finding report, steps should have been taken immediately thereafter to at the very least restrict their access. It doesn't mean that they had to be walked out of the lab, but I have to say, when Dr. Gilmour was here and I asked him what new evidence or what new information PHAC had between the issuance of that report and July 5, 2019, he said there was nothing more. Very simply, then, would you agree that at that moment their access should have been restricted?

[Richard Fadden]

Yes, sir, I think so.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Another issue I find troubling is the fact that a number of scientists gained access to the lab from the PRC. There were two individuals who were associated with or employed with PRC institutions that CSIS determined to be working against the interests of Canada, as well as a PLA scientist whose mentor is Beijing's foremost expert in bioterrorism and biodefence. Could you comment on how it is possible that scientists with that type of connection to the Beijing regime would have the clearances or be granted access to what is supposed to be Canada's highest-security lab?

[Richard Fadden]

I think they had a very, very loose access control policy, but it goes to some of the points that I tried to make in my opening remarks. It was not just the departmental security officer or the general manager. The entire system at that point, I think, was not regarding China as seriously as we do today, so I think there's a lot of blame to go around, not to put too fine a point on it, ranging from the departmental security officer to the manager of the lab to the ADM to the deputy head and probably CSIS and the central agencies. Broadly speaking, I think they should not have been allowed that kind of access. If they were to be allowed access, it should have been a controlled access. They should have been escorted, they should have been required to wear a badge, and they should not have been allowed access to the electronic communication system.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you. We have heard the minister and others saying that in 2018, 2019, it was a different time, and that is true to some extent, but it's not as though in 2018, 2019 or 2017 there weren't a lot of concerns that Canada had with the activities of the PRC. The PRC was a hostile regime at that time. Would you not agree? So I just have some difficulty accepting this notion that it was such a different time in 2017 or 2018.

[Richard Fadden]

I understand where you are coming from, but I also think, next to the facts that you just expounded, there is this broad issue of culture, and I don't think the culture in this particular lab and in large parts of the public service had caught up with the change in facts as we understand China. I agree that there was no sea change. There was no button pushed that changed things, and I think if you're working in the bottoms of a department or of an agency, it takes a while to register these things.

I'd be interested in knowing, for example, if the deputy head or her delegate had caused a note to be sent to the departmental security officer, simply saying, “I'm told by CSIS and everybody else that times have changed.” I'm not trying to excuse what happened, I'm just saying that there's a lot of blame to go around, and it's both public service and political blame.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you very much, Mr. Cooper. We'll now go to Mr. Naqvi for six minutes.

[Yasir Naqvi, Liberal, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Good afternoon, sir. Thank you very much for being here and taking the time on a Friday afternoon. I really appreciated your context-setting comments on the topic of culture within departments. You've been in the national security business for a very long time and have served both as adviser to the Prime Minister and as CSIS director. I wonder if you can expand on the comments you were making in terms of, in your tenures, what kinds of things CSIS or the Privy Council Office were doing to change that culture and make security concerns more front of mind for department heads and others.

[Richard Fadden]

That's a good question, Chair. I think it was very uneven, to be honest. I want to be clear that I'm not directing this to a particular government. I'm talking about the entire time I worked. It was both a Conservative government and a Liberal government.

After 9/11, for example, security across the system was ratcheted up in a major way, and it impacted everyone. However, since Canadians don't generally feel threatened, slowly but surely after that we reverted to the status quo ante.

PCO, the Treasury Board and CSIS regularly sent out reminders to departmental security officers. I think there was the tradition of an annual meeting and conference. However, if there's not a sense, globally, within the public service that there's a significant issue, it's very hard to change, particularly in non-national security departments.

I don't know what you and your colleagues have concluded about the status of the lab. I think some people would argue that it's a national security establishment and it should be treated as such, period. A whole bunch of other people would say it's a medical lab and everyone should get a grip: “Yes, we don't want to share with everybody in town, but it's not a national security establishment.” I think the way the international environment has shifted, it has become a national security environment.

I used to head the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. We had a significant component of work at that place. That's quite a few years ago, but at the time, it was not regarded as a national security institution. For a variety of reasons, security was pretty heavy, but that was because of the risk involved in all the material it was producing.

To go back to your question, it's been very uneven across the years as central agencies try to remind departments to abide by the rules, to enforce them and to push things along.

[Yasir Naqvi, Liberal, Ottawa Centre, ON]

It's very interesting, what you're saying. From other witnesses during these hearings, we've heard a similar sentiment that the nexus between science and security has been evolving. It's far more acute today than it was even perhaps in 2018-19, when this particular instance was taking place.

You're nodding your head. Can you express in words that you agree with that sentiment?

[Richard Fadden]

I agree.

[Yasir Naqvi, Liberal, Ottawa Centre, ON]

I'm a lawyer, so I always want to get it in Hansard.

In light of that realization, do you feel that the steps that were taken at that time—I know you shared some caveats—were by and large appropriate, and do there need to be far better protocols in place today, given what we know up to now?

[Richard Fadden]

I'll give you a two-part answer, if I may.

I think a lot of the protocols today are not unreasonable, but having a protocol or a policy is only as good as its operationalization. It's only as good as its application.

A lot of the rules that were in place at the lab—and I confess I haven't read them all—were not unreasonable. Access controls, how you ship things and not using your personal IT are all entirely reasonable, but it would seem they were not obeyed. I would start from the premise that you take the rules you have today and you take steps to ensure they're followed.

Given what you've said and what Mr. Cooper has said about an evolution in the international environment, I think they should all be reviewed and probably tightened.

In particular, with the use of electronic communications today, you can transmit terabytes of information in an instant. You can transfer, I think, even physically out of the labs with a bit of effort, material that's produced there.

I would start by enforcing what we have. Have a real look at it and take into account the environment that both of you have talked about.

[Yasir Naqvi, Liberal, Ottawa Centre, ON]

This will be my last question.

You talked about the international environment giving you experience.

Have you noticed similar concerns in our peer countries—perhaps the Five Eyes—around culture and this evolving nexus between science and security that we're discussing?

[Richard Fadden]

Yes. The only one I know a bit about is the United States. They've always taken security more seriously than we do, and perhaps not without some reason.

Yes, they've tightened up virtually anything relating to national security, including science.

[Yasir Naqvi, Liberal, Ottawa Centre, ON]

What about other countries, like the U.K., Germany and France?

[Richard Fadden]

I don't know about them. The only other one I'd suggest is Australia. I think it has tightened up as well.

[Yasir Naqvi, Liberal, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you very much, Mr. Naqvi.

We will now go to Mr. Bergeron for six minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Fadden, thank you for being with us today. If I am not mistaken, this is now the second time you have appeared before the Special Committee on the Canada—People's Republic of China Relationship.

I have noted two things in your testimony and your answers to date. First, you talked about culture change, which may not have taken place as quickly as might have been wished. Second is the timeline, the point when the threat became perceptible and when the security mechanisms should have been changed and a change made to the culture within the organization. On that point, there are several items on the timeline that are interesting.

In an article published in Le Journal de Montréal in January, we learned that CSIS, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, had published a report in 2010 explaining China's growing economic power, its growing confidence and its aggressive new agent recruitment policy, which suggest that it has the will and resources to enhance its intelligence activities more and more. So CSIS had been sounding the alarm since 2010.

When the minister appeared before this committee, he told us that until 2018 it was thought to be important to collaborate in the realm of science, but that the world had changed considerably since then. Mr. Fadden, do you think that the world changed in 2018, or should that change have been perceived before 2018?