I think they had a very, very loose access control policy, but it goes to some of the points that I tried to make in my opening remarks. It was not just the departmental security officer or the general manager. The entire system at that point, I think, was not regarding China as seriously as we do today, so I think there's a lot of blame to go around, not to put too fine a point on it, ranging from the departmental security officer to the manager of the lab to the ADM to the deputy head and probably CSIS and the central agencies. Broadly speaking, I think they should not have been allowed that kind of access. If they were to be allowed access, it should have been a controlled access. They should have been escorted, they should have been required to wear a badge, and they should not have been allowed access to the electronic communication system.
On May 3rd, 2024. See this statement in context.