Thank you very much for your question, Mr. Bergeron.
In the big picture, democracy in Southeast Asia, as well as in the organization of ASEAN, is not in a particularly robust position. That means that out of 11 countries in southeast Asia, only perhaps three to four can be considered as electoral democracies. A good three to four are very hard authoritarian regimes. Compared to, say, Latin America, which is another developing region, Southeast Asia, in terms of the state of democracy, is in a very mixed to weak or mediocre position.
Now, to your specific question of the strategy of Chinese disinformation and how it might land in the landscape of Southeast Asia given the problems of democracy in the region, it is true that democracy in Southeast Asia is relatively fragile, whether in terms of rule of law, electoral institutions or constitutional courts. In terms of the institutional structures, in many countries in Southeast Asia—even those like Indonesia, which is considered to be one of the more robust electoral democracies—across the board institutions are quite weak. That could mean that potential strategies of disinformation from outside the region or other possibilities to further undermine democracies or institutions, whether from China or any global actor, could find fertile ground. That is true.
The larger problem for Southeast Asia and ASEAN is democracy, in terms of ensuring the franchise is respected, in terms of ensuring that democracies actually maintain freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, etc.—those liberal rights. Even more deeply than that for these democracies, it's to strengthen institutions and to strengthen institutional structures of law and bureaucracy. That institutional infrastructure is central, in the long run, to establishing more robust and more long-term democracies, for both internal reasons and external reasons.
Thank you.