Canada-China Relations Committee on Nov. 29th, 2022

[Paul Thoppil]

Chair, I want to thank the member for that really important question. That is a question I know Canadian businesses are asking based on the geopolitical environment that is changing.

First of all, I should start off by indicating that the strategy does not indicate that Canadian business should suspend doing trade with China. It is quite clear that businesses should engage and diversify within China, but also outside China.

Minister Joly was very clear that Canadian businesses should take an eyes-wide-open approach to their engagement with China, given the unpredictability that Canadian business has witnessed in trade flows with that country—as much as other countries have also experienced unpredictability—but that is a risk assessment that each Canadian business must do.

Diversification of revenue flows by companies doesn't happen overnight. All government can do is set the table in terms of frameworks for trade opportunities through free trade agreements and foreign investment protection agreements, as well as have a focus on where trade promotion and business development dollars should be in order to help Canadian companies concerning their marketing and their business development in order to achieve diversified revenue flows.

That's why the government has been very clear in the Indo-Pacific strategy with creation of an Indo-Pacific trade representative, moving to modernized trade Team Canada missions, as well as the creation of a trade hub or gateway to southeast Asia, and the early progress trade agreement negotiations with India to capitalize on what the IMF executive director says, which is that India and ASEAN are the two regions of the world that are experiencing the fastest economic growth rates. We're trying to set the table to encourage Canadian business to try to at least increase our possibilities of success on diversification of flow.

[Serge Cormier, Liberal, Acadie—Bathurst, NB]

Very good. Thank you.

As you said, we should also keep doing business with China.

In your opinion, how do you think China views Taiwan's inclusion in the Indo-Pacific strategy?

[Paul Thoppil]

China has a one China principle that is very different from Canada's one China policy. Their one China principle makes it clear that Taiwan is and should be reunited with mainland China. Therefore, China doesn't condone either parliamentary visits to Taiwan or even my visit last week to Taiwan, because China believes that federal or ministerial visits are inconsistent in bestowing an act of sovereignty to the state that China believes should be a province.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you very much, Mr. Cormier.

We'll now go to Mr. Bergeron, for six minutes or less.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here this evening.

We really missed you last week, so we're very glad to have you tonight.

In a speech she gave on September 6, Taiwan's president, Tsai Ing‑wen, accused the People's Republic of China, the PRC, of using cognitive warfare against Taiwan by spreading disinformation.

According to a September 6 Associated Press article, experts have warned that the PRC has made significant inroads within Taiwan's mass media and could plant false narratives in social media.

The Global Taiwan Institute, a Washington-based think tank, reports that the PRC's efforts to interfere in Taiwan's elections have grown more sophisticated and aggressive.

Without getting into the current debate on Chinese interference, I would like to ask you this question: What do we know about the measures Taiwan has put in place to counter China's disinformation campaign and efforts to interfere in Taiwan's internal affairs?

Moreover, what can Canada learn from Taiwan's experience?

[Paul Thoppil]

Mr. Chair, the member asked a very good question, and it was the subject of a discussion I had in Taiwan last week, which I'd like to share for the benefit of committee members.

What they have done within their government is organize an independent party that has the capacity to respond to disinformation from outside sources, and respond through social media through an app within one hour. They have the capacity to do that and are monitoring. The Taiwanese people are very much aware of this app and its responsive nature. Therefore, the Taiwanese people, because of the degree of responsiveness and the timeliness, don't necessarily take on board what is, in a sense, the breaking news that may come from a source that maybe propagating non-factual information. It's that degree of timeliness that the Taiwanese government believes has been very effective in making people aware that they shouldn't take, at first blush, news items that come right away. The key is the responsiveness and the one-hour limit.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Given your discussions with your Taiwanese counterparts, what can Canada learn from Taiwan's experience in that case? To what extent can that experience be applied to Canada's situation?

[Paul Thoppil]

As we look at the proliferation of non facts, whether from external sources, from authoritarian states, or, dare I say, even from domestic sources, we need to ensure that Canadians receive those facts and get the right facts.

There are a number of ways to do that. There's the Taiwanese way with an independent party of the government with the capacity to move with some degree of alacrity in a responsive manner, but there are also a number of other ways to accomplish that. I'm just responding to your first question in terms of what the Taiwanese method is, but I don't think it's the responsibility or mandate of Global Affairs to address the larger question of ensuring that Canadians receive information from bona fide sources and that the information they receive is accurate.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you. That's interesting.

If it's not Global Affairs Canada's responsibility to make sure that a foreign power can't interfere in Canada's internal affairs and spread disinformation, whose responsibility in government is it?

[Paul Thoppil]

Mr. Chair, I think there are a number of agencies of the Government of Canada who are charged with ensuring national security, and I would turn to them first in terms of their mandate in order to mitigate foreign interference or the proliferation of disinformation from international channels onto Canadian soil.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Therefore—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Mr. Bergeron, I'm sorry. You are out of time, sir.

We'll go to Ms. Blaney for six minutes or less.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you, Chair. I appreciate you getting my name correct that time.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

You're welcome.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

I want to thank all of you for being here today. I appreciate your time and your testimony.

We know that Canada pursues an official engagement with Taiwan in accordance with its one China policy, as you spoke of earlier. Are there any discussions at Global Affairs or in the government that you are aware of that would review or amend the one China policy?

[Paul Thoppil]

Thank you for the question.

I think our Indo-Pacific strategy, which was released on Sunday by the Government of Canada, makes it quite clear where we stand vis-à-vis Taiwan and our reiteration that we will remain consistent with our one China policy.

That being said, there is, in our view, lots of room for interpretation of engagement with Taiwan in Canada's national interests and values, and I believe that the Indo-Pacific strategy does cover, in terms of engagement with Taiwan, consistent with our one China policy, a number of areas beyond trade, such as technology, health, democratic governance and countering disinformation, as just a few things that we can do within the rubric of that one China policy.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

It's interesting that you talked about some of the ways that we can expand as Canada in deepening the engagement with Taiwan and the actors in Taiwanese society. You mentioned a few of those, but I'm just wondering if you could talk a bit about how you think Canada can deepen its economic ties with Taiwan.

[Paul Thoppil]

Mr. Chair, I think the Government of Canada has already announced a means to expand its economic relationship with Taiwan through the launch of the exploratory discussions on the foreign investment protection arrangement.

As I indicated previously, the Government of Canada is on a pathway soon in order to communicate the results of that exploratory process that has now concluded. That foreign investment protection arrangement, if proceeded upon, will in fact buttress what is already a robust trading relationship between Taiwan and Canada, as just one example of what we can do.

The other example is the result of the Canada-Taiwan economic bilateral consultations, which I had the privilege to chair on behalf of Canada with Taiwan, whereby one positive outcome that was agreed to was the production of a supply chain resiliency MOU in a number of sectors. That would provide comfort to a number of sectors of our economies in terms of working more closely together.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you for that.

I'm curious to know if you could speak a bit about the implications of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and what that means for Taiwan.

[Paul Thoppil]

Mr. Chair, I'm going to ask my colleague Weldon Epp to respond to that.

[Weldon Epp]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I think it's an excellent question. It has been the subject of much analysis and much discussion, obviously.

I know the member is well aware that the situations are quite unique and quite different in many ways, but what's been fascinating has been seeing how all parties involved in tensions across the strait have been taking on board lessons learned.

We're well aware that the Taiwanese authorities are reviewing and revisiting some of their own planning and operating assumptions around self-defence. We'll see some of that play out over the coming years.

We're also quite concerned with any lessons that the PRC might inadvertently take away with respect to western resolve to, as the minister said recently, oppose any unilateral change to the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.

I think the economic sanctions and quick, consolidated push-back against Russia's invasion of Ukraine have been interesting, but the Chinese have always taken a very long view of Taiwan. Their approach is not contingent on any particular timeline. I suspect they'll also be taking away lessons from what's happened in Ukraine. We may see some of that coming out of the party congress with respect to decisions around their own supply chain security domestically and their capacity to withstand those kinds of counteractions in response.

Although the situations are quite different, unfortunately there will be a lot of revisiting of assumptions around Taiwan security. It makes it all the more concerning for Canada because that brings into play the risk of miscalculations or misunderstandings. One of the primary concerns were the kind of exercises that we saw the PLA undertake in August.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you.

I only have a few seconds left. I'm going to let them go so that I can ask another question later.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Ms. Blaney. I appreciate that.

We'll now go to Ms. Dancho for five minutes or less.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for being with us today. I appreciate it very much.

The last time you were here there was a story breaking about those three alleged Chinese-run police stations operating illegally in Canada.

I'm wondering if you've had an official dialogue or bilateral meeting with the ambassador to express Canada's outrage with these allegations?

[Weldon Epp]

Mr. Chair, the short answer is yes.

We've had several engagements. We've called the ambassador in on multiple occasions and we have conveyed our deep concern. The Government of Canada has formally insisted that the Chinese government, including the ambassador and his embassy, account for any activities within Canada that fall outside of the Vienna Convention and ensure that they cease and desist.

We continue to hold open the possibility of following up on those meetings with further decisions for how we take that forward, depending on how they respond.