Thank you, and thank you for having us here.
I'm here today in follow-up to the presentation to this committee by Minister Mendicino to provide support for the study of the public order emergency and the role the Emergencies Act played in bringing it to a conclusion.
My presentation will focus on my role as the deputy minister of Public Safety in the following areas. First, I will address our understanding of the nature of the threats leading to the invocation of the Emergencies Act. Second will be how the Emergencies Act facilitated law enforcement actions, and third is the role we played in communication and coordination with provinces, territories and municipalities.
The public emergency in January and February 1922 was rooted in a movement centred on anti-government sentiments connected with the public health response to the COVID‑19 pandemic.
At that time, participants in protests and blockades in the nation's capital and at strategic ports of entry adopted tactics that disrupted the peace, impacted the Canadian economy and engendered national security risks. This included aggressive protest tactics, threatening behaviour, slowing down traffic and creating traffic jams, in particular, near ports of entry.
The freedom and well-being of citizens was negatively impacted, and businesses were forced to close either due to safety concerns or due to the disruption in the flow of goods and services through blocked ports of entry.
We also observed that convoys of large trucks, which were growing in terms of both size and number, were manifesting unpredictably around the country. In many locations, the protest moved beyond a peaceful threshold and became illegal, giving rise to a volatile and unpredictable environment at the protest sites, with an assessed potential to mobilize to violence.
Broadly speaking, and crucially, information about what was happening within protest groups was not easy to obtain. While CSIS did not identify specific IMVE threats, ideologically motived violent extremism threats, we were aware that some extremist supporters were seeking to link their causes to these protests.
I want to emphasize that CSIS does not investigate, as the director has testified, lawful advocacy, protest or dissent, except when it is carried out in conjunction with activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada.
That said, assessments provided in a public unclassified space by the integrated threat assessment centre on ideologically motivated violent extremism helped inform our understanding of the complex and evolving nature of the threat environment, one that was spurred by misinformation and harmful rhetoric. It also pointed to the potential for lone actors to find an opportunity within protests—an environment in which determined, disaffected individuals could cause harm in a very short amount of time.
There was also a fear that the measures taken by the police would run up against firm and determined opposition that could cause problems and greater instability.
The reasons for issuing the declaration of a public order emergency were set in the public document of explanation pursuant to section 58, as has been mentioned to this committee.
Furthermore, the Houses of Parliament were provided with the consultations document. These documents highlight that, between the end of January and February 14, the escalation of the threat across the country had been regularly communicated with and by PTs and police of jurisdiction to the federal government. They requested the federal government's action in supporting police of jurisdiction to address the threat.
Officials from Public Safety, I and my colleagues, engaged with provincial, territorial and municipal partners on multiple occasions on topics ranging from additional support for law enforcement to reduce illegal crowd gathering to increasing powers to manage the convoys, including infractions, fines, enforcement regimes, tow trucks and possible deployment of additional RCMP materiel and human resources.
That is the context in which the Emergencies Act was invoked in mid-February.
The act provided tools to bolster law enforcement powers such as access to tow trucks to end the blockades. The act also provided tools to deter the continuing of illegal protests and restore public order such as the prohibition on public assembly and the economic measures on convoy financing.
Within the federal government, Public Safety Canada, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Canada Border Services Agency, Justice Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Transport Canada all played central roles.
Through the three weeks of this crisis, we communicated and coordinated closely with other partners. Collaboration with provincial and territorial counterparts took place through an already-established ADM-level FPT committee, the crime prevention and policing committee, as well as through conversations I had with my provincial deputy minister counterparts. In addition, as deputy minister, I engaged with the City of Ottawa manager, the RCMP, the Ontario Provincial Police, the Ottawa Police Service leaders and provincial deputy minister counterparts.
In conclusion, the Emergencies Act was invoked in a volatile environment with potential risk to national security across Canada, taking into account the view and advice of many stakeholders.
I look forward to your questions.