Electoral Reform Committee on Oct. 5th, 2016

[The Chair, Liberal, Francis Scarpaleggia]

The meeting is officially opened. Welcome to the 37th meeting of the Special Committee on Electoral Reform. It's hard to believe that we've met that many times, but we've been quite busy, since I think it was June or July.

For the benefit of the witnesses, we met quite a bit during the summer in Ottawa, including quite intensively in August.

We've been on the road for two and a half weeks now. It's great to be in St. John's, Newfoundland. It seems that wherever we go, the weather is nice, so I think we're bringing some good weather. That may augur well for our report.

We have three witnesses with us today for this first panel. We have Amanda Bittner, associate professor at Memorial University. We have Christopher Dunn and Robert Ring.

I'll give you a brief overview of how we proceed. Each witness will have five minutes to present. Then we have one round of questions and answers when each member of the committee is allotted five minutes to engage with the witnesses. That five minutes includes questions and answers. If you find you weren't able to answer a question properly because of the time limits, it doesn't mean you can't finish your thought the next time you have the floor. In fact, sometimes a member, when it comes around to them, will say, “You weren't able to finish your point answering so and so. Please take some time to finish your thought.” We're pretty flexible in the interest of gathering the most insight that we can.

Without further ado, we'll start with Professor Bittner, for five minutes, please.

[Amanda Bittner, Associate Professor, Memorial University, As an Individual]

Thank you to the committee for inviting me to speak today.

I've been studying elections and voting for a number of years now. While my primary focus is voting behaviour, both in Canada and other contexts, I do spend a great deal of time thinking about the rules of the game that affect how parties, candidates, and voters interact, how they understand their roles, and how they make decisions. To be frank, rules matter. They affect everything, but not always in ways that we might expect.

I'm not here to advocate for a specific system, but I do have two main points that I'd like to make. I'd also be happy to answer any questions the committee has, either on these points or other issues.

I'm not a francophone, but I hope my French will be adequate enough to answer your questions in French. We shall see.

I know that this committee has been touring the country and has heard testimony from a number of different witnesses, academic and otherwise, and I imagine at this point you have heard it all. Academics don't agree on what's the best system, interest groups don't agree on what's the best system.

As a result, there appear to be many options with many outcomes, and I think this is actually pretty accurate. There are multiple options and all of those systems do have trade-offs, so even small tweaks can have an important impact and major changes can lead to unanticipated consequences.

My first main point is that before the country embarks on change, I think it's important to talk about the goals. We really cannot talk about solutions until we clearly identify the problems. What is the government hoping to achieve with electoral reform? What is this committee hoping to achieve? What motivates all this work and all of these hearings?

What do we think is actually wrong with the SMP system? Until we clearly establish the answer to that question, it's impossible for us to find a good solution. All systems have trade-offs, as I mentioned, and at the root of each is a normative idea about how politics should be.

When we talk about SMP as political science instructors, usually quite quickly, which is very confusing, we often point to five key shortcomings.

It tends to distort votes and creates false majorities, so we get a majority in the legislature where a majority did not exist in the population. It can produce wrong winners. Minority interests and smaller parties often get shut out of the legislature. It can lead to wasted votes. Close observers of Canadian politics, in particular, have pointed to a key shortcoming of our system, which is that it exacerbates and magnifies regional distortions in parties' representation, thus perhaps contributing to regional strife.

These five points are not new to you and I imagine you've heard these points at least 50 times by now.

When we talk about the benefits of SMP, we often refer to the following three features. First, it's familiar, we know it and we understand it, sort of. Second, the system includes an identifiable local representative. You are those reps, you know how important that is to Canadians. Third it tends to produce stable majority governments. Again, this is not news.

Then why am I bringing this simple introduction to political science, this listed system of pros and cons, to the committee like this?

It's not clear to me that the government has clearly laid out what it perceives to be the problem with SMP in advance of embarking on this process. Furthermore, which system we prefer depends on our priorities and values. If we as individuals value co-operation, negotiation, and having more voices heard in the legislature, we might prefer a more proportional system. However, if the local candidate is a bigger priority, or if we prefer decisive governments with lots of power to “get things done” then we might prefer a plurality system like the one we have. The important thing here is that values undergird everything and it's impossible to dissociate those two things.

I'm agnostic about system choice. As I stated, all systems have trade-offs and there's no perfect system. There are pros and cons to our system, and there are pros and cons to systems we might adopt.

The thing that I'm not agnostic about is the desirability of making a change before we identify clearly what the problem is with the status quo. This is not to say that I don't think we have problems. My issue is that I don't believe that we have sufficiently informed Canadians about what we think the problem is and what specifically we want to fix, because I think that different problems have different solutions and that those things will have to be traded off. There is no perfect system.

This brings me to my second key point. In suggesting emphatically that we need to establish the problem before we can find the solution, it occurs to me that the committee is likely to press me on what I perceive the problem to be. I might as well throw this in, just to give you something. Canada is a country that's built on diversity—diverse geography, diverse history, diverse people with diverse backgrounds, diverse sets of interests, priorities, values, and in particular, diverse sets of ideas of how society ought to look, what we ought to do, what our goals ought to be.

Our system of national politics, as it exists right now, does fail us because it does not represent Canadians as it could or as it should. While our Prime Minister declares that it's 2016, the under-representation of traditionally marginalized groups continues. Women constitute only about 25% of the Legislature, less than 15% of the Legislature is composed of visible minority MPs, and only 10 of the 338 sitting MPs are indigenous.

This is important for two reasons.

First, it gives Canadians a skewed idea of what it means to be a politician. Millions of people, people like me, look at Parliament and don't see it as a place where they belong. Our children growing up today are learning about what it means to be a citizen of Canada, but they look at Parliament and don't see themselves there. This is a major problem.

Second, the lack of diversity in the Legislature stymies progress. Diversity of experience provides a diversity of voices, a diversity of perspectives, and has the potential to lead to new and innovative solutions to contemporary policy problems. Thus, our system fails us symbolically, but it also fails us on a practical level.

This is the problem with our politics as I see it, and I strongly believe that this is worth fixing.

This is just one informed opinion. The important thing here is that before we get serious about making changes, the committee needs to identify what problem it wants to solve. This is my opinion. I think that's one problem and there might be a number of solutions to that problem. I urge you as a committee to take this suggestion seriously as you move forward in this process.

Without clearly outlining the problem, it's really difficult to find a solution. Making a change just for change's sake is not a good idea.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Francis Scarpaleggia]

Thank you very much.

Professor Dunn, go ahead, sir.

[Christopher Dunn, As an Individual]

Thank you.

First of all, I'd like to stress that my research background is not in electoral systems or the subject matter of the committee, but is in fact of a more generalist method. What I bring to the committee hopefully is a more general perspective. In terms of this committee, that is the international perspective.

What I'm going to do is not so much make a recommendation but establish questions for discussion. My paper therefore is suggestive in nature. I see a basic conundrum at work with regard to electoral systems. That is that national leadership in English-speaking North Atlantic countries tends to centralize power, especially where external affairs are concerned. On the other hand, electoral reform tends to decentralize it. This point is generally ignored.

The second point is that the SMP system is remarkably durable in these three north Atlantic countries. That must be because there is a political calculus at work with the leadership that points to a utility for their purposes. The utility that I suggest they have is that power shared is power diminished. The point they bring therefore is not to be ignored.

Third, these facts have implications for electoral systems. In the paper I have presented and prepared, I'm going to tease out some of the rationale that I think is being used by these leaders. I use a concept called the North Atlantic triangle. The North Atlantic triangle is a concept used by historians in the past. It basically refers to relationships among America, Britain, and Canada. I suggest that it be applied to electoral reform simply because these three countries are the holdouts with regard to SMP. They are holdouts against electoral reform. They are holdouts, I suggest, because of the nature of the advantages it offers. Especially in external affairs, these are significant.

I suggest that there is a common culture at work with regard to these three countries. The leadership in them regards electoral reform as a contextual element.

In other words, changes in one element affect other elements of the system. This implies a certain caution with regard to its reform. Leadership regards these matters as being in alignment. Therefore, they are cautious about making reforms that affect one part of the system because it might affect the whole system.

I think it's especially important to realize that the considerations for those who have involved themselves in electoral reform are especially important in matters of international diplomacy, international conflict and peacekeeping, trade and environmental matters.

I have much more to say. Perhaps that can be teased out in discussion with the members.

[The Chair, Liberal, Francis Scarpaleggia]

That would be a good idea because there will be many questions and that would be a good way of drawing out some of your additional material, if that's okay.

We're a bit over time.

You have one more point?

[Christopher Dunn]

I have one more point. The issue is particularly important for a country like Canada that has a need for agile relationships with members, other members of the triangle, and other members of the international community. I'm making a number of recommendations or suggestions or directions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Francis Scarpaleggia]

Professor, your recommendations are in the brief?

That's perfect.

Our staff has the brief, and some of the recommendations will come out in discussion and those that do not will still make it to the analysts' desks.

Thank you.

We'll go now to Mr. Ring.

[Robert Ring, As an Individual]

Thank you.

The topic I'm here to discuss today is an electoral system that I designed. It was the subject of my master's thesis that was completed in 2014, and Dr. Bittner was my supervisor. The system is called proportional first past the post.

[The Chair, Liberal, Francis Scarpaleggia]

You only did it for the Atlantic region. At the end of the day, which party received how many seats? What was the breakdown of seats according to your simulation? I'd like to let some members probe your system through Q and A. How many seats did each party get in the end, for the Atlantic?

[Robert Ring]

In this situation here there would have been 34 Atlantic seats.

[The Chair, Liberal, Francis Scarpaleggia]

That's up from 32 today. Is that correct?

[Robert Ring]

Yes. There needs to be an even number per riding, and Labrador was kept as one riding. Nova Scotia also had an odd number of ridings, so they would get 12 instead of 11.

[The Chair, Liberal, Francis Scarpaleggia]

Okay. But out of 34, which party got how many seats?

[Robert Ring]

I'll just look at the totals here. I have the list here of each party and who was elected in each riding. I haven't actually totalled the parties for all of Atlantic Canada.

[The Chair, Liberal, Francis Scarpaleggia]

You don't have a line there that says how many seats the Conservatives got, how many seats the...? If you need to tally that up, that's fine.

[Robert Ring]

Okay. I could tally that up.

[The Chair, Liberal, Francis Scarpaleggia]

Perhaps you could tally that up while we start the round of questions. That would be an interesting result to know.

We'll start our round of questions with Ms. Sahota for five minutes, please.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

It's fantastic to be here in St. John's. It's my first time here and it's beautiful. It's probably one of the most beautiful places I've been in Canada. You're quite lucky to have these views every day.

My first question goes to you, Professor Bittner. It's nice to have you on the panel. I know you've done work on women in politics. It's nice to have women on this panel. It's not often we've been able to get a whole bunch of witnesses who are women.

I agree with you %100 that one of the main problems our system faces is diversity. When we hear from people at the open mike, whether they're talking about diversity of political view or ideology, about women or aboriginals or other minorities, or about other diverse factors that we need represented in our Parliament, that is a main issue that we're seeing come up time after time.

You were basically saying let's figure out what the problem is and then come up with a solution. If that's the main problem, what would be your solution? Do you think Mr. Ring's idea, the set-up of the system he's created, would solve that problem?

[Amanda Bittner]

That's a great question. This is one of those answers that may or may not satisfy the committee at the end of the day. For every problem, there are multiple solutions. You could go wholeheartedly into massive changes that might address some of the solutions and then might create their own problems, or you could try to tweak little things along the way. A variety of solutions are possible.

One thing I would say is that while it is the case that proportional systems tend to be associated with greater levels of diversity, that link is still dependent on a commitment from parties to put forward diverse lists of candidates. We often talk point to New Zealand or Germany, for example, where you have party lists and local ridings, and you zipper in candidates—women or men, or different ethnic groups, or things like that—which can be done, and is done a lot. It doesn't have to be done, though. If that's the issue that the committee sees as being the biggest problem and they want to address that, then we need to ensure that the rules created ensure that this is the priority.

A lot of things can be done without massive system change to encourage women, minority, and aboriginal candidates to be part of the system and to be sitting in the legislature. A lot of the responsibility falls to parties. Parties could do a lot more than they're doing right now to encourage those groups to apply and to ensure that the rules are such that those groups must apply or that they must find those groups.

I know you have a private member's bill in Parliament right now that seeks to penalize parties for not putting forward parity candidates in elections. That's a great way to do it. Lots of folks say they don't believe in quotas. They don't believe in affirmative action. That's fine. But try as we might to fight against quotas, all the evidence is that they actually do work. Once you have those quotas in place, you then lay the groundwork for future generations. We talk about the role model effect and the fact that once you see people in Parliament, you believe you can be there too. It's likelier that you will consider that as a job for yourself. It's likelier that you won't need to be asked or recruited 25,000 times before saying yes. Once we have those quotas in place, the system changes slowly. The culture changes as well, and it's not that big of a deal. Suddenly things are working the way they ought to.

So we might say, “Oh, I don't want to just hire diversity candidates”, or “I don't want to get a job just because I'm a woman”, because who wants to think that? At the same time, we know that all the evidence shows that there are lots of ways you can justify who you hire, who you choose, and who you recruit. It's really easy to use those merit arguments against the groups that are not being seen there. So forcing parties to do this is a really good idea.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Perhaps I can get a comment on Mr. Ring's proposal.

[Amanda Bittner]

I'm familiar with his proposal. I've read it numerous times. It's really interesting. I mean, Robert is one of those students who are very keen and very enthusiastic. That shows through. He worked really hard on his thesis. Certainly I think it has the potential to address some of these things, especially if we are asking parties to nominate more than one candidate per riding. Usually district magnitude is half of the problem when it comes to SMP. We think we're going to nominate one person, and therefore they must be a success, and therefore they must be a white man.

I think there are lots of reasons to think that having a higher district magnitude would change the calculations that parties make, but again, a lot of that stuff is still internal. Part of the problem is recruitment. Part of the problem is that senior party officials have this idea that women and racialized minorities are not successful candidates, even though there's no evidence to suggest that this is the case. All the evidence shows that when women run, they do win. So really, the issue is about recruitment.

[The Chair, Liberal, Francis Scarpaleggia]

Thank you.

We'll go to Mr. Nater, please, for five minutes.

[John Nater, Conservative, Perth—Wellington, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And thank you as well to our witnesses today. I think it was a fascinating panel discussion.

I do want to point out, in full disclosure, that I have an academic connection with Professor Dunn. I co-authored a chapter in one of his publications, The Handbook of Canadian Public Administration, and received a large paycheque for that, $133.33. Academic publishing does have a financial benefit.

I do have some questions for all three panellists, so I'll hopefully get through them all, and if not, I may come back in a future round.

I want to start with Professor Dunn.

Part of your proposal in your brief was maintaining a single-member plurality type of system, as well as regional top-up seats. I wonder if you could maybe elaborate on that a little bit, and whether or not the regional top-up seat might be better focused on a reform to the Senate and seeing the Senate returned to a more regionally based body or a regionally representative body rather than going through a representative change in the electoral system.

[Christopher Dunn]

Actually I didn't deal with regional top-up seats in my particular end section or observations. What I did was point out that the basic dichotomy was between the political systems of these three countries, which tend to centralize power, and the nature of electoral reform, which is to decentralize it. So there is a basic conundrum at work, I suggested, with regard to electoral reform, because we have two different directions going at the same time—centralization and decentralization.

What I'm saying is that this conundrum has to be dealt with, and it's especially concerning, I think, for national leaderships that have to deal with this issue especially in their external or foreign relationships, because in no other area, perhaps, is the need for concerted, coherent direction as necessary as in external or foreign relations. You have electoral reform, which has the ability to decentralize the power structure at the national level, and what you have, therefore, is a collision course between the electoral reform and the all-over direction of political leadership, which is to centralize.

I go through a list of items in my paper that point out the nature of such centralization and the need to cohere power among parties or other bodies, so I posed a question. I think that is the nature of the contribution of this paper.

[John Nater, Conservative, Perth—Wellington, ON]

Mr. Ring, you have made a fascinating proposal. I think that, as a discussion point, it can generate a great discussion.

From a practical standpoint, though, Canadians are used to having election results pretty quickly. Within a few hours of the polls closing, they tend to like to see who has been elected and who has been defeated.

How would you propose getting around that change in mindset that it may take a couple of days to do the math, to figure out the situation, or a couple of weeks potentially? We saw that Australia took a fair bit of time to actually figure out whether Labor or Liberal had won that election. How would you get around that mindset shift for Canadians in changing the system as you have proposed?