Good morning. I'd like to step back a little bit further.
The roots of virtual elimination actually trace back to the 1979 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, in which the VE policy states that “The discharge of toxic substances in toxic amounts be prohibited and the discharge of any or all persistent substances be virtually eliminated”.
I respectfully remind the committee members that CEPA is the primary domestic tool through which Canada meets its commitments to the water quality agreement. CEPA 1999 recognizes a sort of virtual elimination, but the statute did not adopt the definition agreed to in its original water quality agreement context, and it departs significantly from the definition proposed by the international joint commission. The IJC recommends a VE policy that, among other things, applies to “all sources, pathways...and media” and “addresses the complete lifecycle of targeted chemicals”.
Unlike the IJC but consistent with a weakness in the water quality agreement, CEPA focuses on anthropocentric releases, ignoring the health impacts of some legacy toxics in sediment. What comes to mind there primarily are the areas of concern—the most toxic hot spots in North America.
CEPA focuses away from naturally occurring elements in its VE definition, so when you look at something like chlorine, which forms the chemical basis of some of the most persistent bioaccumulative toxics known, this further undermines the act's capacity to foster real pollution prevention. A focus on chemical precursors, at least in some instances, could effectively virtually eliminate whole classes of persistent bioaccumulative toxics. The IJC found that “approximately half of the 362 chemicals confirmed to be present in the water, sediment, or biota of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem are synthetic chlorinated organic substances, and many of these are expected to be persistent toxics.”
I invite committee members to consider a recent study by the Toxics Use Research Institute of Massachusetts that “considered whether less toxic alternatives were available for lead, formaldehyde, perchloroethylene, hexavalent chromium, and di(2-ethylhexyl)phthalate (DEHP).” The study found that “in every application studied, at least one alternative was identified that was commercially available, was likely to meet the technical requirements of some users, and was likely to have reduced environmental and occupational health and safety impacts.”
In response to industry cost concerns, which inevitably come up when we're talking about virtual elimination, I draw the committee members' attention to a report commissioned by the VE task force seeking to identify economic instruments for realizing our virtual elimination goals: “To the extent that that innovation leads to the development of new substitutes less expensive than existing substitutes, the estimated costs of virtual elimination are overstated.”
The report recommends the IJC encourage parties to the water quality agreement to adopt pilot programs to test economic instruments. In so doing, the report later points to a guidance offered by the polluter-pays principle recommended by the OECD in 1975. It further suggests that the parties to the water quality agreement consider marketable permits, taxes, subsidies, deposit refund mechanisms, and other tools in pursuit of virtual elimination.
Two additional CEPA clauses undermine the act's capacity to protect human health and the environment. The first is that a level of quantification is needed prior to any action, and second is the pollute-permissive language of the act, which focuses on what levels can be released rather than what cannot be released. Quoting directly from the act, “When the level of quantification for a substance has been specified...the Ministers shall prescribe the quantity or concentration of the substance that may be released”. Recognizing that technical innovation will allow for ever smaller quantifiable concentration, the act's pursuit of levels of quantification is a bit of a red herring.
In 1994, the IJC's VE task force, in identifying gaps and impediments to achieving VE goals, noted that “The governments' “pollution prevention” approach generally pertains to control (rather than prevention), focuses on releases (rather than uses) and attempts to determine acceptable levels (rather than elimination requirements).” The task force recommended that the parties promote development of technologies, products, and processes that will eliminate the creation of persistent toxics and thereby eliminate their input into the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem.
Although the task force recommended domestic measures to address this failure long before 1999, CEPA 1999 entrenched what was already recognized as a problem. CEPA's largest failure, however, is that it not only allows but requires the political repercussions of measures to virtually eliminate the most deleterious chemicals to human health and the environment.
It may seem trite to note the influence of political realities, but I respectfully remind committee members that following years and years of review, analysis, and identification, not a single chemical has been added to the list. Only one toxic pollutant, hexachlorobutadiene, has been recommended for action. This isn't due to a lack of scientific uncertainty regarding the toxicity of some of these chemicals. Many of them, such as DDT, PCBs, dioxin and other candidates for VE, are recognized as the most toxic among toxins and they are regulated globally. It's a reflection of the regulatory opt-out that consistently plagues and undermines the operationalization of CEPA.
I hope that historical context is of a benefit to the committee.