Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate that.
I'm going to address some of the concerns that were already raised, or at least implied, by my colleague Mr. Warawa.
Another aspect that I want to refer to here is how this impacts Saskatchewan. This bill has a pretty significant, pretty negative effect for the province of Saskatchewan, which has been alluded to before by Ms. Donnelly and others, and that concerns me a great deal.
At this point, particularly when Saskatchewan is coming into a good time and we're a “have” province, now we're going to have the NDP—which purports to protect the little guy, and which is a party that actually had its roots in my own home province with Tommy Douglas as its leader—now we're finding them, for whatever reasons, coming back at our province and, it would seem, significantly trying to hurt the province, whether intentionally or inadvertently, I'm not sure. But that's of great concern to me as a member from that province.
We've had the status of being a “have-not” province, and now for the first time we're moving into a category of being a “have” province.
The premier, just yesterday, expressed great pleasure with our budget, in particular the $240 million for carbon sequestration in the province. That will be good for the environment. It will be very good for the south of the province, where we have already begun to do that kind of thing. I want to come back to that a little bit, and especially make the point that what we have proposed as a government is a practical kind of solution in a number of areas, on clean water and land and air. That regulatory framework is very practical with respect to air emissions and would do us good as a province as well.
I'd like to mention some of the negative aspects or downside of this particular bill we have before us here today. I share some of the concerns that the Bloc member Mr. Bigras has raised in his testimony earlier here with respect to Bill C-377. I'll be referring to some of the stuff in Hansard and the blues here.
I've found very helpful—and I think other members hopefully did as well—the document submitted to us committee members by Mr. Peter Hogg, on February 11 this year. He submitted to the committee a document on the constitutionality of this particular bill and raised some pretty heavy-duty concerns about the constitutionality of Bill C-377. He talked about how, in his view, our accountability act here clearly, in its present form without a major rewrite, was not at all withstanding the constitutional test with respect to climate change. He wrote it on February 1, but submitted it to the committee on February 11.
For the record, Peter Hogg is a well-respected legal scholar in the country, a Companion of the Order of Canada, Queen's Counsel. Those are some significant and very impressive credentials. He's a professor emeritus at the Osgoode Hall Law School of York University and the former dean there. He's also a scholar in residence at Blake, Cassels and Graydon LLP. His field of expertise in particular—as you would know, Mr. McGuinty—is constitutional law. That's what he excels in, and he has much to say and some pretty pointed things to say on the issue of this particular bill.
He's written extensively. For members like my friend Mr. McGuinty and others—and it is one that David has possibly read in detail, every word of it—he has written Constitutional Law of Canada, Carswell edition, Toronto, 5th edition, 2007, two volumes. I suspect that the law students have probably read a fair bit of that.
He addresses some of the things here, and I'll just read some of his remarks from his brief that we all have and maybe we all recall from that submission on February 11 here:
Bill C-377, the Climate Change Accountability Act, First Reading October 31, 2006, is a bill with the purpose of reducing Canada's greenhouse gas emissions (s. 3). By s. 5, it provides that the Government of Canada, “shall ensure” that Canadian greenhouse gas emissions are reduced to 25% below 1990 levels by 2020 and to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050.
The bill itself makes no provision—and that's been acknowledged by a number of people—for the achievement of these targets, leaving that entirely to regulations to be made by the Governor in Council.
Subsection 7(1) provides that “the Governor in Council may make regulations for carrying out the purposes and the provisions of this Act”. Subsection 7(2) provides that “the Governor in Council shall make regulations to ensure that Canada fully meets its commitment under section 5”, the emphasis added.
Peter Hogg says, “Putting the Government of Canada's obligation under section 7(2) into a realistic context, I note that Canada signed the Kyoto Accord in 1997 and committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions down to 6% below 1990 levels by 2012”. He goes on to say, “At the time of signing, Canada's emission levels were already 13% above 1990 levels. I am reliably informed that the level of emissions is now 33% above 1990 levels”. And this is all the backdrop to what he's about to say in terms of the constitutionality or lack thereof of this Bill C-377.
And where he gets this information from apparently, that number being 13% above 1990 levels at the signing—Canada's emission levels were already 13% above 1990 levels, and 33% later—that number was generally accepted by informed participants at the C.D. Howe conference on the economics of greenhouse gas emissions control in Canada in Toronto, December 6 to 7, 2007.
He says, “Canada's economy and population continue to grow, increasing the demand for energy. Obviously radical changes in the behaviour of Canadians would be needed to take the level of emissions down from 33% above 1990 levels to 25% below 1990 levels by 2020—a date that is only 12 years away.”
He goes on to say, “Since government incentives and exhortations to voluntary reductions have not halted the trend of rising emissions, very severe and pervasive regulatory restrictions on activities that produce emissions would be necessary to actually reverse the rising trend and reduce greenhouse gas emissions sharply enough to reach the Bill C-377 target for the year 2020.”
He goes on to say, “The need for strong and pervasive regulations to meet the Bill C-377 target for 2020 is especially the case since Bill C-377 is not a tax measure and does not authorize the imposition of carbon taxes.”
He further goes on to say, “Many economists have advocated the view that taxes are the most effective means of changing behaviour to reduce greenhouse gas emissions”, and apparently that was the view of a number of economists who presented papers or participated in discussions at the C.D. Howe conference we just referred to.
So economists point out that carbon taxes could be revenue neutral by being balanced with cuts in income taxes or other taxes.
The Parliament of Canada has unlimited taxing powers, so this would raise no constitutional issues. However, he goes on to say, “No taxes are authorized by Bill C-377, none were proposed by the previous Liberal government and none have been proposed by the present Conservative government.”
“The Parliament of Canada has two heads of legislative power that might be invoked as the authority to enact Bill C-377. One is the criminal law power and the other is the peace, order, and good government power. In my opinion, neither of those powers will support a law that is as broad and vague as Bill C-377. I will briefly discuss each of these powers in turn.
“The Constitution Act,1867, by s. 91(27) confers on the Parliament of Canada the power to make laws in relation to 'criminal law'”. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that a law will be classified as criminal law if it has “a valid criminal purpose backed by a prohibition and a penalty”.
Again, that was the widespread view among economists who presented papers or participated in that earlier referred to discussion at the C.D. Howe conference.
So far as the “valid criminal purpose” is concerned, the Court has held that the protection of the environment counts as a valid criminal purpose. The purpose of Bill C-377 therefore qualifies as a valid criminal purpose.
So far as the “prohibition and a penalty” is concerned, the question is whether Bill C-377 contains a prohibition and a penalty, as those terms have been understood in the case law.
The courts have traditionally distinguished between criminal law and regulatory law. The Criminal Code is a classic case of criminal law in that the Act itself contains prohibitions of various kinds of conduct (theft, assault, murder, and so on). These prohibitions can be self-applied by citizens who, if they offend, will then be subject to punishment by the criminal courts.For the great bulk of offences, there is no role for an administrative body or official to make regulations or to exercise discretion. A regulatory law, on the other hand, is one that achieves its purposes by more sophisticated means than a simple prohibition and penalty, typically vesting discretionary powers in an administrative body or official and often relying on regulations made by the executive. Even if the regulatory scheme is ultimately subject to the sanction of a prohibition and penalty (as is the case with most laws), those are not the leading characteristics of the law: the prohibition and penalty originate in a regulatory scheme. On this basis, federal laws attempting to regulate competition through an administrative body and to regulate the insurance industry through a licensing scheme have been struck down as falling outside of the criminal law power.
I think that's important for us to note for the purposes of this bill.
In R. v. Hydro-Québec (1977), the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (a 1988 version of the current federal statute) as criminal law, despite the fact that the Act’s prohibition of the emission of “toxic” substances was preceded by an administrative process to determine whether a particular substance should be classified as “toxic”.
I think my friends from the other parties would probably have some recall of the significance of that particular decision.
The Court split five-four on the issue with the dissenting judges saying that “it would be an odd crime whose definition was made entirely dependent on the discretion of the executive”.