Mr. Laforest said:
What Parliament is doing...is making provision for carefully tailoring the prohibited action to specified substances used or dealt with in specific circumstances. This type of tailoring is obviously necessary in defining the scope of a criminal prohibition, and is, of course, within Parliament’s power.
This passage makes it clear that, in a complex area like the environment, there can be some administrative discretion in the creation of criminal offences, but the role of the discretion has to be “carefully tailored” by Parliament, meaning that has to be defined and limited by the act.
He goes on to say:
Based on this ruling, it is my opinion that the provisions of Bill C-377 are not carefully tailored in a fashion that could be upheld as a criminal law.
This is where we're getting to the unconstitutionality of it.
It is true that the Bill, by s. 12, provides that the contravention of a regulation is an offence punishable by fine or imprisonment. But the regulation-making power is so broad and vague that any prohibition in the regulations is left by the Act to be designed by the executive within the ill-defined limits set by s. 7 (described earlier in this opinion). The range of conduct that contributes directly or indirectly to the emission of greenhouse gases is vast. Under Bill C-377, it is all subject to regulation, depending entirely on the discretion of the federal cabinet. From the Act it is impossible to discern what conduct the federal cabinet will actually decide to prohibit. Indeed, even the amount of any penalty is left to the federal cabinet: by 12, any fine or imprisonment for breach of the regulations is “as prescribed by the regulations”.
Then he says:
In my opinion, Bill C-377 does not contain a “carefully tailored” prohibition or penalty of a kind that would qualify as an exercise of Parliament’s criminal law power. The Bill would not be upheld by the Supreme Court as a criminal law.
Then under the section of peace, order, and good government he says:
The Constitution Act, 1867, by the opening words of s. 91, confers on the Parliament of Canada the power to make laws for the “peace, order, and good government of Canada” (pogg). The branch of that power that can authorize environmental legislation is the “national concern” branch, under which Parliament has authority to make laws on topics of national concern.
He then says, as Mr. McGuinty will remember:
In R. v. Crown Zellerbach (1988), the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the federal Ocean Dumping Control Act under the national concern branch of pogg. The law in issue prohibited ships from dumping any substance into the sea without a permit. The Court upheld the law, taking the view that marine pollution was a matter of national concern that was distinct from matters of provincial jurisdiction and beyond the capacity of the provinces to control. But, as in Québec Hydro, the Court was narrowly split, in this case four-three. The split was over the requirement of the national concern branch that any matter of national concern had to have “a singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern”. For Le Dain J. speaking for the majority, the topic of marine pollution did have sufficiently ascertainable limits to meet this requirement of distinctness. For La Forest J. speaking for the dissenting minority, the topic of marine pollution was not sufficiently distinct, because it could lead to federal regulation of industrial and municipal activity, resource development, construction, recreation and other matters that contribute to marine pollution but are within provincial jurisdiction.
In Crown Zellerbach, the majority upheld the law, but the issue of difficulty was the requirement of distinctness. Although the law merely prohibited dumping at sea, the split of the Court made clear how close the decision was. In the case of Bill C-377, no attempt has been made to place limits on what Parliament can do to reduce greenhouse gases; the Bill appears to authorize any regulation that would have the effect, direct or indirect, of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. On the face of it, the Bill represents an assertion of federal authority (coupled with a massive delegation to the executive) over a huge range of matters that are now within provincial jurisdiction. While there can be no doubt that the reduction of greenhouse gases is a matter of national concern, legislation has to be drafted that focuses on a distinct matter, such as industrial air emissions, to have any prospect of being upheld by the Court under the national concern branch of pogg.
Of course, “pogg” is peace, order, and good government.
In my opinion, Bill C-377, while clearly directed to a matter of national concern, is too broad and sweeping to satisfy the requirement of distinctness that the Court has imposed as a limitation on the national concern branch of pogg. The Bill would not be upheld by the Court under that head of federal power.
He then gives his conclusion with respect to his perception of the unconstitutionality of Bill C-377:
The constitutional problem with Bill C-377 is that it leaves the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions solely to a regulation-making power vested in the executive. The only direction given to the Governor in Council as to the nature of the regulations is that they must be “to carry out the purposes and provisions of this Act” and “to ensure that Canada fully meets its commitment under section 5 [to achieve the targets for reduction of emissions]”. This extraordinarily broad and sweeping regulation-making power purports to authorize any regulation that would have the effect of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Such regulations could reach into every area of Canadian economic (and even social) life. The Bill enacts no restrictions as to the kinds of laws that are contemplated or the kinds of activities that can be regulated. Such a sweeping grant of authority to the executive is unprecedented outside of wartime—and should be a matter of grave political concern quite apart from constitutional issues. However, the constitutional issues are enough by themselves to defeat the legislation. Bill C-377 is outside Parliament’s power over criminal law, because that head of power, in addition to a criminal purpose, requires a prohibition and a penalty. If the prohibition and penalty are to be delegated to the executive to design and enact, the delegation must be “carefully tailored” so that Parliament at least provides the guidelines for the creation of the new criminal offences. Bill C-377 provides no guidelines of any kind. Bill C-377 is outside Parliament’s power over criminal law, because that head of power, in addition to a criminal purpose, requires a prohibition and a penalty. If the prohibition and penalty are to be delegated to the executive to design and enact, the delegation must be “carefully tailored” so that Parliament at least provides the guidelines for the creation of the new criminal offences. Bill C-377 provides no guidelines of any kind. Bill C-377 is also outside Parliament’s power over peace, order, and good government, because the national concern branch of that power authorizes laws relating to a matter of national concern only if the matter is sufficiently distinct to distinguish it from matters of provincial concern
So I would think that my Quebec colleagues, Mr. Lussier and Mr. Bigras, would be particularly concerned about this, and particularly that last part, where he judges it to be....
Pardon?