Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'll be trying to address some of the broader issues around Bali and what it actually delivered, instead of specifically addressing issues from Canada—at least in my intervention. I will talk about the implications for Canada, however, and I'll be glad to answer any questions about Canada and Bali, should you so choose.
First of all, was Bali a success? If I may bring in a baseball analogy here, while the final agreement reached at Bali was far from a home run, neither was it a strikeout: I guess I would categorize it as a bunt single. The world is on base in addressing climate change, but barely. We are now entering into the last innings of this critical global challenge.
What did it achieve? Well, let's not overlook some of the extremely useful decisions reached on avoiding deforestation, some progress on technology transfer, and an important agreement on the operation of the innovative adaptation fund.
On the post-2012 issue, decisions were reached that established a road map for countries to hopefully reach a decision on new targets by late 2009 in Copenhagen. But a clear guide, particularly for major developing economies, would have been preferable.
What Bali didn't achieve, unfortunately, was an agreement around what should be the global target in reaching the convention's ultimate objective. I well recognize and I totally agree with what was stated before by the Canadian government concerning the base expectations of Bali, that those were delivered, but I think it was also becoming increasingly critical that the global community set its sights on a global objective.
I well recognize that achieving such a goal would have been an enormous accomplishment, but I am also increasingly of the view that the global community must set its sights on such an objective if we are to make any headway in the negotiations over the next two years.
Besides the drawing up of the terms of reference for developed and developing countries' mitigation efforts for post-2012, probably the most contentious issue in the negotiations was the reference to how much reduction would be required by developed countries to avoid the scenario of global temperature rising more than two degrees Celsius.
The IPCC did not.... We have to be clear about this. I'm a leading author with the IPCC, and I know what it does and what it does not do. It does not make recommendations; it reports on what the literature says. What it reported was that if we want to avoid a two degrees Celsius rise, OECD countries need to reduce their emissions between 25% and 40% from 1990 levels by 2020. But—and this was the interesting omission from the discussions—it also means that major developing countries need to require a significant deviation from business-as-usual scenarios by that same date.
The real question is, why are we now so focused on two degrees? Could we not, if not thrive, at least cope in a world three degrees warmer, which even though it would still call for significant reductions over the next few decades would give us considerably more room to make the enormous transitions that are required?
The problem is the other side of the IPCC findings, the synthesis report that concludes that even under a two-degree scenario, we're going to see some very real changes in the global ecosystem. Under a three- to three-and-a-half-degree scenario, it becomes almost fully apocalyptic. Fully 40% to 70%—let me repeat, 70%—of the world's species could be at risk of extinction.
If there were ever a case of being stuck between a rock and a hard place, this is it, especially for Canada. On the one hand, we stand to be one of the countries most impacted by climate change, with potentially disastrous consequences for our northern cities and ecosystems; yet we have one of the most carbon-intractable economies in place amongst OECD countries.
The way ahead for Canada? First of all, I was heartened by the comments of the Prime Minister in his Christmas-time interview with the CBC. He states that the scientific evidence is compelling, that it will carry costs and responsibilities for Canada, and that we must show leadership while also clearly calling for a global response that includes all the world's major economies.
Secondly, we must not only accelerate the implementation of the current plan, but follow up on the recommendations of the national round table on the need for significant carbon pricing, by elaborating now how Canada will be able to meet its interim target of 20% reductions from 2006 levels.
The government also needs to offer options that would see further reductions by 2020, including adjusting the base year to 1990, and more in line with where the science now compels us.
Third, the government should support a two degrees Centigrade global target, and this would require a developed country range of 25% to 40%, while also making it clear that commensurate actions by major developing countries, at the very least, begin to take on limitation targets starting in 2020.
Fourth, I don't think we can underestimate the extent to which Canada's perceived legitimacy in the post-2012 negotiations are undermined by our failure to clarify how we plan to maintain our status as a Kyoto party while not meeting our mitigation commitments under the protocol.
Will Canada submit to the non-compliance provisions set in the protocol? If yes, we should say so. If no, then frankly we should show respect for the international process and notify the government's intent to withdraw Canada from the protocol.
I'll leave it at that, Mr. Chair. Thank you very much.
