There are two points on that. The first goes to the general question as to the interaction of the federal and provincial powers. It seems to me the fisheries power would be treated somewhat differently from the power with respect to transboundary waters, and that is because the fisheries power is a specific power. The power with respect to transboundary waters would arise out of national concern, and I think it's fair to say that jurisprudence suggests that the courts tend to be somewhat more circumspect in terms of giving the federal government power there. I still think they would have plenty of power to do what they need to do, because they've done virtually nothing.
With respect to the bilateral agreements, the ideal, I suppose, would have been to have just what you're talking about: specific allocations as to both quantity and I suppose a condition on some measurable types of quality. That would be analogous to the prairie provinces' water agreements, which is really what the Mackenzie agreement was originally modelled on, although those are really done in terms of water quantity. Water quality was added later, but they were focused on water quantity, for obvious reasons.
That's not going to happen in the Mackenzie agreement and the likely bilaterals, because we know from the memorandum of understanding between the Northwest Territories and Alberta what the general shape of the bilateral will look like if it's ever reached. We know that the undertakings there will be very modern, in the sense that they will say all the right things that, interestingly, the prairie provinces' water agreements, which are much older, dating to the 1960s, don't say, but they'll be largely unenforceable.
For one thing, on just a basic point, if you compare the prairie provinces' agreements, they have recourse to the Federal Court. They are binding. Dispute resolution in the master agreement and in the bilaterals is basically referred to the board, and then ultimately to the ministers. So it becomes a political decision. But there is no binding dispute mechanism, which lessens, of course, considerably the power of a downstream province to demand compliance.
Hopefully, things will work out and the upstream jurisdictions will behave nicely, but—