Again, it's a rather complex clause, which of course has in paragraph 19(1)(i) different kinds of relief that the court can order, and in subclause 19(2), four different kinds of relief that the court can order.
I should say at the outset that the reason I opposed the deletion of subclause 19(2) is that it is possible—in fact, I think Ms. Duncan just alluded to the fact that government agencies can in fact be required to obtain permits and authorizations to build. If it's Public Works and there are environmental issues involved, they indeed do have to get permits, so potentially, if one were to preserve the rather—I'm looking for a less impolite word—unusual terms of this act, there would be no reason why it ought not to be imposed against an agency of the federal government as well as other agencies. That is subclause 19(2).
On the other hand, I say unusual because this is, in many respects, without precedent in law, and I'll refer to that again in a moment.
Certainly, when it comes to subclause 19(2), the way those provisions are drafted make them singularly inappropriate to enforce against government agencies. I'm not saying that if we have this kind of an act it shouldn't be enforceable against government agencies. But the notion of a government agency providing financial collateral for the performance of its obligations does seem a little odd, because it doesn't indicate to whom the money ought to be paid or that the government should pay an amount to restore an area. Where, let's say, the Department of Public Works put up a building in violation of some public trust obligation under this act and the court orders it to pay an amount of money to restore that area, there's no indication in subclause 19(2) to whom that would be paid.
Nonetheless--