Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
The intention, as expressed by Ms. Murray, is a laudable one, but in my view this provision does not adequately carry it out. In fact, 30 days' notice seems quite inadequate. If the Government of Canada, for example, received notice that Hydro-Québec was about to be sued pursuant to section 23 as a result of a dam constructed five years ago--after eight years of consultations that proceeded to construction of the dam--it seems unlikely that the Government of Canada would even get to the bottom of it in 30 days, much less come up with a remedy or an adequate solution.
Where I thought this amendment was going is that it would enable the Government of Canada to intervene in the lawsuit by receiving notice of the pending lawsuit. Since the Government of Canada would clearly have an interest in the issues in the lawsuit, I thought this was simply a procedural amendment that would give some notice to the Government of Canada to allow it to intervene in the lawsuit. In that respect, it has some value. But quite frankly, I would also point out the fact that these lawsuits are rather complex, and the government, if it receives such a notice, would undoubtedly—or may, rather, I should say—apply to intervene in the lawsuit to present its perspective, since it may be accused of allowing a contravention. This would engage the parties and the government in additional cost and delay.
From that perspective, it points out that these section 23 lawsuits will be rather costly and create long delays.
However, having heard Ms. Murray's explanation that it's somehow an attempt to provide an investigation clause--if I construed her correctly--similar to that found in CEPA and in the Ontario Environmental Bill of Rights, I'm afraid I just can't support it, on the basis that 30 days would be far too short. It's a band-aid on what is otherwise a gaping wound.