Thank you, Mr. Chair.
There are various difficulties presented by the definitions in clause 2. Some of them we have touched upon in relation to the individual clauses of the bill. I'm going to try to go through them and simply highlight them, because in a way they all touch on the weaknesses in this bill and they are intertwined throughout.
The first difficulty is with the definition of “entity,” which is essentially any group that is either “authorized to carry on business in Canada or that has an office or property in Canada”. An entity need not be a resident, need not have any relationship to the rule or undertaking that is being challenged in court or otherwise, and need not even have to have a permanent office in Canada. It simply has to be a group that opens an office.
The question of federal land has now been amended to make it absolutely clear that it includes aboriginal land, and a definition of “aboriginal land” has been added. While I don't purport to be a constitutional lawyer, I seem to recall hearing time and again in committee that particularly at least when one is legislating with respect to aboriginal rights, one is under a constitutional requirement to consult with aboriginal groups before doing so.
It's rather remarkable that in so many environmental matters—in fact, I think, in the two and a half years that I've been on the environment committee, in every case when we have been considering environmental legislation—we have invited and heard from aboriginal groups, except one; that would be the case of this bill. We have not heard from aboriginal groups in relation to this bill, and yet we have heard from other witnesses the grand impact that this bill is going to have. The mover of the bill certainly expresses in the bill the view that this should have a grand impact on the scheme of things; yet we have not heard from aboriginal groups in relation to it.
The definitions of “federal source” and ”federal work or undertaking”, notwithstanding the substantive amendments here today, include matters that will impact upon provincial works and undertakings. That is to say that they will still apply to areas of concurrent jurisdiction, wherever the federal and the provincial government have a shared environmental jurisdiction. They also will still apply to such provincial undertakings as Highway 407, which I mentioned in the course of debate and which is proposed by the Government of Ontario in order to ease transportation problems in the east of Ontario, because of its impacts on federally regulated environmental issues, whether those would involve species at risk or waterways that might be involved, fisheries issues, or indeed the jurisdiction that is contained under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act.
I've tried to do my best to point out that this provision will similarly impact works in the province of Quebec, because I want to make known to the people of Quebec what danger is presented to hydroelectric works in particular, which are so important to the province of Quebec, by a federal bill that will in effect place the determination of environmental issues in the hands of litigants and judges.
Moving on, the definition of a “healthy and ecologically balanced environment” is one of those that is fraught with difficulty in interpretation. We haven't heard too much about how the courts will interpret that clause. One wonders if the phrase “cultural dignity” is included in any other federal statute. It's not one that's known to me, personally, and I don't think I've heard any evidence to the effect that it is included in any other statute.
I think one of my colleagues pointed out that in the definition of “healthy and ecologically balanced environment” there is a reference to “essential ecological processes”. That begs the question: what is a non-essential ecological process, and exactly what do we mean by an essential ecological process?
Of course what we're doing here is in effect delegating those decisions and allowing courts to fill in the content of this act. We are in effect abdicating our responsibility as legislators to produce legislation with certainty that every citizen and every resident can understand.
There are other issues along a similar line. The precautionary principle, for example, departs from some very well recognized definitions of precautionary principle as incorporated into the Rio Declaration, which refers to “cost-effective” actions. By removing that key phrase “cost-effective”’, we are opening the floodgates, if you will, to pre-emptive strikes against development, which will potentially grind them to a halt, because there will be no reference to acting in a cost-effective way. Any cost will be insufficient in relation to the damage that is referred to.
Under the principle of environmental justice, today we've seen that we are now proceeding in a manner that will permit an asymmetrical application of this act across the country, and we did that with little or no discussion of the implications.
We're out of time, are we?