Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just start by saying that I do understand the point you've raised, and I do have some sympathy for the points you've raised, especially in the identification of pedophiles, etc. I'm trying to go beyond that, though, to explore what PIPEDA means to the RCMP in the context of, let's say, terrorist investigations, where it may be CSIS or the RCMP.
Under PIPEDA—and Mr. Stanton is correct in the chapter and verse that he cited—information collected by a private sector organization in secret, and without any constraints other than that the organization has suspicion that something is going on, that information could well be handed over to the RCMP and form the basis of a charge. Wouldn't that fit under the rubric of tainted evidence, if the information was garnered in a way that violated the individual's expectation of privacy, because he had a relationship with that company, maybe even a contractual relationship that guaranteed him the right to privacy that information wouldn't be used?
To me it opens the door, because private sector organizations don't operate under the same legal obligations as law enforcement and national security. You would have to have reasonable grounds to suspect something illegal was going on. They—the language used here—are “suspect”. So if your boss has a suspicion that you have something in your locker, that's all he needs to go on. You need something greater than that, reasonable grounds. I think that it's a slippery slope to tainted evidence, leading to possibly righteous convictions, but from a tainted evidence source.