Thank you very much.
We have tabled a document that we hope is helpful. I'd like to remind the members that we have no pretensions that this is the definitive take on the Privacy Act, nor on the problems of Canadians' information rights. This is a very contextual document. It's meant to suggest some very needed and more easily made changes to a document that now dates from 1982. Throughout the world, it is one of the few information rights laws that has not been modified. So in the group of democratic nations--for example, the U.K., Australia, and so on--we find that our public Privacy Act is now very dated.
I'll go through these recommendations and try to indicate to you the implications of each of them. The first one:
Parliament should create a requirement in the Privacy Act for government departments to demonstrate the need for collecting personal information.This “necessity test” is already included in Treasury Board policies as well as PIPEDA. It is an internationally recognized privacy principle found in modern privacy legislation around the world.
Here we're behind our own most recent standard that this House voted on in PIPEDA.
The second one states:
The role of the Federal Court should be broadened to allow it to review all grounds under the Privacy Act, not just denial of access.
That is, people have the right to see what is in their file. That is the only right they have under the current Privacy Act. They have no right of correction. They have no right to ask that it be modified. They have no right to go to the Federal Court if this information is incorrect, if it's incorrectly released. This was discussed in the case of Murdoch v. Murdoch, which was discussed in this committee. This again is unusual in modern privacy legislation, and much below the PIPEDA standard.
The third one simply enshrines into law the current practice that, according to Treasury Board directives, deputy heads are supposed to carry out a privacy impact assessment before a new program or policy is implemented. The most public example of that is the no-fly program.
We can notionally group together sections 4, 5, and 6, because they're already in practice to some extent and are internal to the workings of the government. I don't think they're things that should cause huge debate. One is a public education mandate, which one of the honourable members asked about. We don't have this mandate. Again we have it in PIPEDA. So in budgetary terms, we are not formally given money to do public education on the do-not-fly program, for example, which many Canadians are concerned about. We are spending money, because you'll see something on our website about the do-not-fly program, but that's not the ideal situation.
Number five is the need for increased flexibility for me to report to the public and to Parliament about privacy management practices. I function in a very secretive way. I report to Parliament and make my findings public once a year, and then unusually in a special report. I first made use of the special report in February about the RCMP's exempt banks. But in the world of information management now, you may have gone through several generations of technology. If you wait to report to Parliament until 18 months after something has happened, Parliament may be breaking up for the summer when you report it. So this is something that should not be difficult to fix, and it would allow me greater flexibility in bringing things to public attention and to Parliament's attention.
Number seven is a housekeeping affair. Once again we're below the level of definition of information that is already consecrated in PIPEDA. This is important because it doesn't explicitly cover DNA samples. As you know, the government is increasingly moving into the use of DNA for crime-fighting purposes.