Mr. Chair, the Arar commission report illustrated the risks and complexities associated with intelligence-gathering by law enforcement agencies, the sharing of data between different agencies within Canada and abroad, and the great harm that can arise when the system fails. What is now referred to as intelligence-led policing has a potential to result in a vast amount of information being collected, not all of which is verified or even verifiable as to its accuracy.
It is our position that the existing statutory framework lacks a mechanism for effective and ongoing oversight by the Canadian government and its institutions in relation to transborder data-sharing. The existing statutory framework also does not provide an adequate mechanism for assuring compliance and accountability.
In our view, effective ongoing oversight should be mandatory, given the enormous trust that is placed in and the power that is accorded to government and its institutions in relation to law enforcement and data-sharing.
The reasons for this oversight include the following: that an individual will have no opportunity to know when a law enforcement agency has collected data about the individual; if the data has been collected, the individual will have no opportunity to learn what the data is or whether it's accurate; an individual will have no opportunity to know if data has been shared with a foreign government or institution, and if so, what foreign government or institution the data's been shared with; an individual will have no opportunity to know the uses for which the data will be used by a foreign government or institution; an individual will have no opportunity to know if the foreign government or institution will have shared the data with other governments or institutions; an individual will have no way of knowing whether the foreign government or institution that has received data will comply with any terms or arrangement under which the data was transferred by the Government of Canada; and the data may be used by a foreign government or institution in a manner or for a purpose that significantly jeopardizes the individual, the individual's family, or friends.
Further, even if an individual knows that a foreign government or institution has breached the terms of an arrangement under which the data was shared—and it is virtually impossible to know whether that is so—the individual is left with basically no recourse or remedy.
It's for that reason that the CBA has recommended what is set out on pages 18 and 19 of our brief, and in particular that:
arrangements for disclosing personal information to a foreign government be written, formal, detailed, and public; arrangements with foreign governments or institutions that do not respect the fundamental principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law be very carefully considered; and a full record be made of all personal information disclosed...and the arrangement under which it is disclosed and the purposes....
In summary, it is our position that the present scheme lacks a sufficient or effective mechanism for accountability. We fully recognize—and I understand that Chief Superintendent Paulson has testified before this committee—the needs of law enforcement, the complexities of an effective law enforcement. But we urge, despite those needs and complexities, that the rule of law be maintained and upheld, and that is done through an effective mechanism of accountability.
Thank you.