I'd now like to briefly describe our recommendations to the committee.
Our first recommendation is to amend the act's enforcement powers. During her December 13 appearance, the Commissioner of Lobbying requested that Parliament grant the office additional powers to include an administrative monetary penalty mechanism, the AMP. We recommend that the Commissioner of Lobbying be granted this increased enforcement power, as long as the office identifies and follows judicious due process and the rules are exercised consistently. All registered lobbyists should be held to the same standard.
Our second recommendation is to delete the designated public office holder carve-out, which has been a consistent theme throughout your hearings. In-house corporate lobbyists affected by the five-year Federal Accountability Act ban are allowed to lobby if they self-determine that they lobby no more than 20% of their time. In our view, this creates confusion for corporations, for organizations, for consultant lobbyists, and frankly, for members of Parliament. Going forward, we recommend that the act be amended to remove the significant part of the duties test for former designated public office holders, thereby clarifying that they could not lobby for the five-year period, as applied to all other designated public office holders.
Our third recommendation is to clarify the treatment of corporate board members. External officers of a corporation who are members of a board of directors are treated as consultant lobbyists. We recommend that Parliament clarify the treatment of outside directors on commercial boards. They receive remuneration, and some, as part of board responsibilities, are asked to communicate with government in one of the prescribed forms of activity. The outside board members, in our view, should be treated as part of the corporation. This change would align with current corporate governance procedures and disclosure.
Our fourth recommendation is to delete the requirement for monthly communication reports. In our brief, we point out that, while disclosure and transparency are common objectives for governments in the U.S., the EU, and the U.K., no other jurisdiction requires monthly communication reports. Our brief demonstrates that the monthly OCL communication report is a secondary report that provides no further clarity on the issue or the subject matter than originally identified in the primary registration. In the interest of transparency and efficiency, we recommend that registered lobbyists be required to update the primary return on a quarterly basis to include who they meet with. This recommendation is more consistent with the accepted norms of commercial confidentiality.
Our fifth recommendation is to affirm registered lobbyists' ability to engage in volunteer political activity. The ability for registered lobbyists to freely participate in political campaigns should be, in our view, clear and unequivocal. Our brief shows that the U.K., the EU, and the U.S. treat lobbying and volunteer political activity very differently from how Canada treats them. Furthermore, unlike the U.S., Canada prohibits corporate donations. We propose that the OCL's Lobbyists' Code of Conduct reflect the same principles found in the Public Service Employment Act, which allows public servants to participate in the political process, similar to all other Canadians.
In conclusion, we believe, in terms of transparency and disclosure, that Canada's Lobbying Act has stronger provisions than other jurisdictions we work in, and that adjustments are required. We believe our suggested approach—which closes loopholes, provides for greater powers of enforcement, and moves to a quarterly update of registrations— will maintain that transparency, provide consistency, and ultimately strengthen Canada's Lobbying Act.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
We look forward to the discussion with committee members.