Mr. Chair, thank you to the committee for inviting the Canadian Human Rights Commission to contribute to your study on the growing problem of identity theft and its economic impact.
I would like to introduce my colleague, Maciej Karpinski, senior research analyst with the commission's protection branch.
Today, I would like to touch upon three main points. First, I will briefly talk about the Canadian Human Rights Commission and how we promote and protect human rights, and ensure equal opportunity for Canadians. Second, I will discuss the commission's 2010 report on identity certification and the importance of ensuring that measures used to certify a person's identity comply with human rights principles. Finally, I will share with you our recommendations on how to avoid being discriminatory in this area.
I will begin with a short description of the commission and its mandate.
We are mandated by Parliament to administer the Canadian Human Rights Act and monitor compliance of federal organizations with the Employment Equity Act.
We receive discrimination complaints regarding employment and services provided by organizations under federal jurisdiction. This includes the federal public sector, as well as private sector companies involved in industries such as transportation, telecommunications and banking.
We also participate in major human rights cases before tribunals and courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada.
The commission works to prevent discrimination and promote the development of sustainable human rights cultures. We do this by providing organizations with research, policies and tools to promote understanding of and compliance with the Canadian Human Rights Act.
One of these tools is the Human Rights Impact Assessment for Security Measures, which I will touch upon later in my remarks.
The report you have asked us to speak about today was published in 2010. It was part of a research initiative related to national security and human rights. Our objective then was to help national security organizations strengthen their identity certification practices in a way that respects human rights principles.
While our report focused on national security organizations, its conclusions, we believe, are relevant for any public or private organization that offers services for which identity information is required. We therefore hope that the information contained in this report will be of assistance to the work of this committee.
Our report demonstrates that the most common forms of identity certification tools used are at risk of being discriminatory based on the prohibited grounds of discrimination set out in the Canadian Human Rights Act. And that is for two reasons.
First, the method may be inaccessible to an individual or a group of individuals. Second, discretionary decisions rendered by officers in validating identities may lead to discrimination.
Our report has shown that there are two main types of metric systems used for identity purposes. The first is uni-modal, which is using just one metric of identity information, and the second is multi-modal, which is using a combination of two or more metrics.
For example, a uni-modal system might rely exclusively on fingerprints. This may be inaccessible to people who do not have fingers or whose fingerprints have been affected by their working conditions and/or their age. By contrast our study found that multi-modal biometric systems offer a degree of inclusiveness that can often address the limitations of uni-modal systems. Multi-modal systems not only have the capacity to help protect human rights, but also have the ability to build a stronger and more trustworthy security system.
At the time of the review, the personal identity certifier card in the United States was identified as an effective multi-modal system. This card stores both fingerprints and facial-scanned biometrics for each enrolled federal employee or contractor. Though it primarily uses fingerprint biometrics, digital facial imaging is used when it is not possible for a federal employee or contractor to provide fingerprints, or if there is an anomaly.
In dealing with these important issues, human rights law provides guidance for determining whether an otherwise discriminatory measure can be justified. This includes looking at: first, the extent to which the measure is necessary; second, whether there are less discriminatory ways of achieving the same objective; and third, the extent to which the infringement on human rights outweighs the benefits gained by the measure.
Situations may also arise where users may require an exemption. Policies and practices to reasonably accommodate these individuals should therefore be included as part of the development of any measure. Should there be no reasonable alternative for a given biometric, it is up to the organization employing the biometric to demonstrate that sufficient measures have been taken to explore other less discriminatory ways of achieving similar results.
Based on these principles, we developed the human rights impact assessment for security measures. This tool outlines the steps to take during a security measure's life cycle to ensure that security standards, policies, and practices are both effective and respectful of human rights.
We believe that by applying a human rights impact assessment before a security measure is finalized, we can not only improve a security measure's effectiveness and efficiency, but also save time and money while bolstering public support for new and existing security initiatives.
That is what we mean when we call on organizations to apply a human rights lens to a proposed policy or procedure.
Thank you for your attention. We'd be happy to take your questions.