I'll start off first with data-driven mergers. Let's say that Facebook were to acquire IAC, which is the largest dating platform. It has Match.com and the like. Under the competition authority, you would look at that. It's not necessarily a horizontal merger, because they don't directly compete. It's not a vertical merger, because it's not like a supplier, manufacturer or distribution chain, and it's not really a conglomerate merger, although you argue that maybe Facebook might be a perceived potential entrant. Under that, you wouldn't really have any antitrust significance, but now the issue is whether the acquisition of that data will help Facebook attain or maintain its dominance in other markets. That's one issue.
How do you assess these data-driven mergers, and how do you assess whether or not Google is even dominant or has monopoly power when you're relying largely on these small but significant non-transitory increases in price standards? You have very much price-centric tools to assess dominance....