Thank you very much for the invitation.
My office provides independent oversight and enforcement over B.C.'s access and privacy laws. The enforcement and oversight extends to over 2,900 public bodies, including ministries, local governments, schools, crown corporations, hospitals, municipal police forces, and more. They're subject to B.C.'s public sector privacy law, the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act or FIPPA.
It extends to over 380,000 private sector organizations, including businesses, charities, associations, trade unions, trusts, and more that are subject to B.C.'s Personal Information Protection Act or PIPA.
Today I am going to focus my comments on three areas that are part of the deliberations of this committee to which the B.C. experience may be informative: commissioners order-making powers, an explicit obligation to safeguard personal information, and mandatory breach notification. Under order-making power and mediation and consultation, in British Columbia the mandate of the office includes the promotion of access and privacy rights, public education, advice to public bodies and businesses, investigation of complaints, mediation, and independent adjudication. These functions are complementary, and in my opinion, best delivered under one roof. It would be extremely difficult for another administrative tribunal or court to attain the same level of expertise and provide for efficient and timely resolutions for citizens.
Privacy and access to information issues are dynamic in the modern digital world. It's in the interests of organizations, individuals, and public bodies that the individuals making legal and binding decisions have the requisite skills and up-to-date knowledge about what is happening on the ground. Having the responsibility for adjudication plus advocacy, education, and investigation ensures the necessary expertise in the law. Our adjudicators receive the same technical training and professional development as our investigators, and are routinely exposed to new technologies, emerging ideas, and global trends affecting privacy and access to information law.
Combining the investigation and adjudication into one office provides clear benefits to citizens. Combining those provides one-stop shopping for citizens. This clarity and convenience is important. There is no confusion about which oversight agency or tribunal citizens need to direct their complaint to. They need merely to address our office. Citizens don't feel as though they are caught in or bounced around an unnecessarily bureaucratic system.
We have not found that the public education or the advisory functions of a commissioner pose a risk of undermining the adjudicative function. We do take steps to protect the integrity of the adjudication process. For example, no information about investigative files or attempts at informal resolution are ever disclosed to the adjudicators. The adjudicators do not report to the same supervisor, and they are not located on the same floor as the investigators.
When providing the public with advice and consultation, we clarify that our view is based on the information provided at the time, and that it is not binding on the commissioner with respect to making a formal finding in the event that we receive a future complaint.
In our consultations, we communicate about general principles and recommend best practices without prejudging individual cases. We are able to perform these various roles effectively because our legislation also explicitly gives us these powers and spells them out in detail.
Adjudication enhances our ability to resolve issues through mediation. The adjudicative function lends greater authority to our investigators by focusing the minds of the parties, and it provides an incentive to both parties to avoid formal adjudication. As a result, we resolve 90% of our complaints and reviews in mediation. In the last year we had 1,056 complaints and requests for review, of which only 109 went to inquiry. Of those that went to inquiry, only a little over 1% were judicially reviewed.
The fact that we have public education and advisory functions, complemented by investigative powers, with the ultimate ability to order compliance through our adjudicative function, gives us a level of authority that can influence the public and the government. Without that complete suite of functions, we would not have that same level of influence.
B.C.'s public sector privacy law has an explicit requirement for public bodies to safeguard personal information. We consider this legislative requirement as being fundamental to a public body's responsibility for the personal information it collects from citizens. Given the negative repercussions that can occur to citizens in the event of a breach of their personal information, it's almost unbelievable that a privacy protection statute would not incorporate this requirement.
Section 30 of our act states:
a public body must protect personal information by making reasonable security arrangements against such risks as unauthorized access, collection, use, disclosure or disposal.
Citizens rely on this section and expect that a public body is taking adequate measures to protect their personal information. It's the legislative requirement in most jurisdictions across Canada and internationally. Having this requirement in legislation is important from the perspective of public trust, as a clear and binding requirement on public bodies. It indicates the importance that governments place on this requirement.
While B.C.'s legislation does not explicitly address physical, organizational, and technological measures commensurate with the sensitivity of the data, our office has set out similar expectations in investigation reports and orders. In my view, placing this language explicitly in the legislation would be consistent with international standards regarding the protection of personal information.
Also, we have been clear that, as our province's regulator, we evaluate “reasonable security arrangements” on an objective basis, and that the determination of what is reasonable is contextual. The standard is not one of perfection but varies based on the sensitivity and the amount of personal information in question.
On breach notification, a privacy breach occurs when there is unauthorized access, collection, use, or disclosure of personal information. It is unauthorized if it occurs in contravention of one of our privacy laws. An important element of safeguarding personal information is ensuring that the privacy commissioner and affected individuals are notified when a privacy breach occurs.
Privacy breaches can carry significant costs. They put individuals at risk for identity theft and serious financial or reputational harms. They can also result in a loss of dignity and a loss of confidence in public bodies. We trust public bodies with some of our most sensitive and comprehensive personal information: social security records, tax data, health information, financial information, and the list goes on. We have no choice but to provide that information to the public bodies.
It seems every week that privacy breaches are reported in the media. We hear about laptops and portable storage devices being lost or stolen, human error resulting in disclosure, unauthorized access, or snooping as well as cyber-attacks.
Breach reporting in B.C. is currently voluntary in both the private and public sector. However, my office has recommended that it be made a mandatory requirement, and let me explain why. In British Columbia, we examined the government's privacy breach management process and we published those results in 2015. We learned that nearly 3,000 breaches were reported to government during the period of 2010 to 2013, but only 30 of those had been reported to my office. This told us that, under a voluntary reporting requirement, my office was receiving reports of only about 1% of all the breaches that occur within government ministries. Of those, the majority, 72%, were classified as “administrative errors”. The breakdown of other types of breaches included unauthorized disclosures at 16%, lost or stolen at 4%, unauthorized access at 3%, and cyber-attacks or phishing at less than 1%.
It shows that it's important to set out a clear threshold where notification must occur. We don't want to hear about every breach, but we need to know about the important ones. In B.C., we have recommended that the threshold be where the breach would be reasonably expected to cause harm to an individual, or where the breach involves a large number of individuals.
Mandatory breach reporting to a privacy commissioner also means that the commissioner's office can work with public bodies to learn from their mistakes and implement lasting preventative strategies. Mandatory breach notification also ensures that affected individuals are made aware of breaches without unreasonable delay, so they can take the important steps to protect themselves.
For these reasons, my office has recommended to the legislative committees reviewing B.C.'s privacy statutes that mandatory breach notification be added as a requirement. Both of these committees agreed and recommended in their final reports that the privacy laws for the public and the private sectors be amended to require breach notification to the commissioner and to affected individuals in the event of a privacy breach. The B.C. government has stated that it is committed to addressing mandatory breach notification at the next available legislative opportunity.
The federal Bill S-4 added breach notification requirements to Canada's private sector privacy law, and it is difficult for me to understand why the government would not hold itself to the same standard as it holds the private sector.
That concludes my remarks.