If people can hear me, I wouldn't mind quickly addressing that and one other point that was raised.
The concern would be paragraph 2(i), where if your constituent is doing an activity that takes place in Canada and undermines the security of another state, even a repressive state, there is a possibility that the information not only will be shared, but if you look at section 5, the criteria is relevance to, among other things, detection and prevention.
One of the concerns about relevance is that it allows data mining. That relevance to detection and prevention can include a vast range of information that on its own may be innocuous, but when combined with more information that is available through computer data banks can reveal quite a bit.
The last thing I would say goes back to what my colleagues have talked about, the importance of review. I think it's very important for this committee not to just look at this act in isolation. The absence of credible review for all of the institutions, combined with the fact that the government appears in the green paper to at least be seriously considering getting more data from metadata and other things feeds into what I would say is a justifiable lack of confidence that many Canadians have about how this information, once it is collected by one part of government, is going to be shared, stored, and accessed by other parts of government.