Sure, and I'll try to keep my remarks on this brief.
In terms of your question about intention as being too high a standard, I tend to agree with that. If we hold the standard of proof so high—and those kinds of things are difficult to make out—if we take it almost to a level of a criminal standard, and we know criminal standards to be higher.... Mr. Young, I think rhetorically, asked the question, if it's not an intentional standard, what would it be? I would suggest that in the same way that the general approach to the reasonable expectation of privacy is an objective standard based on notions of reasonableness, and we have a whole area of private law that regulates harms to people on the basis of reasonable foreseeability and other aspects of an objective standard, we could certainly come to find some level of fault-finding that isn't at the level of intent in the way that you're suggesting.